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Introduction
In the last twenty years, Latin American countries have undergone many changes at
economic, social, and political levels. All of them have made tremendous efforts to
re-create themselves as modern, democratic, and prosperous countries. In the
economic sense, programmes have been implemented for economic restructuring,
with the liberalization and privatization of state-owned utilities and enterprises as
anchor components. Regional trade organizations – such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the South American Common Market
(MERCOSUR) – flourish, expanding the markets for local products and bringing
new forms of competition, cooperation, and trade. At the political level, democratic
systems have become consolidated as the preferred system, and democratic
representation has been improved, since citizens can elect their most direct public
servants at the municipal level. These changes are being implemented in the context
of a major state reform strategy throughout the Latin American region – with some
variations between the different countries. The changes are being supported by
international finance and development agencies, including the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and The World
Bank (WB). 
All this change is happening in a continent that is eminently urban; that it to say, the
developments and transformations in Latin American are taking place
predominantly in the cities. These changes have not only the urban space as their
direct territory, but also the construction of social, economic, and political
relationships in the city. The city is the focus of this study, because this is the spatial
unit where major changes take place under these reform regimes. On the one hand,
analysts of the processes of economic and political reform deplore the lack in these
processes of a territorial dimension (the fitting of reform to levels of territorial
government) that could equip cities and regions with institutional structures
(governments, coalitions, procedures, coordination agreements) capable of
responding better to these changes and could facilitate economic growth. On the
other hand, some authors see the incorporation of state reform, economic reform,
and growing citizen participation as the background of a process of re-
territorialization1 of the state that has the city as its most important territory
(Brenner, 1998). 
This study is about metropolitan government and its relevance in Latin American
urban areas. The basis of the study is a general consideration of metropolitan areas and
metropolitan government, metropolitan coordination, and metropolitan governance
(see chapter 2), and on the conditions in which large cities in Latin America move
towards problems of government coordination on a metropolitan scale.
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1
1.1 Metropolitan areas and arrangements of metropolitan government 
In most parts of the urbanized world, public and urban management most capable
of delivering public goods and services is a matter of current debate. Importantly,
this discussion extends to government structures, the roles of private actors in the
provision of public services, democracy and representation, and government
accountability. In the urbanized areas, these discussions have passed the point of
identifying and analysing the traditional three levels of state government (central,
regional, local), and allocating different combinations of tasks and responsibilities
coverage among them. Basically, the contemporary city is considered as participating
in a global competitive environment (Knox and Taylor, 1995; Sassen, 1994), and
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governments intervene seeking to support effectively the competitive position of
their cities in these global environments (Newman, 2000). The geographical scale of
intervention is crucial, and most government arrangements to provide an effective
response are on a metropolitan scale. As a result, these arrangements lead to a need
to simplify and amplify coordination of the different government levels and
agencies, and to range from informal cooperation to government structures on a
broad scale (Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000). Lefèvre (1998, p. 10) states: “the main
argument in favour of the constitution of metropolitan governments has long been
based on the need to make the urban institutional system correspond to the
economic and social development of cities.” However, the political aspects of
creating a government, or quasi-government, institution at metropolitan level have
been more difficult to resolve. Consequently, there have been various approaches to
metropolitan arrangements, and establishing them with the same historical
endurance as central, regional, and local government has been difficult.
As a result of these trends, the contemporary western city is approaching forms of
government coordination that are metropolitan in scale, or is experimenting with
such arrangements. Although different cities tend to have different arrangements,
and the models or forms of metropolitan coordination are difficult to classify,
coordination at metropolitan level can be said to be part of the institutional profile of
a major city in the western world. A considerable number of cities have metropolitan
governments or arrangements allowing metropolitan coordination: in Italy, the cities
of Bologna, Rome, Turin, Genoa, and Venice, for example. In Germany, there is the
regional community of Stuttgart. In Spain, various types of structure have been
established, serving Greater Barcelona, Greater Madrid, and Greater Valencia. In
Canada, there has been long experience in Toronto, with its “Metro” institution. In
the United States, the configuration of the Metropolitan Planning Organization
(MPO) is the building block for further consolidation of metropolitan arrangements,
and in such cases as Minneapolis- St Paul there is a relatively long tradition of
metropolitan coordination (Lefèvre, 1998). In the Netherlands, the debate about city-
regions and the further development of the Randstad-Holland are also tinted with
the recognition of the need for a larger geographical scale for government
structures.
1.2 The Latin American situation
In Latin America, cities do not usually have government institutions on the
appropriate metropolitan scale, but one can also observe a tendency in this region
towards the re-territorialization of government and the emergence of a metropolitan
city and a metropolitan scale of government arrangements. These trends occur in
the context of high urbanization rates (see figure 1.2), urban primacy2 (IADB, 2000),
and the formation of stronger regional and local government as a result of
decentralization (Burki, 1998; Gilbert, 1994; IADB, 1997; Iracheta, 1995;
Jungemann, 1996; Lungo, 1994). The trends have contributed to the drive towards
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the establishment and proliferation of local governments (municipalities, counties,
districts, intendencias, etc.).
As figure 1.2 shows, the majority of Latin American countries have 60% or more of their
population living in urban areas: one set of countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) shows high rates of urban population; the less
urbanized countries (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay) have
undergone a tremendous leap towards higher rates of urban population over the last 20
years. The average urban population rate for the region has changed from 65% in 1980
to 75% in 1999, which shows a tendency towards urbanization and a similarity to the
average urbanization for high-income countries of 77% in 1999 (World Bank, 2000). Not
only is the region becoming more urbanized; the urban population is becoming
increasingly concentrated in a few metropolitan areas. Urban concentration (primacy)
ranges from around 15% in Brazil to more than 65% in Panama (IADB, 2000). Urban
concentration is high in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and most
Central-American countries (Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala
and Panama).
Nevertheless, average growth has reduced from 2% in the decade 1980-1990 to 1.7%
in 1990-1999, which some analysts perceive as a relief in the demographic pressure
in general but, when considered in combination with the growth of the urban
population, is regarded as a metropolitanization pattern (Dockemdorf et al, 2000;
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Figure 1.2 - Urban population (as a percentage of the total) in Latin American countries in
1980 and 1999. Source: World Bank, 200
Dowall and Treffeisen, 1991; Gilbert, 1994) or even, in certain regions with clusters
of large cities, as a sign of a megalopolization trend (Iracheta, 1997) (Mexico City-
Guadalajara-Puebla in Mexico, Sao Paolo and its hinterland in Brazil).
Another feature evolving from the late 1980s onwards is that political
decentralization has not been resolved, or has even produced coordination problems
at multiple levels of government. The proliferation of regional and local authorities,
the redefinition of their tasks, the establishment of intergovernmental relationships,
the definitions of responsibilities, and the issue of fiscal decentralization, have
created an environment of interlocking and overlapping structures, where
coordination among governments is difficult and costly. 
Large cities (above 1 million inhabitants) are frequently governed by several
municipal authorities without any real coordination. This deficiency becomes
apparent in the management and output of public services, such as urban
transportation, water supply, solid waste disposal, the police, and so forth. In
Caracas, for example, different police forces are attached to different municipalities
and operate without sharing records, procedures, or programmes. In Monterrey, all
bus routes operating in the city ride to the centre; a transfer between routes makes a
first trip to the centre obligatory, with all the cost and time inefficiency that that
entails. However, this situation of uncoordinated action coexists with the delivery of
some services that do have a metropolitan management. In Monterrey, the chaotic
transfer system of bus operations coexists with a metro system of advanced
technology and high efficiency operating at the metropolitan level under one
management regime. 
A similar situation of lack of coordination may also be observed in the urban
physical planning. Urban planners and researchers have expressed concern over this
fragmentation; in the process of decentralization and liberalization, the dismantling
of central government planning offices (Boisier, 1997; Garza, 1999; Palacios, 1993),
and the ambition of sub-national governments to develop their own policies have
undermined the role of the government in urban physical planning. In many cities
in Latin America, urban physical planning is dispersed, producing fundamental
contradictions in actual planning outcomes. A small municipality within a large
metropolitan area could develop a vision of being a tourist centre, while the
neighbouring municipality may assert that its main interest is to establish itself as
an industrial park. The boundary between the two may be just a street, a stream, or a
hill undergoing the process of urban sprawl. It is understandable that municipalities
are eager to implement housing programmes for their middle and upper class
residents and at the same time are tardy in accepting their share of responsibility for
low-income housing. There are some cities, however, where low-income housing
completely escapes planning control and widespread substandard squatting ensues,
with unclear land and property ownership (Hoshino, 1995). 
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Expressions of the inequality and segregation that a fragmented and uncoordinated
large city government evoke range from Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) effects to
gated communities and income disparities (Batley, 1997; Lèfevre, 1998; McGill,
1998). Further dangers of such inequality become manifest when collective goods
are only available to a few, where water is only accessible to the affluent, road
infrastructure benefits car owners, solid waste collection is sporadic and
unpredictable in poor neighbourhoods and regular and punctual in the prosperous
areas. Hoshino (1994) provides plenty of evidence of the difficult conditions of
housing for the poor in Latin American cities, where favelas and barrios have
become the responsibility of their communities and corresponding municipal
governments. Some municipalities are locked into a spiral of low revenues and lack
of capacity to deliver urban services, while resources abound in other municipalities
in the same city, where wealthy, gated communities come as no surprise. Similarly,
Bennett (1995) found that, despite the chronic shortage and inefficient management
becoming a political issue, water provision in Monterrey at least had the advantage
of being a service under one authority for the whole city, which avoided the
problems found elsewhere of coordinating this service. Latin American cities
frequently display uncontrolled negative spatial externalities, where the
environmental consequences of dumping solid waste, degrading river basins, and
urban expansion have an impact on a large geographical scale. This scale is not
matched by that of the institutions responsible for dealing with these environmental
impacts; these institutions tend to have limited authority and restrictive
administrative boundaries.
In many of these cities, government functions on multiple geographical scales. The
interlocking connection, coordination, and aggregation of public action are chaotic,
fragmented, dispersed, contradictory, and on occasion redundant. This deplorable
situation is rarely translated into a public political issue, although the major
problems of the city are directly related to the questions of scale. These may concern
geographical scale, metropolitan scale, or economy of scale.
Nevertheless, these large cities remain the hope of many of their countries; these
cities are positioned at the interception of global interactions and national dynamics.
They have places of quality that are unmatched in the smaller cities in the same
country. Some parts of these large cities have a high quality of life in terms of access
to services, telecommunications capacity, infrastructure, cultural amenities,
knowledge production, education, markets, and social contacts. These elements
form the core of the attractiveness and resilience of these places and define them as
global cities. A global city characteristic invariably found in these cities comprises a
large number of transnational headquarters or subsidiaries, the offices of
international law firms, international airline traffic, and high volumes of
telecommunications traffic (Beaverstock et al, 1998; Friedmann, 1986; Ingram,
1997; Knox and Taylor, 1995; Sassen, 1994). Follow-up research by Taylor (1999,
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2000) reports that, according to the survey and classification undertaken by
Beaverstock and colleagues (1998), Latin America can claim two beta world cities –
Mexico City and Sao Paolo; three gamma world cities – Caracas, Santiago and
Buenos Aires; together with evidence of world city formation in Rio de Janeiro,
Bogota Montevideo, Brasilia and Tijuana3. 
The largest Latin-American cities – Mexico City, with 20 million inhabitants, Buenos
Aires, Santiago, Montevideo, and Caracas – are typical capital cities and primate
agglomerations in their respective countries. Monterrey, Medellín, Cordoba, Santa
Cruz, are secondary cities, but growing in population, trade, and independence.
These cities are positioned in between global expectations and local problems. From
the time of the conquest to the present day, Latin America has been the practice
ground for urban form innovation and experiment, from the foundation rules of Las
Leyes de Indias4 to the modern experiments of Brasilia and Ciudad Guayana.
All these cities have, in one way or another, a government in the process of
restructuring. They are caught between the developments of re-inventing
government, with an array of such principles as decentralization, devolution, public
choice, effectiveness, efficiency, and representativeness and increased democracy.
These are cities where local authorities have emerged as strong actors in their
political and administrative roles, where intergovernmental relations have developed
(or are known to be needed), and where power relationships and responsibility
sharing extend to the civic society, private sector, and community organizations
(Rojas, 2000). These processes occur not only through internal political dynamics,
but also because international agencies (Inter American Development Bank, World
Bank) have identified the city and the metropolis as the specific and effective
territory of action. These agencies exert pressure for citywide institutions for the
application of their programmes or access to finance in the receiving countries
(IADB, 1998). 
This dissertation commences with these processes of constant re-articulation5 and
rearrangement of government institutions in the city. The issue of organizing effective
city government has not been addressed effectively in past decades, and is only now
emerging as a priority question within the process of reform in Latin America
(Garza, 1996b; Jungemann, 1996). It is as though the reform programme, with its
emphasis on macro-economic restructuring and state reform, has only recently
found the territorial issue in its way. To move forward, these processes have to be
reinforced and supported by a better understanding of the spatial and geographical
issues of reform
An underlying assumption in the dissertation is the belief that the fragmentation of
governments and public action has a limit beyond which cities are incapable of
functioning well. A further underlying belief is that this is the moment when
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fragmentation needs to be addressed and reversed. The objective here is to assess
the critical need for urban government structures with a metropolitan reach (this is
further discussed in chapter 2). The main question addressed is whether the Latin
American city, immersed in processes of political and governmental reform, can
come to a form of government that is less fragmented and is effective for a
geographical territory of continuous conurbation). This general question is
operationalized into more precise research questions reported in the second chapter.
1.3 Structure of the dissertation
Following these introductory remarks, and in accordance with the expressed
interests of this study, the research was designed to inform a discussion about
metropolitan governments, incorporating within this discussion the findings and
conclusions from investigations undertaken in certain Latin American cities. The
outline for the rest of the research is as follows: 
Chapter 2, The Metropolitan Question, contains an examination of the background
issues of and a review of the literature on the subject, together with a specification of
the research questions set against this background. In the second part of this chapter
the methodological aspects of the research are discussed. The arguments for
selecting the cities of the case studies (Caracas and Monterrey) and the narrowing of
the analysis on certain urban public functions are also discussed. These arguments
on methodology and case studies provide the background for the definition of the
focus of the research. This chapter also provides the justification for the titles and
content of the four analysis chapters (4 to 7). 
In Chapter 3, Metropolitan areas in Latin America and their Government, the
characteristics are described of the selected cities: Caracas and Monterrey. The
descriptions take the form of city profiles, with special emphasis on geographical
and territorial issues of scale, government institutions, and urban management.
These profiles also make clear how these cities have become immersed in the more
general transformations that have taken place in Latin American countries and their
governments.
The topic of Chapter 4, Caracas: Physical planning, is the analysis of the mtropolitan
urban public function of physical planning in Caracas according to the methodology
presented in chapter 2. The elements at stake here are the tendencies twards
integration of policy, coordination, and the emerging forms of public management
organizations or structures for this urban public function. The correspondence of
these efforts with a territorial scale (in this case metropolitan) and the implication
are evaluated, and basic conclusions for the case study drawn are reported. 
In Chapter 5, Caracas: Urban public Transport, the results are reported of the analysis
of the function of urban public transport in Caracas. Again, the different forms of
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delivery for this function in the city are analysed against the metropolitan scale. The
basic conclusions drawn with regard to the case study, metropolitan coordination
and possible arrangements are reported.
Chapter 6, Monterrey:Physical planning, is the first chapter containing an analysis of
Monterrey: the results of the research in this city regarding physical planning are
explained. As before, there are some conclusions drawn with respect to the case
study-city and function, with regard to the metropolitan scale. An analysis of the data
obtained in Monterrey provides the perspective for an appreciation of whether there
is a tendency towards metropolitan coordination in this function in the city. 
Chapter 7, Monterrey: Urban public transport, is the second and final analysis chapter
on Monterrey and features public transportation in the Mexican city and the
research issues: metropolitan scale, and coordination. Finally, the conclusions on
these issues for the case study are presented.
Chapter 8, Conclusions, recapitulates the original propositions of the research and
the research questions, which are then re-examined in the context of the major
findings of the research. The basic conclusions provided per case study in the
analysis chapters (4-7) are integrated into a concise argument for the general
conclusions of the study. These general observations and arguments are related to
the debates about urban government, re-territorialization, metropolitan government,
and governance. Finally, the development of metropolitan government in Latin
America is discussed in the light of the general and particular findings, and
expectations put forward concerning the major problems to be encountered on the
way towards metropolitan government. 
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Notes
1 According to Brenner (1998, p. 439), the production of state territorial organization, or 
government structures constituted by government institutions (central, regional, local), and
regulatory forms. These are currently being produced on both sub- and supranational scales.
He specifies that “the role of the national scale as a level of governance is itself being radically
redefined in response to the current round of capitalist globalization,” and that “this re-scaling
of state territorial organisation must be viewed as a constitutive, enabling moment of the
globalization process”.
2 According to Sassen (1994, p. 29), “Western European nations typically have been regarded as
a good example of balanced urban sytems; Latin-American nations, as a good examples of
systems with high levels of primacy – that is, inordinate concentrations of population and
major economic activities in one city, typically the national capital”.
3 Beaverstock et al (1998) produced a roster of world cities based on corporate service criteria; the
criteria include four elements: global service centres in accounting; global service centres in
advertising; global service centres in banking; global legal services; together with three levels of
service provision: prime, major, minor. The scores of level of service on each function are
compounded by city, and then classified into three classes: alpha cities (highest scores), beta
and gamma cities and a last group of cities where there is ‘evidence’ of world city formation
according to the system. 
4 Las Leyes de Indias were the set of laws and normatives issued by the Spanish crown to
organize the enterprise of the conquest of the new territories (1500-1700). They regulated a
wide area of topics, such as the Crown and Church authority, conquerors’ and settlers’ rights
and prerogatives, Indians’ rights, government structure. An important element of this set of
laws were those related to settlement foundation, which established the grid as the starting
scheme of territorial occupation, constituting an unit for land distribution (the block in the
grid), and which also defined spatial hierarchies and locations for church, crown and market.
5 In this study the term ‘re-acticulation’ is understood as the re-articulation of the state to the
changing development models, from import-substitution models to market liberalization. This
also implies changes for government institutions in the city: from supported locations through
protection ans subsidies as benefactors of ‘growth poles’ policies, to less protected locations by
way of the dismantling of this model and therefore the abolition of major protective structures
in the city. 
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The metropolitan question: 
literature and research focus 
This chapter comprises a review of current developments in the thinking about
metropolitan government and governance, which sets the framework for the
research. First comes a discussion of the rationale for metropolitan government,
including a critical review of the major concepts used in the literature. Second, the
obstacles to metropolitan arrangement are identified and explained. Third, the
characteristics of metropolitan arrangements in practice are specified. Finally, the
conclusions drawn from this review and the focus for the research are presented,
pointing out the main assumptions on which the research is based and specify the
research questions. This theoretical setting is used for the analysis of the case
studies below. 
2.1 Metropolitan Government
In this section, metropolitan government is defined in terms of the following
elements: the spatial issues, or metropolitan territory; the relationship between
metropolitan government and economic development. The relevant interpretation of the
concepts metropolitan government and metropolitan governance for this research is
discussed in the section: The governance question: a critique. 
2.1.1 The metropolitan territory
The scale of a city, whether defined in terms of a conurbation, functional urban
region, physical continuity, or natural basin, is referred to in this study as the
metropolitan scale. This term is less frequently translated into a level of government
or administration than are the national or local scales, but nevertheless the
metropolitan scale is often identified as the operative scale for many actions (master
plans, infrastructure plans, utilities provision) of the governments of cities (Negrón,
1996; Sharpe, 1995; Vallmitjana, 1997).
For several decades, supporters of metropolitan government have argued that the
functional dynamics of the city often extend beyond the administrative boundaries of
the metropolitan territory (Brenner, 1999; Lefèvre, 1998). For households, firms and
governments alike it is advantageous, at least from a theoretical point of view, if
certain urban public functions are organized under one authority that corresponds
better with the spatial dynamic of the metropolis (physical and strategic planning,
public transport, water provision, sewerage, environmental control). Indeed,
households and firms have taken the lead in pressing for a better form of
coordination at this level to ensure better infrastructure and better services, while
governments respond sporadically in terms of reaction and initiative. 
The rationale of metropolitan coordination is therefore described here as an issue
where geographical scale is of the utmost importance. Other aspects of urban
management play a part in supporting the logic of metropolitan coordination. Those
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aspects could be institutional effectiveness, management requirements, or political
interests, but coordination at the appropriate scale of the territory remains a solid
argument. In other words, intergovernmental coordination or metropolitan
arrangements for government coordination are desirable, but the match of these
arrangements to the territorial scale of the city is crucial. A territorial scale makes
government more effective, because it can handle negative externalities and exploit
economies of scale better than (fragmented) local governments. A government level
covering a metropolitan territory is therefore better able to deliver certain public
goods to the city’s residents and firms. If this delivery is fulfilled satisfactorily, the
competitive position of the city may improve in a globally integrated system, as may
the quality levels within the city (Simon, 1995). 
The demographic and economic weight of a metropolitan agglomeration is
recognized in the literature as a fundamental feature of metropolitan areas in
relation to global, national, and local scales (Barnes et al, 1998). Urban development
in western countries, Latin America, and Asia has resulted in large cities (World
Bank, 1998). Urban cycles of growth and decline take place at metropolitan level
(van den Berg, 1985). Cities have indeed experienced periods of crisis, as evidenced
by dereliction, economic slow-down, congestion, deconcentration, erosion of the tax
base, and so forth. But the centrality of the city does not disappear in the long run;
metropolises may fracture and atomize, to the detriment of the core or suburban
rings alike, but during urban cycles (urbanization, suburbanization, de-
suburbanization, re-urbanization) the metropolitan region remains the relevant
category. 
The metropolitan concept provides a useful framework for describing and analysing
modern urban growth, and is helpful in the interpretation of relationships between
old central cities and their territory or polynuclear agglomerations (Gottmann, 1995).
The patterns of metropolitan growth (Ingram, 1998) and the prospect of world
urbanization (Berghäll, 1996) support the view that the consolidation of megacities
and metropolises is a strong tendency, with attenuated growth in developed
countries and middle-income economies (World Bank, 1998). Throughout the
world, these large urban agglomerations (megacities and large cities) are multi-
municipal (Sivaramakrishnan, 1996). In relation to the local scale, Post (2000, p.
47) stresses that intergovernmental coordination is important in this context: “The
economic well-being of central cities and their suburbs is intertwined, and (that)
some form of regional cooperation is in the self-interest of both the central city and
its suburbs.” While urban growth is slowing down in Latin America (Berghäll, 1996;
Gilbert, 1994; Sassen, 1994), the pressure on large cities is being maintained,
indicating a growth in concentration toward big metropolises and megacities. 
Economic and social relationships are no longer bound only to the city centre, but
operate on a wider geographic scale. The dynamics and location of labour can
therefore be used as an important indicator for defining the metropolitan territory.
Different formulations of thresholds and relationships define inclusion within the
metropolitan region (van den Berg, 1985; Sharpe, 1995). Ratios of labour force
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participation in the core regions label a location as part of the metro-region; in this
way, the economic interdependence of the periphery and the core can be established
through the analysis of behaviour in the labour market and supply chains. This
approach is widely favoured in the literature (van den Berg, 1985; Morgan et al,
1999; Post, 2000). 
There are other indicators that can also be used for the definition of metropolitan
agglomerations; these include the areas covered by certain public services and the
“metropolitan” definitions used for statistical purposes. 
Firstly, the territories covered by public services are derived from considerations of
technical efficiency. These definitions of territory are often quite unrelated to those
of the administrative subdivisions. Transport systems, such as subways, or systems
for the provision of water, electricity, waste management, telephone and
communications, often cover a functional territory, which is effective in economic
terms, responding to standards of technical efficiency. Such a territory could serve as
a definition of a metropolitan territory. The presence of technical efficiency and an
optimal scale for service delivery is not automatically related to a matching of
institutional structures at the metropolitan level (a metropolitan water company
where there is no metropolitan political administration, for example). Nevertheless,
this is not the case for all public services; for some of those relevant functions,
management is at the metropolitan level. The supplier of water might work on the
metropolitan scale while, in the same city, public transport does not, although there
may be good arguments for both functions to operate at the metropolitan level. 
Secondly, many public agencies responsible for the collection and publication of
statistical data go outside their administrative boundaries to present consolidated
data of metropolitan areas. It is often appropriate for statistical purposes and policy
decisions to have demographic, health-related, and economic figures for a city or
metropolitan area as a whole, as well as for municipalities or administrative units.
Within a metropolitan area, data is presented cautiously, without binding it to the
political structure, although it sends out the message of the statistical and economic
importance of such an area.
These indicators mark a territory of technical efficiency (service delivery, statistical
observations) for a city. Furthermore, they point out the mismatches between this
territory and administrative territories.
In summary, the usual spatial definition of a metropolitan agglomeration is based
on a functional-economic point of view, starting from observations of labour market
dynamics. Moreover, areas for the delivery of such services as water supply, and
geographical units for the collection of statistical data can often be used as secondary
indicators of the boundaries of a metropolitan area. For this study, the basic
functional-economic definition used by statistical offices is the starting definition for
a metropolitan territory. To complement this, a criterion of continuous urban land
use and areas for the delivery of public services is used; these are key elements
defining a metropolitan area or territory.
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2.1.2 Metropolitan government and economic development
The role of urban government in the urban economy is important, since urban
service provision and strategies for urban development affect many location
decisions for firms and households. Formal and scientific evidence supporting the
assumption that economic development in the city is related to the form and
effectiveness of its urban government is scarce. However, various observations
support the view that the economic performance of an urban economy depends on a
mounting number of factors ranging from macro-economic policies implemented
by a national government to the framework on which the informal activities are (or
are not) integrated by urban government action. 
The roles of urban government in the economy of a city include: an actor in local
economic development strategies, regulator of the land market, provider and
promoter of infrastructure development, taxation authority, central government
agent, employer, and provider of urban services (Davey, 1996; McGill, 1998).
Together, these facets of urban government produce a combined effect in the urban
economy that is difficult to gauge (Post, 2000). Trying to establish the different
possible outcomes of different institutional arrangements (local government,
metropolitan government) in the same dynamic urban economy is difficult from a
scientific point of view, since no test control situations or approximations are
feasible. Isolating the impact of urban public action and the form of government
from their influence in economic development is complex, if not impossible. First,
the difference in outcome – or the actual influence of the government structure on
the economy of cities – is difficult in national economies suffering from frequent
shocks and sensitive to external changes (as is the case in Latin American countries).
Second, impacts of urban government actions extend over long time periods,
making comparable conditions difficult to find. 
Despite these difficulties, the general understanding is that city-wide government or
metropolitan arrangements are desirable for promoting economic growth (Davey,
1996; Garrocho et al, 1995; Gottmann, 1995; Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1995;
Vallmitjana, 1997; Ward, 1996). This argument is based on empirical findings that
are scattered, ad hoc, and often subjective. Two ideas sustain this concept: a) the
recognition of the metropolitan territory as a functional scale, an engine of growth, a
productive unit; and b) the need to capture economies of scale, produce efficiency,
innovate and stimulate urban growth within this geographical unit. 
Examination of the figures for Latin America and Asia show that 80% of the
expected future economic growth would originate from within the urban economies
(Berghäll, 1996). Moreover, the most urbanized countries in Latin America are those
with the highest GNP per capita (see Figure 2.1).
Several authors have discussed the performance of the city as a growth engine set in
a competitive global framework (Berghäll, 1996; Hall, 1997; Harris et al, 1996;
Hiernaux-Nicolas, 1998; Lungo, 1994; Mohan, 1994; Nientied, 1998; Post, 2000;
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Sassen, 1994). The interests of the authors could be categorized as: a) ranking cities
in this competitive space (Friedmann, 1995; Taylor, 1997; Taylor, 1999); b) specifying
strategies to improve competitiveness in cities within their regional or global context
(van den Berg et al, 1997; Newman, 2000; OECD, 1997); c) discussing the origin
and dynamics of this competitive environment, or “global system of cities” (Knox et
al, 1995; Kresl et al, 1995; Sassen, 1991; Sassen, 1994). 
Brenner’s critique of these analyses (1999, p. 432) reinstates the scale issue and
government coordination at the centre of this debate. He states: “(These) analyses
neglect the ways in which the current round of neo-liberal globalization has been
intrinsically dependent upon, intertwined with and expressed through major
transformations of territorial organization on multiple geographical scales.”
Beaureaugard (1995, p. 238) had previously directed his attention to the local scale
when he wrote: “The local is the dedicated outcome of forces operating at all spatial
scales. Forces operating at intermediate scales add complexity to the global-local
argument but do not change its essential orientation.” City governments are to some
extent unable, either formally or functionally, to influence, benefit, or articulate their
policies towards the globalization process, because these other forces at the
intermediate level are at work.
An important issue in this debate is a city’s competitiveness. The competitiveness of
the economic activities within a city is under pressure in a growing globally
integrated economy, and city government must respond to this pressure. For
example, Newman (2000, p. 903) writes that: “It is cities, their functional urban
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Figure 2.1 - Urbanization and gross domestic product per capita in Latin American
countries. Source: World Bank, 1998
regions and wider networks, which are now seen as the drivers of a competitive
European economy.” For Latin America, Jorda (1996) notes that the notion of cities
as the “wealth of nations” is an important element in government policies for cities
in the region. Jungemann (1996, p. 69) identifies the spatial element in the
arguments supporting decentralization policies; she argues that the creation of what
is referred to as the organized territory is an important aspect of the search for
competitiveness. Competitiveness is therefore an implicit argument for government
policy and government reform. Eventually, competitiveness issues translate into
urban management problems, as Rodriguez and Winchester point out (1996, p. 25),
when commenting on Latin American cities: “When public services disintegrate,
urban sectors break off from the city and become autonomous. Eventually, the city
stops functioning as an interrelated entity. When public services do not exist,
literally, the urban conglomeration stops making sense and limits the
competitiveness of the activities located within it.” A comment that is not far
removed from what Newman (2000, p. 904) found in Europe: “Fragmented
authority across functional regions may work against competitiveness.” 
Although empirical evidence of the relationship between the economic performance
of the city and urban government forms of action is not conclusive (Hamilton,
2000; Morgan et al, 1999; Post, 2000), action at the metropolitan level is considered
positive. Sharpe (1995, p. 15) perceives a strong case for this, because of labour
market interdependency: “In the case of the metropolitan area the need to match
governmental structures to socio-geographic and economic reality is at its strongest
– simply because of the interdependency between the areas within the metropolitan
area derived from being tributary to a single labour”. However, it is pertinent to
establish that economic growth is associated, but not necessarily dependent, on
strong metropolitan governmental arrangements (Post, 2000).
In the discussions based on this vision of the city as an engine of growth, or on its
competitive characteristics, there is a lack of interest in presenting the multi-level
dimension of the government of the city. Furthermore, the problems of this
multiplicity (fragmentation, redundancy, lack of coordination), are fundamental
issues for the advent of these growth engines, or competitive agglomerations. The
discussion stresses the interpretation of global economic trends, and the global city
hypothesis rather than the practical issues of city government, such as
intergovernmental coordination, territorial definitions and participation. In addition
to the critiques cited that indicate these shortcomings, Newman (2000), Rodriguez
et al (1996), and Persky and Wievel (1994, p. 141) are explicit on this point when
they state that: “Lack of cooperation at the metropolitan level may in fact be a greater
problem than the globalization of the economy.” 
The governmental units central to these coordination and cooperation issues are
those at the local level. But local government (municipal, district, or county
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government) has often been identified at too small a geographical scale to undertake
metropolitan tasks (Davey, 1996). Greater technical capacity, planning, and
regulatory skills that improve the productive environment of the city, and also
attenuate growing inequalities, are more effective and efficient on a metropolitan
scale. Because of this trend towards metropolitan coordination and government at
the metropolitan scale, the concept of metropolitan governance is being used. This
concept is discussed below.
In summary, this research leans more towards issues of intergovernmental
coordination than global city debates. As indicated below (chapter 3), the case studies
of Caracas and Monterrey are representative of how global developments impact on
Latin American cities, and the economic performance of these cities is related to
global economic trends as well as the capacity of these cities to organize adequate
forms of government. This study follows the recommendation of Persky and Wievel
(1994) to select and differentiate the field of work, that brings about institutional
change. Facts and arguments are sought concerning the hazards of metropolitan
coordination in a globalized context.
2.1.3 The governance question: a critique of the concept of metropolitan governance
At this point, an explanation on the choice of concepts related to the metropolitan
model is necessary, to avoid confusion in the way concepts are used in this study.
Basically, there are two important concepts related to the metropolitan model:
metropolitan government, and metropolitan governance (Sharpe, 1995). Metropolitan
government is the long-established concept previously discussed; it is directly related
to the structure and functions of government in the city, and in particular to the
metropolitan scale. Metropolitan governance has been proposed as a concept that
includes other forms of public action, which differ from those based on the
government side alone (Lefèvre., 1998). Metropolitan governance is a concept
concerned with the relationships in and around government and the delivery of
public goods in the city. 
Recent literature and ongoing academic discussions make use of the concept of
metropolitan governance. The term is sometimes used to describe coordination
procedures, the active participation of community and interest groups in decision-
making, the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services,
coalition formations, and the combination of some or all of these alternatives. Use of
the term in the literature is far from consistent. Metropolitan governance has been
seen as an important conceptual contribution to the metropolitan debate (Lefèvre,
1998). At the same time, this concept incorporates different elements from so many
perspectives, it is difficult to apply in an analysis for a research project as
consistently as the metropolitan government concept, which is based only on the
structure of government and the distribution of functions (Lefèvre, 1998). 
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Nevertheless, there are key issues of the theoretical discussion on metropolitan
governance that are worthy of consideration, because they address the relationship
dimension (coordination, intergovernmental arrangements, coalitions, and so forth)
in a more explicit way than a simple discussion about government. In summary:
coordination patterns identified by authors using the concept of metropolitan
governance could indicate positive conditions for the establishment of metropolitan
government. These key issues and the working concept of metropolitan governance
relevant to this study are discussed below. 
The World Bank (1994) defines governance as the “manner in which power is
exercised in the management of the country’s economic and social resources for
development,” adding that “good governance is epitomized by a transparent process; a
bureaucracy imbued with professional ethos; a strong civil society participating in
public affairs: and all behaving under the rule of law.” Sivaramakrishnan (1996)
comments that this is “an ambitious catalogue of ideals rather than an analytical
framework of a concept,” but does not attempt an alternative definition of the term,
although he praises the explicit recognition of governance as a broader concept than
government. Nielson (OECD, 1997) uses urban governance as a key concept, and
although one might expect further specificity towards the urban realm, his definition
remains general. For him, urban governance is “the way we arrange the roles and
responsibilities of governments, the public sector and communities in matters that are
dealt with in the public realm.” Hamilton (1999, p. 74) states that “the term
governance is not concerned with government structure per se, but with relationships
among governments and governmental processes and functions,” and then specifies
that “governance is a functional and issue-oriented approach to addressing problems of
a regional nature.” McCarney and colleagues (1995, p. 95-96) state that governance is
“the relationship between civil society and the state, between ruler and the ruled, the
government and the governed.” Urban governance is for McCarney the application of
this concept to local level, and she emphasizes the shift in the traditional urban
management focus to elements outside the processes of public policy, including civic
associations, private sector organizations, community groups, and social movements.
Urban governance can also be related to the metropolitan scale; the idea of
metropolitan governance could then also be related, and new elements added to the
debate about governmental arrangements at the metropolitan level.
There are examples where the political impasse has been overcome by strategies of
metropolitan coordination. In the United States, basic services such as water supply,
sanitation, or transport have an effective metropolitan coordination in many urban
areas, without enacting formal metropolitan governments (Sivaramakrishnan,
1996). In Canada, the recent amalgamation of six municipalities into greater
Toronto (The Economist, 1998) was preceded by years of collaboration and informal
arrangements in the police, board of trade, and labour council (Kjellberg et al, 1996;
Lefèvre C., 1998; Sharpe, 1995).
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The emphasis in this dissertation has been put on metropolitan government,
because of the more continuous character of government in the literature, policy
documents, and case studies. The main interest is the structure and functions of
metropolitan government; coordination is seen as an arrangement at the
metropolitan level that can be termed formal. The discussion is in terms of
metropolitan government, since it is more precise to consider tiers of government
and metropolitan arrangements than metropolitan governance relationships. This
research therefore contributes to the discussion on metropolitan government. 
2.2 Political and institutional obstacles to metropolitan government
Following a review of the fundamentals of metropolitan government with regard to
territory, economic rationale, and its relationship with the metropolitan governance
debate, the constraints and obstacles in the path of metropolitan government are
then explained. The political restrictions are first considered; secondly, the
institutional elements are discussed; finally, a brief overview of the situation in Latin
America is presented.
2.2.1 Political restrictions to governments at metropolitan level
The forms (structure and functions) of government in large urban areas alternate
between dominant central and regional authorities, and local authorities. In general,
these levels of government (central and local) have solid institutional, political, and
historical validation. In this context, the degree of dominance of either central or
local institutions in the government of a city depends on the national settings of the
country. Unitary and federal systems represent the basis of these national settings,
where further organization of the local structures of governments vary per country,
as do their relationships with upper levels of government. Basically, urban
government is accomplished between two important and stable scales of
government: the national scale, corresponding with central government; and the
local scale, corresponding with local/municipal government.
Governments at metropolitan scale are difficult to implement and have less
continuity than central, or local forms of government. Three types of bottlenecks –
legal-institutional, political, and historical – have constrained the establishment, or
consolidation of metropolitan government (Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1995;
Vallmitjana, 1994). The political-administrative organizations of countries confront
legal-institutional bottlenecks, stated in the constitution, organic laws and municipal
laws. There are also political bottlenecks, for example the barriers that central or
local government create for institutions at metropolitan level; and there are also
historical bottlenecks, since the traditional form of government in cities has
developed mainly from local government forms. 
Traditionally, metropolitan governments have less political legitimacy than central,
regional, or local governments. Central governments have a geo-political rationale,
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as the ruling institution of nation-states. Historical development of the nation-state,
whether in western or non-western countries, shows that a nation-state aims at
sovereign power over national territory to validate its position among other nation-
states (Brenner, 1999). In this context, claims of sovereignty of regions and cities
within the nation-state are sometimes overruled by force, or arranged by
constitutional constructions to the benefit of the nation-state (Brenner, 1999). On
the other hand, local governments are the institutions within which communities
fulfil their social and economic contracts with regard to the territory where the
community is based. Representatives of these units mediate, as elected or appointed
officers, between the actions of the nation-state and the local authority. Frequently,
metropolitan-level arrangements are caught between central and local government
power struggles. Proposals for metropolitan arrangements launched from one level
of government (central or local) are sometimes intended to increase power in favour
of those government institutions backing the proposal, rather than following a
metropolitan interest. Sharpe (1996, p.22) notes: “The first and perhaps the most
obvious problem is that a metro (organizational level) will always tend to be isolated,
squeezed as it is between two probably hostile forces.”
Central government appears to disrupt and oppose powerful (and less dependent)
city government for simple political reasons; metropolitan arrangement could
represent unwanted partnership with opposition parties, and in primate urban
systems1 (as in Latin America), strong city governments (in a primate city, at least)
represent a threat to the central government and a platform for political promotion.
Examples of the first type of opposition are documented in the case of the Greater
London Council (Hall, 1996; Sharpe, 1995; Sivaramakrishnan, 1996). These authors
interpret the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986 as a manifestation of
the conflict between national and local authorities. These forms of opposition are
also apparent in Latin America. Even so, in the Latin American region, central
governments have passed and implemented several reform strategies for their sub-
national government organization and structure where municipalization and
empowerment of sub-national institutions have been foremost (Inter-American
Development Bank, 1998). The full implementation of these reforms in the most
important cities (capitals, primate cities) has been hindered by the same central
governments that proposed the decentralization of government functions. 
On the one hand there is a trend towards decentralization of power that has produced
an extraordinary growth in the number of municipalities, sometimes promoting
redundancy. For instance, in Venezuela the number of municipalities rose from 112 to
340 between 1989 and 1990 (Vallmitjana, 1993). Instead of increasing efficiency, the
process was aimed at the redistribution and creation of power locations 
On the other hand, capital cities and other important metropolitan areas have been
explicitly excluded from this process of reforms, with appointed authorities (mayors
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directly appointed by central government) and urban public utilities companies and
development agencies under the direct supervision of central or regional
government. Cities such as Caracas (Venezuela) or Santiago (Chile) illustrate this
situation, with 10 or more elected mayors for the new municipalities, whereas the
higher authority (mayor or governor) is appointed by the central government. Some
capital cities are run by appointed mayors (as was the case for Buenos Aires and
Mexico City until the late 1990s), while the municipal authorities are freely elected
in all the other cities in the country. Capital cities are often exceptions to the
decentralization process that installs empowered regional and local governments, or
these reforms may be implemented with delay. 
Local governments object to metropolitan arrangements, because they perceive them
as a threat to their independence. For local governments, a metropolitan arrangement
has fiscal, political, and personal power consequences. In a metropolitan arrangement,
local government has to hand over power and autonomy for higher interest goals
(Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1995a). Metropolitan arrangements tend to affect the tax base,
the fiscal structure, and rearrange tax expenditures on urban issues that are sensitive
to local interests. Physical planning, for example, is a typical urban function that has
to be defined between local and metropolitan level, and it affects policy on property
tax. If a local government depends on property tax as an important source of
revenue, which is often the case in Latin America, then a coordinated strategy with
other actors which could affect property tax would be unattractive.
Often, local governments prefer to rely on functional arrangements of metropolitan
collaboration (associations, coalitions, companies, advisory councils, and so forth) to
provide certain services without formal administrative structures that take away
control of their responsibilities (a metropolitan mayor, and so forth). These ad hoc
arrangements are more or less voluntary. They exist now because of central
government enforcement. When asked to formalize a metropolitan authority, it is
difficult for local government and the related actors to make a political case. In a
European context, the latest attempt in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, to organize a
metropolitan authority in Rotterdam encountered political and cultural barriers in a
referendum for formal metropolitan authorities in 1995/1996; the conflicting
visions, unclear perceptions, and failures in the participatory process led to a
rejection of the proposed institutional change, in spite of sound functional and
economic arguments (Flierman, 1997; Newman, 2000). 
The objections and difficulties that central and local governments encounter with
metro-level arrangements are mainly related to the distribution of political power and –
consequently – with fiscal issues regarding revenue and expenditure decisions. The
dispute is simple: which level of government has the decision power to assign
resources, and therefore government expenditure. As a government level, metropolitan
institutions have little support, political clout, or experience to participate in this
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dispute. Institutions at central and local level have comparatively more political
resources, stronger legal positions, and extended political experience in competing for
power. In summary, the main political constraints on establishing formal metropolitan
government institutions are lack of legitimacy, and conflicting sovereignty. 
An important aspect of local government legitimacy is the identification the
population has with the institution, a feature built up over time on political,
psychological, and social elements (Lefèvre, 1998). Larger administrative territories
tend to be less readily identifiable and accountable, since their actions spread out
over a wider area, and they are therefore less exposed to the scrutiny of their citizens.
The legitimacy of metropolitan government is basically functional, not political;
creating and sustaining legitimacy for new institutions and policies is therefore an
important political problem (Newman, 2000). 
Central governments avoid the legitimization of power institutions that represent a
threat to their own; in many cases, the urban governments of metropolitan range
have autonomous characteristics, such as population size (vote leverage) and
economic clutter (lobby power) that could upset nation-state strategies. 
2.2.2 Institutional issues
It is not only the political dimension which provides constraints for the development
of metropolitan government. The advance of government reform in Latin America
has taken place through following two public management principles – subsidiarity
and public choice – which are fundamental elements of modern public management
theory. These two principles are in conflict with metropolitan governmental
arrangements, so that the application of general state reform based (as in many
Latin American countries) on subsidiarity and public choice is intrinsically opposed
to metropolitan arrangements. It is therefore appropriate to review the relationship
of these principles with the metropolitan debate. 
Subsidiarity and metropolitan government
In a general sense, functional logic (public services, economies of scale) identifies a
metropolitan territory (see section 2.1.1), but this is not the only “space” operating in
the city. Local territories associated with communities, neighbourhoods, and
physical features (natural or man-made) also have their meaning in the city.
Following the concept of subsidiarity, some elements in the provision of public
services would be better delivered at this smaller scale level. Nell-Breuning (1990, p.
145) defines subsidiarity as: “A principle for public management that restricts the
tasks of any particular level of government to those not taken by any (subsidiary)
lower levels of government with the appropriate capacity or mandate. The
centralization of tasks should take place only when and where they cannot be
accomplished as well or better on a lower level. This is as true of regions, provinces,
lander, communities, and cities as it is of traditional nation-states.” In a simpler
definition, Honey (1996, p. 23) writes: “….subsidiarity or proximity, whereby decisions
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are taken at the level closest and most accountable to citizens, and only those tasks that
local government cannot effectively carry out are referred to higher levels.” This
principle should be enforced throughout all levels of government to be effective. In a
subsidiary system, the territorial scale of public action is related to the government
structure (the number of levels, authority, and so forth) and the actual capacity to
provide or deliver public services.
The results of public action carried out in different local areas by local governments
(municipalities, counties) in a subsidiary system are perceived, however, at the level
of the city. Differences in the quantity and quality of service delivery in different
locations provoke inequalities that impact on the city as a whole. For a city operating
in a competitive international economic framework, a better quality of life in a
limited number of localities is not enough. For example, consolidated prosperous
neighbourhoods with adequate provision of urban utilities (water, sewerage,
electricity, good accessibility, green areas, and so forth), access to media and
technology, integration into global networks (finance, entertainment, information),
and with a local government whose acts tend to protect the privileged position of
these neighbourhoods, do not change the perceptions or the position of the city in
global terms if the city as a whole remains under the effects of such negative
externalities as health risks, criminality, poor accessibility, air pollution, illiteracy,
and poor water provision. In Latin America, pockets of urban quality are present in
most of the major cities: Chacao municipality in Caracas, Miraflores in Lima, El
Pedregal in Mexico City, San Pedro municipality in Monterrey, and so forth
In general, equity is part of the philosophy of good government and is ideally built
into the institutional framework. Local government public action can then provide
guarantees of equal access to services, and stimulate compensation and cross-
subsidies where necessary (De la Cruz et al, 1994; Fasci, 1995; Ingram, 1998).
Avoiding and reducing inequality are induced through these built-in measures of
equity, but if there is no clear metropolitan organization, local governments may
abuse these arrangements and promote their own benefits. This non-collaboration
of local governments may then lead to a result quite the opposite of the intended
equity. For example, central government grants for poverty alleviation programmes
may be granted on a project basis; projects are approved following the application of
technical criteria to projects presented by municipalities. Large, or affluent
municipalities will have better technical capacity to produce good project plans and
have them approved, while poor municipalities find that more difficult. Moreover,
when the political gains for the local politician are high enough (a mayor with
presidential aspirations, such as Fernando Mahuad in Quito, Fernando De la Rua in
Buenos Aires, Cauathemoc Cardenas in Mexico City, Claudio Fermín and Irene Saéz
in Caracas, for example), local public actions tend to concentrate on local policy
rather than metropolitan coordination.
In the general conception of subsidiarity, a system of metropolitan government is a
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fitting arrangement. Thus, government on a metropolitan scale would be at an
appropriate level to deliver public services that would otherwise be poorly provided
by local governments. However, in Latin America the political issues at the local
government level are more important than subsidiarity principles.
Public choice and metropolitan government
Local government has a political logic, because it is supported by principles of
political representation, democracy, and public choice (Davey, 1996; McGill, 1998;
Tiebout, 1956). However, local governments per se, as part of a bigger urban
agglomeration, are unable to avoid inequalities within this bigger agglomeration in
an effective way. Local governments are incompetent with respect to metropolitan-
area issues. Public choice principles justify the autonomy of local governments,
since they compete against each other to attract people and firms to their
jurisdiction, introducing a competitive environment in the city that is supposed to
improve the quality of public services. A basic idea of public choice is that people
vote with their feet, moving from one jurisdiction to another in search of better
services. In a competitive environment, all providers (or jurisdictions) would
therefore tend to deliver better services and every jurisdiction would be better off in
the long run. However, public choice adherents recognize that certain services are
provided more efficiently and effectively on a metropolitan-wide basis, although they
still reject unified area-wide government (Hamilton, 2000). In the absence of area-
wide coordination policies, this competitive environment tends to produce exclusion
and inequalities. Batley (1997, p. 338) also observes these developments in Latin
America, and recommends governments with adequate territorial range, mainly
because of their redistributive function. He writes: “The problem of persistent
inequality in Latin American cities is endogenous and not explained away by global
processes. If growth is to be inclusive it requires either to be very dynamic or that a
government with adequate territorial range, powers, sources of revenues and
political support should tap and redistribute resources.”
Public choice would seem, under this analysis, to be an inadequate principle to apply
to all urban public functions in large cities. For example, in the case of water supply,
the public choice principle would not be very effective, because each local
government would promote an independent water company that in the end would
not have an effective geographical scale. In this case, a metropolitan arrangement
would be more appropriate.
In summary, the equity discussion around the consequences of applying subsidiarity
and public choice principles in the organization of urban government (Lefèvre,
1998; Sharpe, 1995), and the resulting shortcomings of applying these principles in
the context of Latin America, support the idea that – for certain urban public
functions – there is a territory for government or public action that is metropolitan
rather than local.
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2.3 Metropolitan arrangements in practice
Despite political and institutional obstacles – legitimacy, sovereignty conflicts,
subsidiarity, and public choice – some forms of metropolitan arrangements and
coordination take place in Latin American cities. Such arrangements apply to
specific urban functions, which require management at metropolitan level because
of their characteristics (technical, geographical, financial). These arrangements are
based on coordination, and take different forms depending on the city. In this
section, the typical urban functions subject to metropolitan coordination are
described, and the forms of coordination identified in the literature are then
presented.
It is pertinent to point out that, in this study, metropolitan coordination, as stated
here and below does not represent the final outcome of metropolitan arrangements.
They are ad hoc, voluntary agreements that are often fragile in a political, institutional,
and financial sense. They present different degrees of coordination that indicate their
level of achievement with regard to the metropolitan territory (see page 3 below for a
further explanation). These coordination efforts are understood here, however, as
starting initiatives towards metropolitan government, and as necessary conditions
for the emergence of solid institutional proposals for metropolitan government. 
2.3.1 Functions that demand a metropolitan strategy: the metropolitan functions
The relevant public services and urban functions that relate to metropolitan areas,
the economic development, and refer to equity concerns have been discussed widely
in the literature. Sivaramakrishnan (1996) observes that water supply, sanitation,
and transport have usually been administered by metropolitan bodies in North
America. Davey (1996, p.83) indicates that, at the conurbation level, coordinated or
united management for water supply, sewage and waste disposal, transportation and
pollution control is “crucial”. He also indicates that a metropolitan scale for land-use
planning and infrastructure planning is conducive to sound city-growth strategies.
Sharpe (1995) puts forward the following set of functions that require a metropolitan
perspective: master planning, arterial highways, traffic management, public
transport, general utilities, recreational areas, housing, trunk sewers and main
drainage, solid waste disposal, water supply, police, major cultural institutions, fire,
and environmental protection, although he excludes the planning function at
metropolitan level. According to Ward (1996) metropolitan-wide authority should be
exerted on strategic planning, land-use zoning, transport policy, and major
infrastructure programmes and services. In addition to suggesting metropolitan
functions, Ward (1996) also suggests several basic principles for the administration
of metropolitan areas in Latin America: democracy, transparency, and wide-
territorial authority. His considerations on democracy and transparency are in line
with traditional concerns about political representation and the prevailing corruption
in Latin America, which he distinguishes appropriately as key issues for the
administration of metropolitan areas. From this and other literature sources (IHS,
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1996; Lefèvre, 1998) a set of common urban functions which require coordination
at the metropolitan level can be identified. These functions are: 
• urban development planning (physical planning)
• urban public transport
• environmental control/regulation
• water supply and sewerage
• local economic development
Urban development planning and urban public transport are subjected to analysis in the
case studies featured in this dissertation. This methodology, the focus, and the
choice of case studies are explained below. The metropolitan functions are first
briefly discussed here.
Urban development planning is a typical metropolitan activity related to the
productive environment of the city that includes strategic options for urban
development such as land use, housing development, and infrastructure provision.
Some planning outcomes affect and guide the locational choices of firms and
households, influence real estate markets in the city, and are therefore intertwined
with the urban economy. On the one hand choices made by the government
planning institutions play a part in the locational behaviour of real-estate developers,
households, and firms. On the other hand, these strategic decisions on urban
development influence the final outcome of government revenues based on land
(property tax, construction permits, land disposal, and so forth). However, Priemus
(1994, p. 510) comments that: “The importance of physical planning in enhancing
the international economic competitive edge of an urban region should not be
overestimated,” and adds: “Physical planning can at most play a stimulating and
enabling role. Good spatial planning, and above all a well-developed material
infrastructure (not only facilities for the transport of persons and goods, but also
telecommunication networks for the transport of information) form a necessary but
not sufficient condition for a region to play a major role in the international league.”
When entitled to metropolitan coverage and authority, urban development planning
is an instrument to avoid inequalities and sprawl in the urban agglomeration (Hull,
1998). Decisions to locate facilities and plan infrastructure investments have, in
addition to their technical logic, a social-equity impact.
In Latin American countries, the main goal of the most important planning efforts
and strategies has been urban deconcentration (the restriction of urban growth and
population concentration in the major cities in favour of more balanced national
urban systems) and growth-pole creation. This deconcentration is in line with the
prevailing paradigm of development based in import substitution, which started
during the 1960s and continued until the beginning of the 1980s (Boisier, 1997;
Jungemann, 1996; Palacios, 1993). Urban development planning suffered from the
debt crisis, the change of paradigm to market economies and increased
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decentralization, and provided few effective alternatives for the present planning
problems (Jungemann, 1996). Moreover, urban deconcentration was not achieved
on the national scale. Besides, growth poles proved to be fragile locations in a
liberalized economy. These two outcomes have had severe consequences in land use,
infrastructure provision, congestion, and employment. The rigidities of the physical
planning institutions, among other distortions, have been exposed (Boisier, 1997).
Urban public transport is considered a metropolitan function, because the effects of
accessibility and mobility on the urban economy, the negative externalities on the
urban economy and environment if the coordination of urban transport is
inadequate, and investments in infrastructure are most effective if they relate to the
metropolitan scale. Urban public transport policy (infrastructure planning, traffic
management, public transport) therefore fits into the rationale of the metropolitan
territory (Davey, 1996; McGill, 1998; Sharpe, 1995). 
Congestion and traffic management are related to metropolitan needs for
accessibility and mobility. The combination of high concentration, urbanization,
suburbanization, poor road infrastructure, and inadequate public transport affects a
city’s economic performance (Borja, 1996). One of the consequences of these factors
is an increase in car-ownership, which becomes both the cause and effect of a
deficient urban public-transport system. This research is concentrated on urban
public-transport measures: the portion of urban public transport provided (and
eventually produced) by the public sector. Car-ownership variables and private
transportation are not included in the analysis, since car ownership and its
relationship with urban public transport are difficult to categorize or relate to
government policy. 
In Latin American countries, transport strategies have been implemented by different
levels of government. However, infrastructure investment (road infrastructure, rail
systems) is commonly a prerogative of central governments, with considerable impact
on further strategic decisions about the use and modes of transportation (Boisier,
1997; De la Cruz, 1995). This custom is related to the tendency to keep large
government expenditures centralized (Gakenheimer, 1999).
Environmental control and regulation is a function which evidently needs management
on a metropolitan basis as a result of spill-over effects (Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1995).
The dynamics of consumption and growth in the city have an impact on the
environment of the whole territory of the urban agglomeration and beyond. Keeping
control of the environmental impact of the city’s activities is only effective at the
metropolitan level, because environmental impacts take place in a territory going
beyond individual municipalities. 
Production of water is a metropolitan or regional function, because of the costly
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infrastructure and economies of scale. Besides production, other elements of the
delivery of water can be organized into various institutional arrangements, whether
municipal companies for water delivery, or private participation which can take care
of delivery, metering, charging, administration, and maintenance. Nevertheless,
coordination is fundamental at metropolitan level to avoid misuse or loss, to ensure
a reliable standard of maintenance, and to coordinate capital investment. The
diseconomies resulting from fragmented delivery, poor or non-existent provision of
water in parts of the city, and an unreliable distribution network, affect the whole
city economy and are a potential health threat to the citizens (Roth, 1987). Reliable
water provision is an important component of an improved quality of life, thereby
influencing the attractiveness of a city (Bennett, 1995; Roth, 1987). Similarly,
sewerage collection and treatment is a metropolitan function, because of the same
economies of scale, health dangers, and environmental consequences.
Local economic development
According to some authors (Barnes et al, 1998; Nientied, 1998; Nunn, 1995), if they
are to be effective, government initiatives to improve local economic development
have to correspond with functional territories such as metropolitan areas.
Nevertheless, other authors claim that local government consolidation into one
government agency does not influence economic development (Carr et al, 1999).
They conclude that, even if the question of scale is important, consolidation into
metropolitan government or metropolitan development agencies only reduces the
costs of the implementation of strategies (by increasing efficiency and reducing
redundancy) and does little to increase economic growth. In any case, the main
premise underlying these arguments for a metropolitan scale in economic
development plans is that strategies to improve locational attractiveness for firms, to
influence the labour market, and to guide the economic growth of the city, are
unsuccessful if they fail to recognize the economic interactions within the city,
within an extended territory. A local economic development plan implemented by
one municipality, or a local authority with a limited territory in the city, is not
capable of capturing or creating benefits, because firms and workers are able to
move beyond the administrative boundaries of the local economic development
plan. Similarly, the negative effects of economic growth could be avoided in one
jurisdiction while negative externalities occur in contiguous administrations. 
2.3.2 Forms of coordination
The forms of government arrangement at the metropolitan level differ in different
cities with regard to institutional organization, legal framework, and political status.
These differences are responses to the particularities of each city, such as the current
national system (federal, unitary), the stage of government decentralization in the
country, the presence of local growth coalitions or civil society organization, and so
forth. Some authors attempting to classify these different arrangements pay
attention to the following features: the level of collaboration/cooperation within the
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arrangements (Lefèvre, 1998), the correspondence with the territorial aspect
(Sharpe, 1995), and the institutional forms available from the legal frameworks
(councils, metro-government, municipal partnerships, coalitions, and so forth)
(Hamilton, 2000). These classifications vary from descriptive lists to rankings
evaluating the outcomes of the government arrangements. The latter are less
concerned with the formal structures (metropolitan government, metropolitan
council, metropolitan governance, two or three-tier government, metropolitan region
authorities, development corporations, and so forth) than in public management
issues such as effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, these rankings are used
to classify the metropolitan arrangements in terms of their outcomes, giving higher
ranks to those arrangements that are more effective accomplishing specific public
objectives and, most importantly, those that are effective within the whole
metropolitan territory (Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000). Descriptive lists, on the other
hand, concentrate on the formal structure, categorizing different metropolitan
arrangements by their legal and institutional relationships (Hamilton, 2000).
Descriptive lists take into account whether an arrangement fits into the current legal
provision (is it formal, or informal), the level of government at which it operates or
has most influence (central, regional or local level), whether the organization is
unique or a coalition, to what extent it extends or is limited with respect to all
metropolitan functions, and the kind of binding which keeps these arrangements
together (political interests, fiscal pressure, decrees). 
Davies (1996, p. 85) identifies strategies that have been implemented to address
problems of scale and metropolitan fragmentation, including municipal
amalgamations, municipal boundary extensions, two-tier local government, the
creation of joint bodies, the creation of metropolitan planning and development
authorities. Ward (1996) observes three types of metropolitan coordination in Latin
American cities: an authority much more powerful than the rest of the authorities in
the city; consultative bodies functioning as a sort of communication channel with few
achievements; large-scale government agencies for specific functions. The IHS (1996)
classifies institutional arrangements in a metropolitan area into the following groups:
voluntary agreement organizations; special agencies emphasizing functional aspects;
arrangements encompassing two levels of government; fusions of existing local
authorities; special cases with regard to super-authorities and special governments for
capital cities. Mitchell-Weaver and colleagues (2000) classify the different types of
intergovernmental coordination, governance and government in three groups:
relatively easy; moderately difficult; very difficult. Where a category includes a number
of different arrangements, they are ordered by their feasibility (see table 2.2). 
For the purposes of this study, Mitchell-Weaver’s perspective is preferred. It falls into
the category of descriptive lists and, given the choice of this research for
metropolitan government above metropolitan governance (see section 2.1.3), this
perspective is more appropriate, since it concentrates on formal structures. 
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Coordination within the formal structures of government is the key element in
producing effective outcomes. This coordination is relevant in both urban public
transport strategies and urban development planning in the metropolitan area. The
level of coordination achieved is considered a good indication of the effectiveness of
public action. If government arrangements allow for coordinated decisions and
implementation of actions, it is then possible to expect effective outcomes.
Coordination among actors is important, not only in the formulations of goals and
decisions, but also because the implementation of these decisions can be followed
more effectively. Decision-making and implementation are defined as the key
actions in coordination in the metropolitan realm.
To establish an evaluation model to use in this research, several models of public
policy analysis were reviewed (Hamilton, 2000; Metcalfe, 1994; Mitchell-Weaver et al,
2000; Nunn et al, 1997; Pierre, 1999), and two instruments were chosen for further
adaptation: the tabulation of different types of intergovernmental coordination,
governance and government developed by Mitchell-Weaver and colleagues (2000)
from Walker (1987); and the scale of coordination proposed by Metcalfe (1994) in
the context of the intergovernmental cooperation of nation-states. Although
Mitchell-Weaver incorporates the word governance in the analysis, the tabulation is
based on intergovernmental coordination and not on broader coalitions with social
groups, as the term governance would imply in current definitions (see 2.1.3). 
This choice is based on the clarity of the evaluation instruments. Mitchell-Weaver
and colleagues (2000) specify three levels of political difficulty ordering the different
types of intergovernmental co-ordination (see table). This classification is useful for
this research study, because data about metropolitan government can be tabulated
according to these types of intergovernmental co-ordination, and thereby measured. 
The policy coordination scale proposed by Metcalfe (1994) is used as the second
instrument of the analysis. The particular data about coordination and metropolitan
government of the case studies can be specified according to this scale. This scale
assigns a position to each form of coordination, and these positions are arranged in
the scale as on the steps of a ladder, with each higher step indicating a more
complete form of coordination than the step below. In this sense, level 4 indicates
more coordination than level 1, although the progression is neither geometrical nor
natural (level 4 does not suggest four times more coordination that level 1).
Additionally, it is assumed that higher levels of coordination in the scale could
include elements or activities undertaken in the lower levels. For example, level 4 in
the scale, Avoiding differences among actors, is less advanced than level 5, Searching
for agreement among actors, but subsumes and is more advanced than level 3,
Consultation with other actors. In the same way, policy coordination could not
achieve higher levels if the levels below had not been accomplished. That is to say,
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Table 2.1 - Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 2.2 - Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
Source: Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864) and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
level 3, Consultation with other actors, implies that level 2, Information exchange,
has already taken place. The different case studies can be positioned in the scale
without compromising their intrinsic differences, because according to Melcalfe:
“The emphasis in on the management capacities that coordination requires rather
than the institutions responsible for deploying them (Melcalfe, 1994, p. 280)”
2.4 Research on the relevance of metropolitan government in Latin America
Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the discussions above to serve as a
starting point for the research. The research questions are elaborated in relation to
these observations. The research framework and research implementation are then
described. These elements form the basis for the collection of information and data
in the case studies.
2.4.1 Conclusions from literature
From the discussion of the literature in this chapter, we can draw a number of
conclusions that inform the research in this dissertation.
The first conclusion is that coordination and government at the metropolitan level
can be a relevant practice for the delivery of some services in the city, because more
gains than losses are generated in economic, social, and political terms, and because
the scale distortions in urban government practice are corrected. This conclusion is
one guideline for the research undertaken in this dissertation; it is in agreement
with contemporary literature (Brenner, 1999; Carr et al, 1999; Hall, 1997; Lefèvre,
1998; Sharpe, 1995), and follows suggestions put forward by Sassen (1994).
The second conclusion is that metropolitan coordination is best practised by urban
government on a set of urban utilities on a scale that corresponds with the
metropolitan scale (Davey, 1996; Lefèvre, 1998; McGill, 1998). In other words, the
principle of subsidiarity plays an important part in the conceptualization of the
research study. Urban functions should be administered by agencies at the
appropriate geographical scale, and for some functions that is a metropolitan scale.
The general consensus is that, for the metropolitan scale, these functions are: urban
development planning (physical planning); urban public transport; environmental
control/regulation; local economic development; water and sanitation (IHS, 1996;
Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1995; Ward, 1996). 
The third conclusion to be taken into account is that the governments of the large
metropolises of Latin America (capital cities, secondary cities), are in a complex
process of change that includes decentralization and liberalization. Caught between
liberalization programmes and decentralization processes, the governments of these
cities are burdened with increasing service demand from households and firms,
while at the same time they are redefining their spatial mandates, territorial
organizations, and interaction with other agencies and governments in the city
(Boisier, 1997; De la Cruz, 1995; Garrocho et al, 1995; Iracheta, 1995; Jungemann,
1996; Lungo, 1994; McGill, 1998; Mohan, 1994; Rodriguez et al, 1996; Ward,
1996). 
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2.4.2 Research questions
The objective of the research, the analysis of the need for urban government
structures with a metropolitan reach, is operationalized into four questions:
Are there relevant (existing) institutional arrangements with the ability/capacity to
respond to issues at the metropolitan scale? 
First, the existence of forms of metropolitan governments and/or coordination is
important for this research. An assessment of the context in which they operate and
the aims of their policies would clarify how they interact within this context. 
Are there new emerging institutional arrangements that respond to the problem at the
metropolitan level? 
In response to the new processes and problems affecting city development, new
forms of arrangements as yet ill defined in the institutional structure, but
nonetheless capable of functioning in the city, may be discovered. Identifying and
describing these developments (agencies, coalitions, and so forth) is relevant.
What is the performance of these (existing or emerging) arrangements with regard to
decision making on processes at the metropolitan scale? 
The capability of responding to the economic, political, and spatial transformations
described in this chapter suggests that strategic decisions are made with a
metropolitan dimension and at least a medium-term perspective. Whether these
decisions are made within metropolitan institutions or not, the process of achieving
them and their impact on the city are relevant for the research.
What bottlenecks can be observed for these metropolitan arrangements? 
In addition to the existence or emergence of relevant metropolitan arrangements, a
study of the main bottlenecks affecting their performance is pertinent. An inventory
of these bottlenecks is relevant not only to the case studies observed, but also to
other cities [in Latin America] which are moving towards metropolitanization, and
development institutions operating at the urban level.
2.4.3 Research framework
So far, looking at the schematic research framework figure (figure 2.3), this research
has drawn conclusions from metropolitan discussions and observations of
institutional processes in Latin American cities (see 2.4.1 and conclusions 1 to 3 in
the figure). The research questions have been formulated in relation to these
conclusions (see 2.4.2 and research questions in the figure). Until this point, these
elaborations have been limited to a theoretical discussion (in the figure, a line has
been drawn schematically to establish this limit). 
It is however possible from this theoretical discussion to define the main research
action as: assessing the developments and characteristics of the institutional dynamics in
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the selected functions. This statement implies several decisions for research, the sort
of data to be collected, the extent and type of the analysis, and the final interpretation
of results in the conclusive chapter. The decisions made are elaborated below.
For the selection of data, as mentioned above, selected urban functions would be
researched. For practical reasons, not all metropolitan functions were to be analysed,
but two were selected from the known set of them (see 2.3.1 above). These two
functions (urban public transport, and physical planning) were used as
representative functions from the range of functions that can best be delivered at the
metropolitan level. The arguments supporting the selection of these functions are
presented below in 2.4.4.
The cases for the selected cities are built up in the next chapter (Metropolitan Areas
in Latin America and their government). 
Finally, elements of the analysis were mentioned in section 2.3.2, where some
instruments to identify and classify metropolitan coordination were described.
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Figure 2.2 - Research Framework.
These instruments formed the core of the analysis and were applied to the data
collected (data collected about urban planning for Caracas and Monterrey). The
results of this operation (type of inter-governmental arrangements, level of
coordination, tendencies, bottlenecks) shape the starting arguments for the
particular findings with regard to the research questions. 
2.4.4 Research implementation
In this section the case studies, the urban functions and the instruments of analysis
are described. An extended discussion about the case studies is provided in the next
chapter.
The focus of the research is two metropolitan territories in Latin America: Monterrey
in Mexico, and Caracas in Venezuela. The relevance of the case studies is explained by
their specific roles in their particular countries: Monterrey as an export city, where
effective government is important to support and maintain the economic dynamic;
Caracas as a capital city absorbed in power struggles, and representing the most
important agglomeration of its country in terms of population and economic
development. These two cities exemplify what happens in cities in Latin America.
Most Latin American countries have a capital city with characteristics similar to those
of Caracas – primacy, power struggles, interlocking and overlapping governments.
Monterrey is similar to other cities in the region that are not the capital cities of their
countries. Economic development and greater integration with the international
economy, taking advantages of the opportunities that the round of liberalization
programmes has brought to Latin American countries, are featured. In the next
chapter, profiles of Monterrey and Caracas are presented. The selection of these cases
and their relevance in representing similar conditions in Latin America is further
explained.
For urban functions, urban planning and transport strategies are the focus of this
study; they serve as a sample of the institutional developments in the metropolitan
areas of the case studies. The arguments for this selection are further explained. in
the following paragraphs.
The selection of urban development planning is made on the assumption that
physical planning is the main instrument of intervention and control for
government in the built environment. It is also a function generally performed by
the central government. The urban plan is, therefore, an interpretation of the
present and future condition of the city. The question is how this interpretation fits
into the functionality of the metropolitan area. An evaluation is required of the
content and reach of plans proposed by government institutions in relation to
metropolitan areas.
For urban development planning, the decisions relevant in the metropolitan area, and
so for this research, are investment, regulation, and enforcement/ implementation.
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The analysis assesses who takes the decisions, at what level of authority, what kind of
coordination is achieved, where the bottlenecks are, and what the impact is of these
decisions on the urban agglomeration.
In addition to the explicit interpretation mentioned, the institutions that implement
urban development plans are also interesting for this study, especially identifying the
level of government on which they operate, what kind of links they have with each
other, and how they deal with the conflicts and bottlenecks of fragmentation. 
Urban Public Transport has been selected, because the proposal and implementation
of strategies in this service play a part in the economic performance of the city.
Transportation involves different levels of government, and coordination is
important if an effective outcome is to be obtained. Road infrastructure, trunk roads,
urban rail systems (metro, tramways) are frequently under central or regional
government control. The provision of bus lines and other modes of public transport,
the maintenance of roads, infrastructure, and equipment are assigned in many cases
to local authorities. The government strategies that relate infrastructure investment,
transport mode administration, maintenance and regulation, are dispersed
throughout the different levels of government and different administrations at the
same administrative level. The study considers these strategies, or the combined
outcome of public action. Attention is also paid to the interrelation and coordination
within the current arrangements and the bottlenecks encountered through a lack of
metropolitan coordination. The data collected for the case studies was designed to
illuminate two points: on the one hand, an institutional map of the urban transport
sector in the city; on the other, the performance of this structure with respect to the
goals and strategies in the metropolitan realm.
For the urban transport sector, the decisions relevant to this research are investment,
pricing, and maintenance. More specifically, it is important to know who takes the
decisions, what level of authority is involved, what kind of coordination is achieved,
where the bottlenecks are, and what the impact is of these decisions on the urban
agglomeration. 
For the two case studies and the two urban functions selected, data was collected in
the form of documents (laws, agreements, partnerships), statistics, and thematic
interviews with key officers involved in the urban functions selected (see appendix).
This information was used to assign a value for the government arrangement acting
in the selected function, using the table types of intergovernmental coordination
(Table 2.1) as described in section 2.3.2 and modified from Mitchell-Weaver’s
classification (2000). A level in the coordination scale (table 2.2) was assigned in
accordance with the interviews and secondary data specifying the co-ordination level
achieved for that function with the type of intergovermental arrangement found. In
each case, the metropolitan adequacy (the coverage of the urban function involved in
relation to the metropolitan scale) was observed.
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From the information collected through interviews and the analysis of the selected
functions in the selected cities, a commentary has been given on the state of
metropolitan government in these cities, the bottlenecks and the perspectives for
institutional development in the direction of metropolitan arrangements. 
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Note
1 A primate urban system is one where a single city concentrates the majority of the population,
demographic growth is faster and stronger than in other cities in the country, or a city, which
remains in a “primacy” position by concentrating a large amount of population and
investments. The system is often referred as unbalanced, because of the territorial imbalances
in population distribution, use of natural resources, and provision of service and infrastructure.
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Metropolitan areas in Latin America 
and their government
In this chapter, the background against which cities in Latin America are governed is
described. This background consists mainly of political issues rather than
organizational or management issues. Although the management of all the large
Latin American cities (above 1 million inhabitants) faces similar problems, such as
congestion, inadequate water supply, and urban sprawl, these cities’ institutional
background (national political context, economic profile) is considered to be as
important as their institutional structure (levels of governments, legitimacy,
distribution of functions and responsibilities). These cities may be classified by their
main economic activity and political significance in their national urban systems;
such a classification can contribute to an understanding of the forces that shape the
institutional arrangements in the major Latin American cities. Following this
argument, it was decided to analyse cases from two classes of cities: the capital cities,
and export cities. 
First in this classification come the capital cities, the political and economic centres
of their countries, where a subtle, or direct struggle for power is being played out.
This type of city is exemplified by Caracas, the capital of Venezuela. Caracas serves
as a representative case for our research analysis and the purposes of this
dissertation.
In the second part of the chapter, export cities are discussed. These are cities that,
while not a political centre in the sense of a capital city, have developed a profile of
economic dynamism based on the opportunities of liberal trade that have been open
to Latin American countries in the last two decades. This trade has provided the
export cities with a growth capacity. Institutional demands and local government
policies lead them to differ from the capital cities in terms of institutional
development and political government. Monterrey, the capital of the State of Nuevo
León in Mexico, is the representative case to illustrate this type of city described in
this chapter and serve as a case study for this dissertation as reported below.
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3.1 Caracas: Capital City
Capital cities in Latin America are usually the largest cities in their countries. The
concentration of political and economic power comes together with a concentration
of people and resources. These cities are frequently part of a national urban system
characterized by primacy and continuous urban growth.
These capital cities share a position as important representatives of their countries
in an international context. This position is based on historical developments; in
early colonial times (1500-1840) these cities functioned as the seat of colonial
governments with strong relations with the European colonial power (Spain, or in
the case of Brazil, Portugal). Most of the exchange with the colonial power took place
through these cities, which meant that other cities in the colonial province or
territory were dependent on the capital city for trade, travel and power. Later on, after
these provinces gained their independence and new countries were created in Latin
America in the first half of the nineteenth century (1800-1840), the capital cities of
the colonial provinces became the capital cities of the new countries, keeping the
urban hierarchy within the new nations unchanged. 
During the twentieth century, most Latin American countries experienced sustained
growth in population and trade. Their role in international trade reflects a
transformation in the economies of the region. This transformation proceeded from
predominantly agricultural economies at the beginning of the century to more
industrialized and service oriented economies at the end of the century. However,
some Latin American economies are not sufficiently diversified and continue to
depend on one or two products, typically natural resources (oil, minerals, timber) or
agricultural products. In any case, these developments have occurred in a region
where governments were centralized, and policy defined at only a few locations. A
centre of power has always been present, and its location has tended to be the capital
city. This location derives from hierarchies and structures inherited from colonial
times with regard to urban systems, or as a consequence of the centralized and
hierarchical structures of governments (military regimes, centralized democracies).
In general, capital cities in Latin America developed their primacy from a
combination of historical developments, the centralization of power, and their role as
economic centres. However, as noted earlier (see chapter 1), although its rate of
population growth might be slowing down, Latin America is becoming increasingly
urban and metropolitan. That is to say, the concentration of people in the major
cities is increasing. This concentration puts pressure on the capital cities, where
populations were already large, and this pressure translates into an increasing
demand to sustain or improve the quality of life in the city (public utilities,
infrastructure, and so forth). Accordingly, governments and institutions responsible
for providing public utilities and infrastructure in the capital cities are under
pressure. The array of institutional arrangements found in the various capital cities
|52|
of Latin American to deliver public transport, water and sanitation, urban planning,
control sprawl, ensure police security, organize major infrastructure investments,
and fulfil other public responsibilities indicates the efforts that city governments
have had to make to respond to these challenges. At this point, a first tentative
conclusion can be drawn that the governments of the capital cities in Latin America
have the obligation to organize themselves to deal properly with the tasks arising
from urban growth, metropolitanization, and the role of these cities as key locations.
Undoubtedly, the extent of this range of responsibilities has an impact on the
institutional structure governing these cities. 
Another issue affecting the way government is institutionalized in capital cities in
Latin American is the political weight and power inherent in governing primate
cities. With the largest numbers of inhabitants, these cities are also the largest
electoral constituencies in their countries, and the vote in the city will often have a
considerable political impact in major elections, regardless of the level of
government (central, regional, or local). This characteristic makes government
institutions in capital cities prone to all kind of disputes and reshuffling. 
On the one hand, those elected to the central government could foresee potential
political threats from elected or acting public servants operating at regional or local
city levels. An example would be a mayor building a political platform strong enough
to support a candidacy in a presidential election, as has been the case in Buenos
Aires, Quito, Caracas, and Mexico City. Such a situation tends to be curbed by
actions from central government to limit the regional or local government power,
which is perceived as threatening. These actions range from limiting revenue
transfers, delaying the functional and financial transfer implied in decentralization,
centralizing public utilities, breaking the constituency into smaller sub-divisions,
and avoiding intergovernmental collaboration. 
On the other hand, the regional or local governments of these capital cities react to
these curtailing actions from central government and form coalitions or
partnerships with decentralized agencies (agencies in charge of specific functions,
such as investment in and management of metro systems, water supply, solid waste
management), and challenge central government in court to gain authority and
power. In the long run, these conflicts leave their mark on the institutional
arrangements and governments of capital cities: double-checks for investments,
loops in legislation to get things done, damage to legitimacy, distortion of
responsibilities, ad hoc coalitions with no continuity, and so forth. Consequently, a
second tentative conclusion drawn about governing capital cities in Latin America is
that the organization of government institutions not only serves the functional needs
of the city or the constitutional mandates of the country, but is also characterized by
political struggle and intersecting national, regional, and local ambitions. All in all,
the institutional framework is complicated and unstable. Caracas serves as a good
example of such developments. 
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Caracas is the primate city of Venezuela, concentrating political and economic
power. Functionally, it has a territorial core of about 2000 km2 with almost 4 million
inhabitants (see Table 3.1), which is close to 20% of the total population of the
country. In a typical metropolitan paradox, this functional urban region has a
fragmented and contradictory institutional arrangement; that is to say, operating in
the city are all three levels of government (central, regional, local). The local
government is subdivided into several districts within the city, and these
governmental units divide up the typical urban functions (transport coordination,
planning, and so forth). The politics in and around the government of the city follow
a logic that is not functional-economic. 
3.1.1 Institutional framework
Three elements are discussed here to illustrate the functioning of the institutional
framework in Caracas: first, the geographical and functional characteristics of the
metropolitan realm or metropolitan. The economic position of the city is then briefly
elaborated, and finally the structure of urban government (the sum of government,
agencies, and institutions acting within the metropolitan area) is reviewed.
Metropolitan realm
Geographically, Caracas has a confined territory, located in a valley whose natural
boundaries provide the boundaries to the conurbation. The Avila mountain range,
forming part of Cordillera de la Costa, provides an impressive northern limit,
standing between the city and the Caribbean Sea. To the south, more accessible hills
define the natural end of the valley, which runs from west to east with the Guaire
River. Further south, a system of valleys runs eastwards along the Tuy River. These
secondary valleys became the first natural hinterlands and later the expansion
territory for the city.
Caracas is accessible by air and sea through the infrastructure facilities that lie on
the Caribbean side of the Avila. These mainports are the International Airport in
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Source: OCEI, 1993
Table 3.1 - Caracas’s territory, population and working force
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Maiquetia, and the Port of La Guaira. The road infrastructure of the country also
serves the city, providing good connections to the east, west, and south. 
Caracas became the capital of the Province of Venezuela in 1577, ten years after the
foundation of the city in 1567 by Diego de Losada. The possibility of controlled
access and good defence against attacks from the sea made Caracas the natural
choice as the main city of the province, replacing the earlier capital of Coro, which
had suffered frequent attacks from sea during the first years of the colony. This
strategic choice of the city to be the capital of the province added to the favourable
conditions for agricultural production in the valley of Caracas. This agricultural
metropolis capitalized quickly on the advantages of its administrative pre-eminence
and developed into the military, religious, commercial and cultural centre of the
province. It became the thriving community where the independence movement
was initiated (1811). After gaining independence from Spanish colonial rule (1821)
and during the remaining years of the nineteenth century, Caracas remained the
capital of the Republic and continued to be the centre of power. At that time, Caracas
became the ultimate destination for the various regional political and military
factions in their attempts to attain national authority. 
The conurbation in the major valley of Caracas corresponds to a functional urban
region. Within the geographical boundaries of the valley, the urban agglomeration is
constituted politically by different administrative entities, and constituted
economically to act as a functional urban region. Apart from the sets of statistics that
fit the administrative boundaries (states, municipalities), for practical purposes the
official publications from the Central Statistical Office (OCEI) include two additional
field boundary definitions: Caracas Metropolitan Area (AMC) defined in 1971,
including core municipalities of the city; and the Capital Region, including two
federal entities (Miranda State, and the Federal District). 
The AMC definition is widely used by the Central Bank for consumer-price
indicators; AMC data are used to calculate the official urban inflation rate. The
Capital Region definition is used by central government for planning needs. Central
Government goals and actions in planning, environment, transport, and to a lesser
degree in housing provision, use regions as their work field. This preference
provokes some tension between political administrative subdivisions (states and
municipalities), which adds to the political pressures on the institutions governing
the city. 
These two statistical realms, the AMC and the Capital Region, are based on
economic and geographical conditions (the economic realm, the continuous urban
sprawl) rather than on political-administrative delineations. A functional urban
region (FUR) as defined by van den Berg (1986) would contain the AMC, where
employment in the area is strongly related to the core of the region. To identify the
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Capital Region (Federal District+Miranda State) with such an integrated model
would be difficult, since employment for the population in the east part of Miranda
State, the barlovento area, is related to the core less strongly. In Barlovento, the
tourist sector along the coast and the remains of an agricultural sector provide
employment in the non-urban areas. Nevertheless, the urban areas in Miranda State
have been intensively related to the core in employment and economic activities. The
functional urban region of Caracas rests on the totality of the Federal District and the
continuous urbanized areas of Miranda state, where employment and economic
activities are strongly related to the city. The core and the hard ring (where at least
20% of the population are employed) of this functional urban region are included in
the AMC. The soft ring consists of the rest of the urban areas in Miranda State. 
As in most countries in Latin America, population growth in Venezuela is slowing
down (Gilbert, 1994), although the pressures on urban infrastructure remain. In
fact, the AMC is deurbanizing, and growth in the core of the functional urban region
is declining, while the opposite is occurring in the hard ring (See Figure 3.2).
However, the AMC is expected to keep its lead as the main urban agglomeration in
the country, with at least 12% of the population by the year 2000 (Vallmitjana,
1994).
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caculations
For a capital city, the choice of location of one important actor has already been
made. Through historical circumstances and decisions made at constitutional level,
the national (central) government, with many of its branches, is associated with a
capital city at an early stage. Other actors in the urban economy follow, in a logical
set of interdependencies. Firms directly concerned with the provision of services to
the bureaucracy and the political class also choose the primate city. In Latin
American capitals, the concentration of power and, until recently, a heavily
centralized government, have been important factors for the location of other agents
of the national economy within the core of the national capital. Firms seek locations
close to the centre where political decisions are made. The commanding levels of
business sector management gravitate towards the place where, in size and power,
the public sector concentrates. 
Caracas, a capital city, has a big government sector. In comparison with other urban
agglomerations in Venezuela, employment related to state functions is high. Most
agencies of the Central Government are located in Caracas. The executive,
legislative, and judicial arms of the state are in Caracas. In the last decades (from
1986 onwards), state reform strategies have pressed for a reduction in the size of the
state, but it remains a big employer in the country and in the city (see Figure 3.3). 
Employment in the manufacturing sector is more evenly distributed over the major
urban agglomerations in Venezuela (see Figure 3.4), while employment at the top of
the service sector is concentrated in Caracas (see Figure 3.5). The main branches of
the financial sector, both national and international institutions, are concentrated in
Caracas (see Figure 3.6). Control activities, high-end transactions, and international
transactions take place in the city. Of the two stock exchanges in Venezuela
(Maracaibo and Caracas), the Caracas Stock Exchange is by far the larger in terms of
volume and value of transactions. Corporate headquarters in Caracas greatly
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Figure 3.3 - Government Sector’s Employment by Federal Entity. Source: OCEI, 1993
outnumber those in any other city of the country. The headquarters of the most
important enterprises remain in Caracas. Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A. (PDVSA), the
largest single fiscal contributor, is a state-owned oil company with its head office in the
capital. In addition to the corporate command functions, the coordination and
procurement functions and the service divisions of the oil giant are also located in
Caracas. In fact, the national dominance of Caracas in the corporate, financial, and
banking spheres is in line with the second thesis of the World City hypothesis of
Friedmann (1986), in which he includes Caracas as a secondary city within the semi-
peripheral countries of his world-city hierarchy, indicating the role of these cities as an
articulation of their national economies to the international capital. Further studies by
Taylor (1997, 1999, 2000) and Beaverstock (1999) based on Friedmann’s hypothesis
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Figure 3.5 - Service Sector’s Employment by Federal Entity. Source: OCEI, 1993. Services
include: finance, insurance, commence, government, social services, transport,
communications, service to firms
and Sassen’s ideas (1991) have provided a “roster of world cities” in which the capitals
of Latin American countries are set in a hierarchy, and, in the case of Caracas, set in a
rank referred to as gamma, 1 the third rank of the world cities hierarchy.
The economic position of Caracas within the national economy is strong, and the
restructuring of the economy has further strengthened its interrelationship with
global markets. The city functions as the global node for capital, information, and
decision-making. The city represents the point of convergence of the international
flows and the national economy. The locational advantages of an extended
infrastructure, good accessibility, a concentration of human resources, amenities,
and the implications of its population size (consumer market, labour availability),
have been attractive enough to sustain the principal role of the city in the national
urban system, although reform and liberalization would introduce competition from
other cities, which should have locational advantages for production, export-zones,
and innovative environments. 
Caracas is a step ahead of the other cities in the country. First, the capital has been the
main recipient of the benefits of the oil revenues, since the redistributive policies are
based more on formulas ruled by population size than by rules of origin of taxes. The
government’s fiscal strength is therefore unrelated to the economy of the city. Second,
the city’s size and growth have followed a natural development path that has provided
incentives for urban growth, despite planning policies and rural development policies
explicitly aimed at the deconcentration of the largest cities (Vallmitjana, 1993). Third,
centralized power in Venezuela favoured a State where the top executive had wide
authority and means. This state of affairs translates, by way of populist policies, into
extra attention being paid to Caracas (larger electorate) in infrastructure investment,
and service development. Self-reinforcement ensues as powerful middle and upper
class groups, living largely in the capital, exert pressure for better delivery of services.
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The urban government of Caracas is characterized by complexity and fragmentation:
complexity, because of the overlapping administrative and legal provisions;
fragmentation, because of the extended number of actors and administrative
territories. From its constitution (1961, 1999), Venezuela is a Federal Republic.
Twenty-two states joined in a federation to form a Republic; they remain equal to
each other in political terms. As is the case in many federate countries, such as the
United States of America, or the United States of Mexico, the capital city of the
federation is not located in one of the participant states. This arrangement prevents
any form of advantage or inequality. The administrative solution has been to
establish an administrative entity (a special district, a federal district) that covers the
territory of the capital of the federation and which, by way of its special status and
territorial limitations, prevents the concentration of power affecting any particular
state. The federal district is neither a state, nor the capital of a state. It is an
administrative entity hosting the functions of government of the country.
The branches of federal government – executive, legislative and judicial – are located
in the federal district. The executive is consequently granted extended authority over
the district. Logically, the federal district would be expected to include only the
territory where these government functions operate, but in Caracas it covers a larger
territory. A Government quadrangle including only the federal government
installations and buildings would extend to several hectares, but the Federal District
defined by the constitution in 1961 (confirmed in the 1999s constitution) covers 1930
Km2. This is a considerable territory for a non-state district; it is densely populated
and, with the considerable political leverage this concentration of votes brings, it has a
substantial impact on the composition of legislative and executive powers. 
Until 1999, the authority of Central Government in the Federal District consisted of
the appointment of a Governor for the district, with basic responsibilities for law and
order (police) and some duties related to land management, schools, and health
provision. After 1999, the figure of a mayor for the Federal District was introduced,
this time an elected officer, but still carrying the same attributes of authority and
duties as the former Governor.
Below the special provision for the Federal District are two other administrative tiers
in the metropolitan area: first, (regional level), the government of the federal entities,
or the State Government that is present in the AMC through Miranda State; second,
(local level) the municipal governments. Both regional and local levels have elected
officers in the executive and legislative branches, and both levels are entitled to make
fiscal decisions. In the case of the Federal District, a provision in the law of
municipal government allows the district to have municipal governments as any
other federal entity, with equal rights and obligations. Table 3.2 shows the levels of
government in Venezuela and the associated distribution of power; Table 3.3 lists the
government tiers present at the AMC.
The administrative subdivisions in the AMC are settled mainly by political
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considerations rather than geographic, or economic justifications. This situation is
the consequence of institutional developments associated with centralization (the
prevailing system for a long period of republican life following the 1961
constitution), political interests at play in the capital (to capture votes, define
constituencies, divide opposition strongholds, and so forth), and the way the
decentralization process has evolved since its inception in 1989, when the Municipal
Act (Ley Orgánica de Regimén Municipal, LORM), and decentralization act were first
sanctioned.
At the regional level, the administrative subdivision of the city into two different
territories (Federal District, Miranda State) is a natural problem for coordination.
These territories have different status, which has political and fiscal implications,
and adds to the problems of joint public action. The seaside municipality of Vargas
(part of the Federal District), the location of both air and sea ports, successfully
lobbied for secession from the Federal District and has recently obtained the right to
become the country’s 23rd State. The situation at the regional tier of government in
the city is complicated.
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Level of
government
Executive
functions
Central
Regional (FD)
Regional (states)
Local
President
Governor
Governors
Mayors
Legislative
functions
National congress
National congress
State assemblies
Municipal councils
Justice
functions
Courts
Courts
Courts
Courts
Source: LORM, LODF, Constitution.
Table 3.2 - Levels of government and distribution of powers
Federal District
Miranda State
Federal entity Regional Authority
Local authority
(all elected)
Governor (Appointed)
Governor (Elected)
Libertador Vargas
Petare
Chacao
Hatillo
Baruta
Salias
Carrizal
Other municipalities
Source: LORM, LODF, Constitution.
Table 3.3 - Government Tiers in AMC
At local level, new municipalities have proliferated in Caracas and in the larger
metropolitan areas in the country as a reaction to decades of centralization, and as a
result of the political and fiscal incentives give for a new municipality to be
established. A certain weight in population, public support (expressed in
endorsement signatures from a threshold number of inhabitants) and a strong lobby
in the legislature are sufficient to mobilize the creation of a municipality. Less
attention and leverage is given to physical-geographical elements, socio-cultural
implications, or economic conditions. Besides, the nature of the fiscal transfer
system is a strong incentive to create recipient administrations (since sub-national
governments are automatic recipients of fiscal transfers through formulas based on
population). This goal is an attractive one for political groups and community
coalitions.
Vallmitjana (1994) recognized these developments in a study of the new scenarios
for local government in Caracas and concluded as early as 1994 that a moratorium
for the creation of new municipalities in the AMC was needed as the first step for
improved government and better-coordinated actions. 
The tiers of government (central, regional, local) present at the AMC have a legal
framework in the Constitution (1961) (1999), the Territorial Ordering Act (1989),
the Organic Act for Municipal Government (1989), and the Federal District Act
(1970). Taken together, these Acts provide ample legal support for the case for the
institutionalization of these levels of government. However, the same legislation has
provided little support to metropolitan governments, urban consortia or extended co-
ordination for the whole metropolitan area. Within this framework, metropolitan
arrangements are frequently included in the legislation as an optional arrangement. 
In Caracas, forms of coordination are emerging in the different government
institutions and agencies related to the government of the city. Aside from the
institutional complexity and fragmentation, these forms of coordination seek to
introduce a wider perspective in the management of urban services and build a
territorial coverage fitting the metropolitan needs. 
First of all, decentralization has only been partial, consisting mainly of an
incomplete devolution of functions and responsibilities from central government to
sub-national levels. This partial devolution has protected the scale of some service
providers remaining under central government control, giving these agencies (such
as the metro company, or the city water company) the advantage of scale, although
putting them in conflict with the new governing institutions of the city.
Infrastructure providers, the metro transport system, public utilities such as water
and sanitation, and electricity provision, have followed a different logic of
decentralization than that of the political institutions, and have therefore been
immune to fragmentation and closely related in financial terms to central
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government. The difference is that, on the one hand, governments and government
representation has been decentralized at a rapid pace, providing the country with
elected officers at all levels of government, and giving the city an array of local level
governments (municipalities) with elected mayors and councils. On the other hand,
public utilities have not been decentralized or handed out to the new authorities at
the same pace. Ultimately, they should be decentralized or transferred to lower levels
of governments, but this process has been slower than that of the political
institutions, and often subject to negotiation between central government and sub
national governments (regional or local). These public functions have been
transformed from institutions on a national scale to regional, decentralized
organizations aiming at optimal functional scale. 
These two decentralization logics translate into differences in financial procedures,
accountability, and goal setting. For finance, agencies working independently of
regional or local government, but still attached to central government, have direct
access to budgetary discussions or might lobby the central government directly. The
level of accountability that elected officers, state governors and municipal mayors
have towards their public differs from that of the assigned executives of public
agencies, such as the metro company or the water company. Finally, a decentralized
agency can afford to set its goals in accordance with its technical view of the issues;
these may include accessibility, sanitation, infrastructure and investment. These
goals and responses differ from those of an elected government, which has to
balance technical views with the political issues inherent to an elected post. 
Local governments in Caracas have moved to interact with these public service
organizations, ultimately to respond to their obligations as legal providers of urban
services. These organizations have gradually developed a tendency to assume control
of local government urban functions. The first step is the acceleration of the transfers
of functions from central government, or the independent agency involved. A second
step is negotiating arrangements (contracts, partnerships) with the provider (the
decentralized agency or central government) to guarantee that they meet the goals of
the local government. A third step in this process is the consolidation of the
arrangements and coalitions between different local governments to interact as a
whole with the service agency. With this last mechanism, the local governments add
bargaining power and create room for coordination and consultation.
Another choice for local government is to remain inactive in dealing with the
services still provided by metropolitan or regional agencies. While such inaction
might bring some risk to the officers in charge, it has been a conscious choice for
many local governments, because services might be difficult to manage and political
losses might be incurred. 
The reasons leading to this kind of avoidance include financial constraints,
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management capacity, personnel, or the possibility of political confrontation. This
inaction occurs in Caracas in the following urban functions: water provision,
transportation, electricity, and environmental control. This option generates an
interesting picture of metropolitan action by omission. Sometimes conflicting issues
about metropolitan functions are only discussed by the actors willing to participate,
and not by all those legally involved, since some of them would prefer not to
participate. That is the case for the manner in which decisions have been made
concerning transport fares, tariffs, and concessions. The decision-making involved
the transport unions, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and just one
municipality (Libertador). The decisions they took on fares, tariffs, and concessions
were later followed throughout the city, but the political losses were associated
exclusively with the actors primarily involved. The political losses associated with an
increase in fares accrued to the mayor of the municipality of Libertador, although all
the other municipalities, and therefore their mayors, also imposed the fare increase
after a few weeks, but without suffering any political damage. 
Decentralization implemented partially or unevenly across politics and functions has
made room for ad hoc government arrangements that cross the bridge between
government institutions and agencies providing metro services. Sometimes these
arrangements are on a metropolitan scale on both agency and government sides, but
a metro agency is more likely than an urban government to operate on the
metropolitan scale. In Caracas, these conditions bring about a multitude of
arrangements and contracts within urban authorities, public utilities, central
government agencies, and private providers. An agency is likely to make separate
arrangements with various municipalities. More ambitious options to attempt
coordination at metropolitan level in Caracas are limited to municipal partnerships
and a council of mayors, regardless of the fact that Municipal Act refers to the option
of a formal structure as a metropolitan district.
Partnerships among municipalities have become the arrangements closest to
metropolitan co-ordination. They consist of inter-municipal agreements to establish
wide-area authorities or agencies for particular services. In the Municipal Act Ley
Orgánica de Regimen Municipal LORM (1989), many features of such agencies, such
as accountability to the participant municipalities, duties, financing, composition,
staffing, pricing, and so forth, are left to be determined with great flexibility by the
partners involved. This flexibility is an advantage over the metropolitan district
arrangement, which is designed more rigidly in the Municipal Act(LORM).
Nevertheless, the main failure of municipal partnerships acting in a metropolitan
area such as Caracas is the lack of scale adequacy. These arrangements are voluntary,
so that scale issues are not adequately met if some municipalities in the
metropolitan area are unwilling to participate. The lack of scale adequacy is a
shortcoming in these partnerships for externalities related to environmentally
sensitive services, urban development, or infrastructure planning, which could lead
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to positive or negative spill over effects. A typical case in Caracas is the partnership
of the five municipalities in the valley (Libertador, Sucre, Baruta, El Hatillo, Chacao)
to contract out solid waste management and disposal. The dumpsite, or landfill lies
in a municipality in the direct proximity of the conurbation, a municipality that is
not part of the partnership. The external municipality is left to deal with the
environmental consequences (land contamination, health risks, water pollution, and
so forth) of hosting the landfill, or to negotiate with the contractor. The resolution of
these issues is, however, of interest for the whole conurbation or metropolitan area,
including the municipalities in the partnership. 
The council of mayors is a consultative, non-binding group of mayors at the level of
the metropolitan area. The council includes the representatives of Libertador,
Chacao, Hatillo, Baruta, and Petare. Participation consists of attending the
consultation meetings and exchanges between senior technical staff. The council
produces statements on urban and metropolitan issues and tries to enforce some
coordination on their members in the form of agreements at technical levels
(standardization of procedures, documentation, and so forth). The council is less
effective in producing and enforcing these agreements than in producing general
political statements. Two reasons for the poor organizing capacity of the council are:
a lack of fiscal power, since the council is not a structure fitted into any legislation,
so it lacks any entitlement to revenue transfers or taxation powers; and that it is a
voluntary organization, with territorial coverage or scale adequacy secondary to the
political convenience of participation among mayors. Continuity is also affected by
this fact and erodes any chance of enhancing organizing capacity.
The council of mayors plays a part in the political debate in the city, and thus in the
national debate. Raising metropolitan issues such as environmental control, waste
disposal, transport problems, water shortages, has been important. A combative
stance has been used to support the demands of the local governments to central
government, making the Council a good lobby for municipal demands. In the
context of weak financial capacity and voluntary participation, the lobby seems the
most appropriate role for this institution.
A metropolitan district is a meso-level government proposed in the Municipal Act
(LORM, 1989). The rights and obligations of this form of government intrude on
local government duties and finance. For this reason, the debate to activate this
structure encounters the opposition of local governments, especially the politically
strong counties of Caracas. Nevertheless, the problems of fragmentation and lack of
scale in urban management have fuelled the debate around the Metropolitan
District. Before the change in the national constitution in 1999, under the 1961
constitution there were at least three reforms proposed around this theme: two from
central government; one from the national Congress. After 1999, the new
constitutional framework overcame the early bottlenecks to establish a metropolitan
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government in Caracas, and changed the designation of the Federal District to a
Metropolitan District, while keeping the same combination of responsibilities as
before. In addition to the change of name, the Metropolitan District was assigned a
coordinating role for the municipalities in the metropolitan area. But, as in other
reshuffling and decentralization processes, the legal arguments defining authority,
mandates, transfers, and functions have lagged behind the initial political and
institutional change. It has been argued elsewhere (Paiva, 2001) that these changes,
although in the right direction when they explicitly recognize metropolitan co-
ordination, have brought little change or improvement in the institutional
framework of Caracas. Without legal support or sufficient authority, coordination at
metropolitan level is doomed. Moreover, a new actor (an elected mayor for the
Metropolitan District) is likely to have less capacity to continue, or bring depth to,
ongoing processes such as the municipal partnerships or council of mayors referred
to above.
3.1.2 Conclusion 
The institutional framework of Caracas illustrates how difficult it is to obtain
metropolitan coordination in capital cities. Although geographical or economic
rationales define a metropolitan area with some precision, the governments of
capital cities are dispersed, fragmented, and in many cases redundant in their
competencies. Dispersion, fragmentation and redundancy are to some extent
consequences of the specific path of institutional development in Latin American,
with its tradition of centralized government and the changes introduced by the
decentralization process. This has turned out to be more susceptible to political
interference than to the argument of the adequate provision of metropolitan
services. As Rojas (1999, p.9) explains: “The moving train of decentralization had to
make – and still has to make – frequent stops and take long detours to bring
national political parties and finance and sector ministries on board.” The result of
these stops and detours is that capital cities such as Caracas find themselves in a
difficult position with respect to the organization of effective government or
dependable institutional arrangements capable of serving the demands of the
metropolitan agglomeration at the appropriate geographical scale. 
The existence of metropolitan regions is evident from many geographical and
economic features. Examples of the physical-geographical case include Santiago,
Bogotá (both located in valleys), and Mexico City (settled on the bed of a lake).
Supporting the role of capitals as economic articulations in the global economy,
researchers on world city development (Beaverstock, 1999; Taylor, 1997) have shown
that capitals in Latin America are better represented as case studies than secondary
cities in the region2. In the view of the Inter-American Development Bank (2000, p.
141), as primate cities these metropolises are crucial for the economic development
of their countries, and are seen as “the focal points of any strategy to spur economic
growth.”
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Here the stage is set for Caracas as a case study for this research. As a capital, and
with the kind of institutional framework that has just been outlined, it serves to
exemplify the developments taking place in Latin American capitals. Caracas
epitomizes the case study in which to apply the research analysis to fulfil the
objective of this research, namely to assess the critical need for urban government
structures with a metropolitan reach (see paragraph 2.4.2, chapter 2). We return to this
matter in chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 Monterrey: Export City
Secondary cities in Latin America are facing economic, social, and institutional
challenges that show a metropolitan character previously found only in capital cities.
These secondary cities are often capitals of regional administrations (regions, states,
provinces); most of them were important locations for implementing the past
development policies of import substitution (1950-1970) realized by many countries
in the Latin American region. In recent years, these cities have evolved into
important agglomerations in their nations, pulling the urban growth from the
traditional metropolises (capital cities or primate cities), and sometimes reproducing
the problems associated with metropolitan growth and an inadequate institutional
framework on metropolitan scales. Moreover, while capital cities – through their
primacy, resilience, and concentration of power – have access to resources of many
kinds (financial, political, cultural), allowing them to undergo institutional change
and metropolitan arrangements, secondary cities must often rely on their own
endogenous resources to get through.
As mentioned earlier, Latin American countries experienced sustained growth in
population and trade during the twentieth century, although these transformation
occurred within economies of little or no diversification (Gilbert 1996; Ward 1996).
The dependency of Latin American countries on a limited number of products had
an impact in the definition of urban systems. On the one hand capital cities became
the centres of power and articulation with world systems (Hall 2000; Frey and Dietz
1990), while on the other hand they were the production centres of the relevant
products for their country (mining, agriculture, and so forth) and became the next
important urban agglomerations in the country. 
Similarly, the development policies of industrialization and import substitution
implemented between 1950 and the early 1980s stressed the creation of growth
poles, which soon became secondary cities in their urban systems. The development
of these locations – often existing cities (Guadalajara in Mexico, for example), but
sometimes completely new towns (Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela) – was
accompanied by trade protection, incentives for industries to establish themselves in
these centres, infrastructure development, extensive planning, and incentives for
households to move in. In both cases (traditional production centres and new
growth poles) these secondary cities functioned within clear centralized hierarchies.
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Within these hierarchies, the role of the capital city remained unchanged as a centre
of power and control. Although the location of political and economic power was
unchallenged, population growth and the metropolitanization of the primate cities
was perceived to be inconvenient and a sign of unbalanced urban development, so
“growth pole” policies were also targeted to deconcentrate primate cities and obtain a
balanced urban system with less primacy. 
In the context of state reform, these state-guided policies of centralized planning
were quickly abandoned during the 1980s, setting the stage for a process of
liberalization of the economy, reduction in the size of the state, and political
decentralization. The secondary cities were suddenly open to competition through
trade liberalization, with less central government support through state reforms, and
operating with new political powers through decentralization (Hoshino 1994).
These changes in institutional and economic background brought positive hope
together with immediate difficulties. Hope came in the form of an opportunity for
cities and regions to have more autonomy in the design and implementation of their
development policies or development visions. Dependency on central government
planning declined. Difficulties appeared in the rapid withdrawal of central
government support and capacity as part of the decentralization strategy. An array of
unprepared regional and local governments arose, with unclear assignments of
revenue and expenditure decisions (Salas, 2000). This state of affairs came about
despite all the defects of the previous centralized system, and also despite the fact
that decentralization policies implied processes of devolution and deconcentration of
power that could build capacity into regional governments in the short term. 
Many cities moved from the primate city towards a less dependent role, looking for a
strong position in global markets for themselves. Traditional export centres, whether
the product of genuine industrial and technological capacity or years of artificial
protectionism (growth poles), now had the opportunity to interact with the expanded
markets (trade groups, global markets) more directly than before. For example, Sao
Paolo in Brazil, already a large and important city at national level, has evolved into a
global city (Beaverstock and others 2000; Sassen 1991) with business activities
involving advanced industrial production and specialized services. Another example
is Valencia, in Venezuela, which developed into a modern industrial and export city
after decentralization. In this case, the use of the new political room for manoeuvre
and independence has meant that the regional government and the city have each
taken responsibility for their development direction. The resulting performance has
surpassed that of the traditional secondary cities in Venezuela such as Maracaibo
(involved in oil export), and Puerto Ordaz (a typical growth pole established in the
1960s).
In short, these Latin American cities face interesting institutional challenges that
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characterize them as dynamic, politically uncomplicated, ambitious, and
metropolitan. First, they have recently been empowered to govern themselves.
Second, central government support is receding, making room for the innovation
and creation of new management capacity. Third, opportunities are emerging to
participate more directly in extended markets. These qualities require an effective
urban management prepared to grasp these opportunities. Fourth, in contrast with
the capital cities, the political impasse at different levels of government and the
number of power stakeholders in less complicated. And fifth, the metropolitan scale
of the institutional challenges is becoming more relevant, to such an extent that the
bottlenecks and diseconomies associated with a large metropolitan agglomerations
are appearing more frequently in these cities. 
Monterrey, the capital of the State of Nuevo León in Mexico, is a city of this type
(Garza 1996a). It is facing economic, social, and institutional challenges of a
metropolitan character. While the capital of the country (Mexico City) has to cope
with political bottlenecks and metropolitan problems similar to those encountered in
many other capital cities in Latin America, Monterrey has had to develop its own
solutions to institutional organization and metropolitan problems with fewer
resources and less attention. Mexico City is one of the largest metropolises in the
world and has the benefits and deficiencies of concentration and metropolitanization
on a large scale, ranging from extensive cultural opportunities at the positive end to
environmental problems and administrative fragmentation at the other (Gormsen
1997; Ward 1998). Mexico City, as a capital and primate city, hosts a concentration of
government agencies and is the centre of power. Nevertheless, the urban problems
of Mexico City receive considerable attention from many parties, through its size, its
importance, and its particular appeal. Urban management in Monterrey is
confronted by the typical metropolitan problems arising from urban growth and
economic transformation (urban transportation, comprehensive and feasible
physical planning, environmental control, economic development, water supply
management), without having the advantages or leverage of being the capital city.
And at the same time, the blemishes and imperfections of a barely manageable
metropolis are only too evident. As Garcia Ortega (1998, p. 4) points out: “If actions
are not taken, the Metropolitan Area of Monterrey is at risk of collapsing in the near
future with unsolvable problems such as those of Mexico City – without the Federal
resources on which the capital survives”
In addition, the current fragmentation of the urban government and the projections
of growth make the question about the need of a metropolitan government relevant.
(Garza 1996b). 
Monterrey is representative of Latin American cities, featuring increased interaction
with the world economy and redefining their interaction with the centres of power
(political and economic) of their own national systems. Interaction with the world
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economy accompanies the liberalization of national economies. Additionally, the
restructuring of the national systems is a consequence of the processes of
decentralization and political reform introduced during the last decade (Kresl 1998;
Richardson and Rowland 1994; Weiss 1999).
3.2.1 Institutional framework
The elements discussed in the following pages are illustrative of the institutional
framework functioning in Monterrey. These elements are the metropolitan realm, the
economic position, and the structure of urban government. The metropolitan realm
concerns the geographical characteristics of Monterrey. Important features of the
urban economy are discussed in the section on the economic position of the city.
Finally, under urban government in Monterrey, the combination of government,
agencies, and institutions acting within the metropolitan government are reviewed.
Some general conclusions about export cities drawn from these comments are
presented.
Metropolitan realm
Monterrey is the capital of the State of Nuevo León (see figure 3.7), one of the 31
federal states forming the United States of Mexico. With 2.6 million inhabitants, it is
the largest city in the state, concentrating 85% of the state’s total population (García
Ortega 1998). Monterrey has a strong primacy role within the federal entity. Mexico
has 74% of its total population living in urban environments (World Bank 1998);
one fifth of the country’s total population lives in the megalopolis of Mexico City. 
Monterrey has experienced demographic growth, urban expansion and urban sprawl
for the last 50 years; it became one of the earliest extended metropolitan areas of
Mexico. These metropolises have been the most important agglomerations for the
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Country’s total
  Cities’ total
   MA Mexico City
MA Guadalajara
  MA Monterrey
  MA Puebla
   MA León
Cities
Population
1980
Population
1990 Growth rate Federal Entity
66,846,833
31,946,773
12,968,029
2,210,293
1,929,196
862,453
633,945
81,249,645
41,827,179
14,866,240
2,809,132
2,526,092
1,209,986
810,570
2.02
2.80
1.41
2.48
2.80
3.53
2.55
-
-
D.F., Mexico State
Jalisco
Nuevo León
Puebla
Guanajuato
Source: Sobrino, 1994
Table 3.4 - Urban population. Selected metropolitan areas
country in terms of population and economic development. This centre-periphery
national urban system has a top level of cities – Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey
and Puebla – each with more that one million inhabitants. These cities acted as
centres of economic growth during the import-substitution era (1960-1980), and are
now restructuring their economic base to accommodate a new situation. Half the
population in the country is concentrated in these cities (see Table 3.4); they remain
dominant in a country which is shifting from increased urbanization to
metropolitanization (Richardson and Rowland 1994).
Monterrey is the most important city in the northeast of Mexico and benefits from
intensive trade with the United States of America, as a result of historical
development and the proximity of the USA/Mexico border. In fact, Monterrey is one
of the Mexican cities where new economic tendencies (liberalization, North
American Free Trade Agreement-NAFTA) can be seen to have a direct impact as
measured by trade flows, restructuring of the manufacturing base, employment
composition, consumption patterns, and territorial occupation by households and
firms (Hiernaux 1995; Vellinga 2000). 
Monterrey has long had a private sector that has been involved in policy issues, with
strong lobbies in the state and central governments, and direct participation in
politics. The economic elite of Monterrey has been actively involved in shaping a city
and region that mirrors their interests. This aspect of the institutional framework
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Figure 3.7 - State of Nuevo León
remains a relevant feature of Monterrey with regard to its position in the national
urban system, the national economy, and its own trade and international relations.
The urban management of Monterrey and the regional government of the state of
Nuevo León have therefore an active counterpart in the private sector: a counterpart
experienced in policy discussion and accustomed to direct debate and actions
fostering its own interests. Moreover, this private sector actor has a thorough
understanding of its territory of action, whether metropolitan or regional, and a
vision about territory that is more clearly defined than that of its counterparts in the
different levels of government. 
Monterrey is located in the centre of the State of Nuevo León, on a plateau with a dry
climate in the northeast of Mexico. Having been a city of continuous growth
throughout the last 100 years, with times of prosperity and industrial expansion, the
functional territory of the city has expanded. Indications of this development are the
constant enlargement of the administrative definition for the metropolitan area used
(or proposed) by the management institutions and planning agencies of the
metropolis. In 1950, the Regulatory Plan of the City of Monterrey included the
municipalities of Guadalupe, San Nicolás de los Garza, and San Pedro García in the
Metropolitan Area of Monterrey or AMM (Garza et al., 1995). Later, in 1967, a new
planning institution came into force, which included the original municipalities and
added Garza García to the metropolitan denomination. In the 1980s, there were
already 8 municipalities forming the AMM as a consequence of conurbanations, and
early in the 1990s the AMM received its current administrative definition including
9 urban municipalities (Fasci 1995; Garza 1995). 
Monterrey is a mature metropolis; it is in the process of desurbanization, an
advanced stage of the urban dynamic cycle described by Van den Berg (1987) and
identified by Richardson (1994) in several Mexican cities, with Monterrey showing
the largest rate of desurbanization. In this desurbanization stage, households and
firms tend to move out of the city centre, favouring locations in the near and far
periphery of the city. This phenomenon produced an erosion of the fiscal base of the
municipalities in the centre of the city, so that this in turn began to lose appeal and
fell into a pattern of urban decline. In desurbanization, increasing inequality has a
spatial consequence; some municipalities and locations enjoy relative prosperity and
attempt to isolate themselves and defend their advantageous position from the
problems of the metropolis(Aguilar 1997). It is at this stage that metropolitan
coordination and the search for wide territorial government arrangements are
critical.
The metropolitan realm does not only manifest itself in government arrangements
and demographic trends; it is also evident in public service bottlenecks and
coordination failures. For instance, water has been in short supply and inadequately
provided in the city during the last few decades, with peak moments of chronic
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shortages and social unrest (Bennett 1995). Her studies of water supply in
Monterrey were conducted to identify the characteristics of urban infrastructure
politics and the problems hindering the interactions of the federal government, the
private sector, and the social actors (Bennett 1995). However, the underlying spatial
dimension of the water service remains metropolitan or regional. The allocation of
this dimension corresponds with the assignation of water supply management as a
typical metropolitan urban utility in the literature(Barlow 1997; Bauroth 2000; Berg
and others 1993; Lefevre 1998).
Economic position
Monterrey has a wide manufacturing base, producing glass, cement, chemicals,
beer, and related goods. In addition, Monterrey has developed a number of
specialized services related to these industries and firms. These captains of industry
comprise a clearly defined elite, native to Monterrey and present in some debates as
Grupo Monterrey. This elite has developed during the various processes and phases
of the industrialization of Monterrey during the last 100 years. It embodies a tight
family-related structure (Vellinga 1989) which influences the economy and social
relations in the city. Although some corporate structures still carry family members
on their executive boards, the corporate and transnational aspirations of the main
industrial groups have permeated to the professionalization of the management
level. Their aspirations have somehow been realized, since some of these groups
have been transformed into important players operating beyond the confines of
Monterrey, Nuevo León, or even Mexico. In this regard, economic groups in
Monterrey work at the international level (Pozas 1995). 
Monterrey ranks as one of the most productive agglomerations in the country. GDP
figures for the federal states show that Nuevo León is pre-eminent in manufacturing
and services, maintaining stable developments in these indicators, and with a
relative contribution to the national product that ranks high among the states; 6.47%
in 1993 (INEGI, 1998) falls just behind the states for Mexico City (D.F. and Mexico
state) and Guadalajara (Jalisco). Moreover, while Mexico City is experiencing a
decline in the manufacturing sector coupled with an expansion of the service sector,
Monterrey is maintaining a high profile as a manufacturing centre (see Figure 3.8
and Figure 3.9) . This contrast could be accounted for by the different conditions
found in these two cities: while the central metropolises (Mexico and Guadalajara)
expanded and benefited during the import substitution years (1960-1980),
Monterrey also worked throughout that paradigm, but the ambitions and
independence of the private sector made a difference in terms of industrial
integration, flexibility, trade strategies, and so forth. In this way, Monterrey became
less dependent on protectionism and subsidies authorized by central government as
part of the national development policies (Aguilar-Barajas 1990; Garza 1999;
Vellinga 2000). The economic elite of Monterrey had a parallel agenda in addition to
that of the government in power: an agenda that profited from the development
|73|
paradigm in operation, while at the same time establishing a solid position for
Monterrey and its industrial conglomerates (or the prominent families of the
Monterrey Group) in the economy. 
Nevertheless, the changing of the paradigm during the 1980s, the dramatic debt
crisis in those years, and the Peso crisis in 1995 had an impact on the national
economy from which Monterrey was not spared. The level of employment in the city
is very sensitive to economic shocks, and Monterrey’s urban unemployment has
moved above the national rate in recent difficult periods.
In the context of liberalization and financial crisis, the recovery of the manufacturing
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Figure 3.9 - Mexico. GDP Manufacture. Selected Federal States. Source: INEGI, 1998a
potential of the city is significant. According to Garza (1996, p. 168): “Monterrey
should consolidate its traditional manufacturing specialization by stimulating the
development of advanced technology firms while stimulating the development of
services to the producer, which are essential to the efficient realization of modern
productive processes.” The implication is that, rather than a tertiary revolution, the
transformation of the manufacturing base is the key issue in the economic
development of Monterrey. Garza also recognizes that this commitment represents a
challenge for urban development, and “a need for the appropriate modernization
and technical upgrading of the administrative bodies in the metropolitan areas
(Garza, 1996, p 168).” 
When we consider the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), we see that Monterrey is included within the traditional metropolises of
the Mexican urban system (Mexico City, Guadalajara, Puebla) rather than being
classified as a border city. This is increasingly the classification for the group of cities
with dynamic growth and high-level trade relations through maquila operations with
firms from the United States. These border cities have been described as the clear
winners in the NAFTA, but further analysis has revealed that non-border cities also
have a stake in the benefits of NAFTA through the activation of the installed
industrial base and traditional clustering practices. Monterrey, being a non-border
city (it is located further that 200 kilometres from the border) with a manufacturing
base and an established entrepreneurial character, has maintained its position as one
of the most dynamic urban economies in Mexico. Analysis of the impacts of NAFTA
on the Mexican urban system reveals that Monterrey is the non-border city which
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should benefit most, ranking well above León and Puebla, the immediate followers
(Richardson, 1994).
Urban government
The urban government of Monterrey is highly hierarchic, and has a tendency to
fragment. The hierarchical feature is a response to the traditional ways of exercising
political power, which in Mexico have been centralized, presidential, and unipolar
(Ward and Rodríguez, 1999). The fragmentary feature is a result of the processes of
political decentralization and increased representativity at local and regional levels
(by way of direct elections). These processes have brought the desired accountability
and flexibility to lower levels of government, in line with the objective to modernize
the State. However, the processes have also brought a desire to increase decision
power (over revenues and expenditures), and have therefore produced a constellation
of political groups, interest groups, local authorities, mayors and council members
all laying claim to this decision power. These claims include the creation of new
municipalities, new state laws for the devolution of functions, and extended taxation
powers for local authorities. Since these claims are uncoordinated within the
metropolitan area, with different characteristics and reach from one municipality to
the next, or from regional government to municipalities, the result is a divergent,
fragmented implementation of policy. 
Mexico is a federal country which three levels of government: federal government
(national level); state government (31 states); municipal government (see Table 3.5).
The forms of metropolitan government are not described in the constitution, but
planning regulations and infrastructure provision is often coordinated or produced
at the metro-level. Traditionally, state and municipal authorities have been fiscally
dependent on the federal government, which is typical of a centralized
government.(Rojas 2000; Ward and Rodriguez 1999). Until recently, State
Governors were appointed by the President, an indication of the line of
accountability of the post, directed towards central government rather than to local
or regional electorates. 
In Nuevo León, municipalities are created by the state legislature through a
procedure that does not establish any functional criteria based on area, population,
or existing utilities (Pineda Pablos 1994). The local government is formed by an
elected assembly, which serves for three years. In law, local government is
responsible for the provision of several urban public services, although the limited
fiscal power of municipalities gives room for the direct intervention of central and
state government in infrastructure investment, fiscal support, direct subsidies, and
so forth. Local government in Mexico is defined as a public organization accountable
to the community it represents, but also as an agent of central and state government
action (Ward and Rodriguez 1999). 
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In Monterrey, there are nine municipalities constituting the Monterrey Metropolitan
Area (AMM); they are independent of each other, as is any municipal authority in
the country, with its own assemblies and regulations. Despite this independence, the
importance and size of the city provides opportunities for coordinated action. On the
one hand, there is a demand for metropolitan coordination in the implementation of
projects of infrastructure and social programmes, since federal funds and transfers
are earmarked by sector and targeted to relevant urban areas. Furthermore, as the
capital of the state of Nuevo León, the regional government has an active role in
metropolitan issues, since state priorities are often equivalent to urban priorities and
so they concern the metropolitan territory of Monterrey. 
Monterrey remains within one state. In contrast with such capital cities as Caracas,
Mexico City, Washington, or Buenos Aires, there are no conflicting federal entities
governing one urban agglomeration. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the capital
of Nuevo León is a metropolis covering at least nine municipalities which differ in
size, number of inhabitants, and geographic and socio-economic conditions. These
municipalities are: Apodaca, Garcia, General Escobedo, Guadalupe, Juarez, Monterrey,
San Nicolás, San Pedro Garza García, and Santa Catarina. In population terms, the
most important are Monterrey, Guadalupe and San Nicolás. These local government
authorities are entitled by constitutional mandates to provide urban public services,
but they provide very little themselves; these responsibilities are largely taken over by
the regional (state) and federal (central) governments. 
Recently, the decentralization process has given hope and encouragement to the
local authorities, to strengthen their fiscal autonomy and take on the complete
assumption of their responsibilities. Even so, sensitive elements of local government
action, such as land use regulation, building permits, and strategic planning, are still
in the hands of the higher tiers of governments, notably the state government
(García Ortega 1998).
As in any primate city, the political administrative subdivisions relate to power
balances. Land use regulation, physical planning, and infrastructure provision give
substantial political leverage to the government authority in charge of the relevant
|77|
Level of
government
Executive
functions
Central
Regional (states)
Local
President
Governors
Mayors
Legislative
functions
National congress
State assemblies
Municipal councils
Justice
functions
Courts
Courts
Courts
Source: Garza, 1995
Table 3.5 - Levels of government and distribution of powers
decisions by way of political clientelism and populism. García Ortega (1998) detected
in his study of Monterrey that the legal-administrative framework places decision-
making at state and central government level. Local participation and local
management is limited in scope, while private urban developers declare themselves
satisfied with the regulations and plans made at the levels of government that are
accessible to them, and so remain less accountable to the electorate. An indication of
the lack of representativeness of the local authorities is that, at between 50% to 70%,
the rate of abstentions in local elections has been high since the elections of 1982
(Cervantes Galván 1995) Even if this tendency for abstentions is a result of other
political processes taking place in Mexico and Monterrey, it has to be noted that local
authorities lack effective control over their designated responsibilities. These have
been taken over by other levels of government, mostly central government (Ward
and Rodriguez, 1999), so that the political value of municipal posts is low. 
All nine of the AMM mayors (intendentes) are obliged to work in coordination under
the authority of the governor. Government arrangements in the AMM covering the
functional territory are rare, however. There are several institutional arrangements
in the planning area that seek coordination: a) a coordination arrangement between
the SEDUOP and the municipalities; b) bilateral consultative arrangements between
Santa Catarina and San Pedro; c) technical support from SEDUOP to municipal
planning agencies. Despite their inclusion, these institutional arrangements remain
consultative in nature and lack effective authority on and through the various
government agencies they seek to coordinate. Similarly, the scope of functions on
which these arrangements operate is often reduced to one element or function (that
is, urban public transport coordination, water provision, land use regulations), a
situation that makes it difficult to coordinate horizontally to resolve the problems
and demands of the metropolitan territory. Basically, the history of metropolitan
management in Monterrey tells us that management has been carried out with
different goals and through different structures – technical, consultative, or
executive – and through particular and ad hoc legal arrangements at different
moments in time (Garza et al., 1995).
Councils, mandates. Currently, there are two institutions dealing with metropolitan
management in Monterrey, both part of a system described in the Act of Urban
Development of the State of Nuevo León of1991. These institutions are: a) the
Commission of Urban Development; b) the Consultative Council of Urban
Development. An amendment to this Act in 1993 confirmed these institutions and
added a technical institution in the form of the Institute of Urban Studies of Nuevo
León (INSEUR-NL), which provided the structure with support and systematic
knowledge (Garza et al. 1995). These institutions are mainly political bodies,
including members of different levels of government or advisory agencies with little
mandatory power, although the subject of their attention is urban management
(Davey, 1996). In a broader sense, the centre of their attention is planning issues
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regarding land-use regulation, physical planning, building regulations, and so forth.
The Commission of Urban Development is responsible for the supervision of city
plans, but not for their formulation. If the local authorities do not draw up plans, the
commission outlines land use, infrastructure locations, and plot subdivisions, and
has a say in the construction of public buildings. The territorial dimensions of the
commission are those of the state of Nuevo León, not a metropolitan authority in
itself, even though it accumulates a set of responsibilities of strategic value and
metropolitan interest. The members of this commission include representatives of
the state government, central government, the federal delegation of Petróleos
Mexicanos, and the electric power company. It is an open institution by law, since it
is expected to invite representatives of relevant social groups, and also other public
institutions (Garza et al., 1995). 
The Consultative Council of Urban Development is responsible for the formulation
of the urban development plan for the state, and also for the regional and city levels
of this plan. The Council is also an advisory body associated with the governor’s
office. Participants of this council for the AMM are representatives of universities,
the commissions of the State Legislature that are related to human settlements and
urban development, private sector bodies (industrial sector and urban developers),
and trade unions. Commissions convened in other cities in Nuevo León consist of
participants selected by the state government.
3.2.2 Conclusion: Institutional issues at Export Cities
The institutional framework of Monterrey makes it clear that, even without the
complexity of a capital city, export cities also experience difficulties in coming to
governmental arrangements that achieve metropolitan coordination. A combination
of new economic opportunities, new government structures, the distribution of
power, and shifts in national urban systems has brought about an institutional
profile with governments who are uncooperative and whose responsibilities overlap.
They are uncooperative, because they need to maximize the devolution of decision
making from the upper levels of government. Sharing hard-earned decision power
to design revenu and expenditure programmes with other municipalities, or yielding
this decision power to shared strategies is difficult to bring about, since local
governments tend to see this power they have obtained as their sole prerogative,
looking after metropolitan interests in the long run. Through this same mechanism,
public services tend to be duplicated and – in the medium term – to overlap each
other. Urban government actors (municipalities, one-purpose agencies, regional
offices) all have legitimate claims to provide public services to the city, but again, the
scale element is understated and there are no strong initiatives to coordinate the
provision of services on the metropolitan scale. However, urban governments in
cities such as Monterrey are creative and learning-oriented in their institutional
development, since these secondary cities are more exposed to a context of change.
Such change has been a strong feature in Latin American in the last twenty years,
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determined by processes of economic liberalization, decentralization of the State,
and increased political participation.
Economic and geographical features reveal that the metropolitan scale is emerging
as a tangible component of urban management challenges (Garza, 1999). That is to
say, the demands confronting local and regional governments and specialized
agencies active in the city’s government are on a metropolitan scale. These demands
include adequate public transport to guarantee accessibility, water supply for the
whole conurbation to guarantee public health levels, sound urban development to
constrain sprawl and land speculation, and the avoidance of urban inequity. These
challenges are related to the need for export cities such as Monterrey to acquire and
secure their position as important agglomerations within the urban system of their
countries, where they are expected to find a position for themselves within the more
open and general development strategies. In fact, while capital cities seem to be less
affected by the paradigm change reform in Latin America implies, secondary cities
need to establish or consolidate their integration with global markets, since they
operate with less protection and interference from the capital and central
government (Barnes and Lebedur, 1998). Finally, these external factors call for a co-
ordinated form of government within export cities, since the issues of accessibility
and living quality add to the performance of these cities in a liberalized context
(Hamilton, 2000). 
Monterrey is, therefore, a representative case of an export city in Latin America.
Monterrey was the second case study of this research; while Caracas represents the
capital cities, Monterrey is the counterpart export city. The institutional structure of
Monterrey shows interesting developments and changes, and this configuration has
provided the opportunity to assess the critical need for urban government structures
with a metropolitan need, as the objective of this research states. The analysis of the
research is reported when the account returns to Monterrey in chapters 6 and 7.
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Notes
1 According to Beaverstock and colleagues (1999, p. 455) the definition of Gamma world cities
consists of cities that have global service centres for at least two sectors (the sectors being
accounting, advertisement, banking and law) and at least one of those must be a major service
provision centre. 
2 Taylor (1997) considers for his research the following Latin-American cities: Mexico City, Sao
Paolo, Santiago, Caracas, Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, and Brasilia.
With the exception of Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro (which together with the capital Brasilia are
the most important Brazilian cities) all these cities are capitals of their countries.
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Caracas: Physical planning
Physical planning is a key function of urban government. In bigger urban
agglomerations, selecting the appropriate scale of actions is very important in
supporting urban development, avoiding inequalities, and preventing negative
spillover effects. In addition, the locus of decision-making in the institutional
framework of physical planning is important in dealing effectively with key issues of
strategic relevance.
In the first part of this section, the structure and features of urban planning are
presented as the background against which the analysis has been performed. The
second part shows the territorial scales that are operative in the city; this is the spatial
focus. The analysis is discussed more fully in the third part – decisions – when
selected elements of urban planning structure are evaluated with respect to the way
decisions impact on the territorial scales. This performance evaluation reveals who
takes decisions, how decisions correspond with territorial scales, and what kind of
designs are drawn up to make these decisions correspond with the appropriate
scales. The focus of the fourth and last part of the section – metropolitan
arrangements – is the result of the previous analysis in the scale (metropolitan) that is
relevant for this research, summarizing the main findings.
4.1 Background
The analysis reported in the following sections was carried out within a specific
framework first explained in this background section. Since this research makes
observations on the practice of urban planning, it is necessary to specify the context
of this practice in Venezuela and Caracas.
This section is divided into four parts, each correspond to one of the background
issues that are important for this research: a) elements of urban planning; b) levels
of government that intervene in urban planning; c) the decentralization context; d)
the role of planning in the urban system. In each of these parts the issues are
presented and briefly discussed.
The reason for presenting these background issues is that they are considered
structural to the sector. The first two issues (elements of urban planning, level of
government) are derived from the country’s legal structure. It would seem
reasonable to look briefly at this structure and relate it to the form that urban
planning has taken from the vicissitudes of urban government practice, and also
from the implementation of planning policies in the course of time.
Decentralization is discussed because it is a process that influences the relationships
between governments, agencies, and actors, since decentralization aims to provoke
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change. Decentralization is an ongoing process in Venezuela with evident influence
on current urban planning practice. Finally, Caracas’ role in the urban system is a
feature that corresponds to the simultaneous active presence of different levels of
government in the capital city; it is a feature strong enough to exert influence in the
ways in which the institutional framework constitutes itself. 
4.1 Overview
The development of the physical environment in Caracas has been marked by
explosive growth (both formal and informal), and the progressive occupation of the
major valley, with development spilling over to contiguous valleys and hills.
As in other Latin American cities, physical planning represents an attempt to
regulate and give direction to this growth. Additionally, acting through all the
available agencies (ministries, development corporations, sub-national governments,
purpose specific agencies, and so forth), state action in physical planning balances a
programmatic vision of what the city should be and the fulfilment of circumstantial
demand. The state can provide a visionary plan, or master plan, of urban
development and at the same Act to resolve the immediate problems of urban
infrastructure, housing, and congestion. 
Within the framework of the physical plans outlined by government authorities
(central, regional, or local), real estate developers can provide land with urban
infrastructure (roads, services) and develop their properties accordingly. This process
is relatively flexible; a government’s authority is binding to a certain extend, but is
not obligatory. Urban landowners are often private parties.
On land owned by the state, whether owned nationally through the Instituto Agrario
Nacional (National Agriculture Institute) or locally in the form of municipal land
banks or ejidos, the authority of planning is less disputed. Nevertheless, vacant land
of this type in the urban area of Caracas – within the major valley and other
conurbations – can be informally occupied settlements, or barrios. Such settlements
are frequently encountered on land declared unsuitable for housing, because of
steep slopes, watercourses, or unstable subsoil. This part of the urban fabric was
largely ignored in urban planning practice until 15 years ago, when strategies and
programmes underwent changes. These were introduced in the practice of
empowering settlers and enabling them to acquire participation, self-help, access to
services (water, solid waste disposal), land entitlement, and access to credit facilities.
4.1.2 Elements of urban planning
Physical planning in Venezuela and Caracas is a public good delivered by the
government under the following terms: 1) physical planning is a component of
national development policy; 2) physical planning is focused in territorial
development; 3) the main objective of physical planning is to give direction and
balance to land use, whether in rural or urban growth, in accordance with desirable
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social objectives (Rodriguez Vazquez, 1995). An interesting definition of urban
planning put forward by the planning department of Universidad Simón Bolívar
(USB) in Caracas states: ‘Urban planning is an interdisciplinary activity whose goal
is to put forward strategies and influence decision-making processes, with the
objective of improving the quality of urban life through improvements in the
coexistence of human activities in urban spaces’ (Rodriguez Vasquez, 1995 p. 44).
Rodriguez Vasquez (1995) develops his definitions further by identifying two main
interrelated activities within the concept of urban planning. These are: a) urban
design, and b) urban management. The former is concerned with proposals of a
physical-spatial character to order activities on territories; the latter deals with
processes to validate and make feasible the decisions taken within a chosen strategy.
Urban planning has several competencies, or important sub-elements, in both urban
design and urban management. In order to simplify the distribution of these
competencies within the state, three major groups of competencies are used:
planning, execution or implementation, and control.
Planning refers to the processes of the formulation of plans, documents, and
instruments to implement spatial transformations. In Venezuela, plans are
predominantly concerned with defining land use. Infrastructure investments,
management processes, action plans, and regulations are all subservient to land use
proposals incorporated into plans. The relevance of land use definitions is made
clear in the structure of the Act, in which the top legal instrument, the Territorial
Ordering Act (LOOT), uses several general national guidelines to define urban areas,
rural areas, natural reserves, national parks, and geographic-economic regions. The
spatial dimensions of these general definitions of territorial use are not necessarily
tied to the political-administrative territories, indicating that spatial ordering is
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Box 4.1 Major guidelines corresponding to the National Plan of Territorial Ordering
(according to the organic law):
• Land use
• Localize economic activities (industries, agriculture, mining, services, etc)
• General guidelines of the urbanization process, and to the system of cities.
• Define special protected areas
• Define special (military defense) strategic areas
• Policies for management of natural resources
• Signal and localize major infrastructure projects in energy, communication (land,
sea, air), hydraulic resources, decontamination of big areas, and other projects
• General guidelines of road and transport infrastructure
• Harmonize land uses in agricultural and leisure (tourist) areas
• Define incentive policy accompanying ordering plans.
Source: Territorial Ordering Act, 1983.
understood as different and independent from political-administrative ordering.
This situation seems to conflict with the administrative structure: on one side are
the states and local government authorities defined in the Constitution , and on
other is the legal structure of planning which supersedes these subdivisions.
Conflicts arise when both structures – political and technical – have consequences
for fiscal decisions, thereby affecting the financial capacity of either administrative
entities or planning agencies.
The preferred instruments for ordering are physical plans. Through its various
agencies, central government produces plans (PNOT) that prefigure territorial and
land use (see National Plans of Territorial Ordering, or PNOT textbox). These plans
are the spatial components of larger government plans in which the development
goals of the administration are worked out. Judging from their continuous inclusion
in the policy debate during the last twenty-five years, the most important objectives
of territorial ordering have been the concentration of development efforts
(investments, plans, incentives) in geographic-economic regions, the creation and
management of natural reserves, and a resilient policy of urban deconcentration. 
PNOTs have long time horizons – from ten to twenty years – whereas under the
1961 Constitution the time period for central government administration was five
years, and is now six years under the new 1998 Constitution. PNOTs are included,
adapted, or reoriented within the more general National Development Plans
proposed by each administration for their period; PNOTs then have the same
medium-term time-horizon of five years, or even less if one subtracts the
preparation time of the plan and the final months of administration. The current
outcome of national and regional plans has been limited, producing at the most
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Box 4.2 Major guidelines corresponding to the Regional Plan of Territorial
Ordering:
• Land use
• Localize economic activities (industries, agriculture, mining, services, etc)
• General guidelines of the urbanization process, and to the regional system of
cities.
• Define special protected areas
• Define special (military defense) strategic areas
• Set policies for management of natural resources
• Define incentive policy accompanying ordering plans 
• Identify and set regime for energy and mining resources
• Localize regional and state infrastructure projects 
• General guidelines of regional road and transport infrastructure
Source: Organic Territorial Ordering Act, 1983.
zoning regulations that define expansion areas, structural elements such as road
infrastructure, land use, special areas, and urban area limits (Vallmitjana, 1994).
Nevertheless, the objective of the deconcentration of urban areas – a consequence of
the urban crisis debate prevailing in the 1970s (Palacios, 1993) – in favour of a more
even distribution of the population across the country has not been achieved. 
The current physical pattern – a highly concentrated urbanized area along the north
coast mountain range of the country – has not been affected by the implementation
of the PNOTs; the physical pattern has rather been consolidated in demographic and
land use terms.
Below the PNOT the system of plans is vertical and includes the following: a) the
Regional plan of Territorial Ordering (PROT); b) national plans for the use of natural
resources and other sector plans; c) urban ordering plans; d) plans for areas under
special administration (parks, national territories, and so forth). The levels in the
system relevant for this research, bearing in mind its urban character, are the
Regional Plan of Territorial Ordering, and the Urban Ordering Plan.
The regional plans (PROT) follow objectives and incorporate elements similar to
those in the National Plan (PNOT). These objectives are in line with goals
formulated in the PNOT; these statutory terms of reference ensure the agent role of
regional and state governments in the fulfilment of national plan objectives, leaving
little room for manoeuvre for regions or states deciding about their development
and urban direction (see PROT textbox). 
The Urban Ordering Plans (POU) are specific instruments for urban agglomerations.
According to the Territorial Ordering Act (1983) these plans are the urban spatial
concretization of the National Plan of Territorial Ordering, and the related Regional
Plan of Territorial Ordering (art.18). These plans are designed to organize urban
agglomeration within the urban perimeters (art. 52), defined by the Ministries of the
Environment and Urban Development together with the local government authorities
involved. The urban ordering plans correspond with urban agglomerations (cities)
and are not limited to one local authority.
A subset of the POU is the more specific Local Urban Plan (PLU). This is produced
by the local authorities according to their development goals, but nevertheless
framed within the general plan system of the nation. These PLU are mentioned in
the Municipal Act (art. 36, clause 3) as a municipal responsibility in these terms:
formulated according to technical norms and procedures established by the national
executive. At the same time it should be noted that it complies with the PNOT,
PROT and Urban Ordering Plans affecting the local realm.
It is important to note that these different plans have not been presented or
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delivered simultaneously at all the levels involved. The Act allows any plan at sub-
national or municipal level to be put into effect, even though corresponding plans at
higher levels have not been sanctioned. The legislators anticipated the discontinuity
and heterogeneity of public administration, as well as the dispersion in the
elaboration of these documents at different levels and branches of government. The
Act therefore foresees that when a plan on a higher step of the ladder is approved, all
plans below that are already in force should be adapted accordingly. At the same time
the Act asks for coordination and the reduction of friction, proposing that, wherever
possible. new plans should include and confirm practices and goals already
established.
The intermediate level in the system between the national and municipal scales
includes the Regional Plan (PROT) and the Urban Ordering Plan (POU); their scope
of intervention does not necessarily coincide with the administrative subdivisions of
the country. While National Plans and Local Urban plans coincide the with
administration levels (the national government and the local government), the two
intermediate scales (region and metropolis) do not (see Table 4.1). This anomaly
plays a part in the further analysis of the specific situation of Caracas.
The Execution and implementation of urban planning strategies are follow-up
activities with respect to the ordering stage. In principle, in Venezuela, not only is
the state entitled by the Constitution to be the dominant actor in physical planning;
the state assumes that role in any case as the provider of urban facilities. The
Territorial Ordering Act (LOOT) is not comprehensive with respect to the articles
specifying the implementation of plans. The Act calls for intergovernmental, inter-
institutional cooperation, leaving room for the direct and indirect participation of the
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Box 4.3 Mandatory guidelines included in the Urban Ordering Plans:
• Delimit cities’ expansion areas within their urban realm
• Determine Land use and density
• Determine environmental aspects: green zones, open spaces, areas of protection
and conservation, and parameters of environmental quality 
• Locate of public buildings and services, especially those related to good supply,
education, sport facilities, public health, leisure, etc.
• Determine the system of urban roads, and the public transport system and its
principal routes
• Determine the basic sewerage system
• Determine the precision of the areas or minimum housing units
• Determine the normal and minimal amounts for cultural services, educational
services, sport facilities, and leisure.
Source: Organic Territorial Ordering Act, 1983.
government in planning implementation, and also leaving open the opportunity to
create specific public bodies for the purposes of such cooperation. In addition to
these declarations, the Act acknowledges the authority of territorial ordering plans as
blueprints for implementation and investment. Central government can bypass
restrictions embedded in the system of plans by setting up investment agencies to
provide the infrastructure and other physical elements included in ordering plans.
Through these practices, the central government could operate in parallel with those
departments or agencies at sub-national levels of government. These ad hoc agencies
appear at the will of the central government, and they have considerable impact in
the urban domain.
The Venezuelan Government provides urban infrastructure according to the
guidelines expressed in plans, whether national or municipal, and government
agencies assume a facilitating role in urban development. The plans and land use
regulation are the blueprints, but the items prefigured in plans are implemented
according to the political priorities at the level of government involved, the availability
of finance, and management capacity. It might be the case that land assigned to urban
uses in the regulations is not occupied or developed because of these dynamics. In
contrast, urban infrastructure might be provided with excess funding for certain
areas, and land uses might be contested in the absence of political will or executive
orders from an authoritative level of government. By selecting its priorities for urban
infrastructure investment, the government sends clear signals indicating where
urban development might take place, and becomes an important actor affecting the
land and real estate market. 
This infrastructure approach, together with land use regulations, form the core of
central and regional government participation in the implementation of physical
plans. Local government authorities are less active as urban infrastructure providers,
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Plan Spatial realm Governments Legitimization
National
Government
Several
states
 Several
authorities
 Municipal
government
National
Regional
Urban
agglomerations
Local authority
Local
Urban Plan
Urban
Ordering Plan
Territorial
Ordering Act (1983)
Territorial
Ordering Act (1983)
Territorial
Ordering Act (1983)
Municipal
Administration Act (1989)
Regional Plan of
Territorial Ordering
National Plan of
Territorial Ordering
Source: Sobrino, 1994
Table 4.1 - Physical plans and their spatial realms
because of their limited financial capacity. This infrastructure approach would seem
sufficient to provide a steering role for government (at any level) in urban
development growth; however, government intervention in urban development does
not stop here. Central government intervenes directly in housing provision,
investing not only in urban infrastructure, but also in housing production. This
approach has been criticized for being inconsistent, but it is a remainder from the
past central government role in the national economy. 
Agencies in charge of housing production are still active, even when they are in the
process of reform, fusion, reorientation, or closure. They continue to function as
facilitators, or channels for investment in housing, or they assume coordinating
roles, working in a system whose terms of reference are housing goals,
infrastructure investment, and private development. These agencies have worked
under the direct control of their parent executive officers (president, governor, or
mayor) who exempt them from following the guidelines set down in the ordering
plans (see Table 4.2). This remarkable shift from housing producer to housing
provider experienced by these agencies has not changed their detached nature with
respect to spatial plans. The government side of housing provision, with its
objectives, policies and implementation strategies, forms part of the plans of
particular administrations (central, regional, or local) rather than of plans with a
territorial, spatial, or geographic orientation. Some political aspects play a part here.
It has frequently been noted that incumbent administrations see the provision of
housing, opening housing complexes and the allocation of dwellings as political
opportunities to show obras, that work has been done. Also, the contracts for these
works provide an opportunity for irregular practices such as collusion, corruption,
overpricing, and so forth. All these practices are embedded at the core of the political
system.
Control and monitoring is understood as government action supervising the
transformation of urban areas (new buildings and settlements, changes in land use,
demographic changes, road infrastructure), and the efforts to keep such
transformation in line with current plans. The government exercises its authority to
steer the action of third parties (other public agencies and the private sector) within
the parameters of the plans. Monitoring could be inter-governmental; that is to say, a
branch of government verifies the observance of the guidelines by other government
institutions. Monitoring could be carried out on firms, citizens, or any institution
active in the building process; regulation comprises such measures as issuing
building permits, assigning density levels, applying sanctions to illegal developments,
promoting or demoting urban development, and so forth These tasks require
supporting documents that establish the legal authority of the agency responsible for
the regulation, including type of use, transformations, allowances, procedures, and
sanctions. In the case of intergovernmental regulation, these documents are
organisational. Acts that establish the relationships between regional and local
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governments), and physical plans on a regional scale (defining the parameters for
local government action). 
The Territorial Ordering Act (LOOT) assigns powers of control to the Ministry of the
Environment in the case of National Plans (PNOT) and appoints the state
governments as supervisory agents for the implementation of PNOTs. (Art. 43).
State administration is also responsible for supervising the implementation of the
regional plans with the regional planning authorities, such as a development
corporation, or a regional office of the Ministry of Urban Development. 
In the case of the control and regulation of the building environment, the legal
framework is sustained by urban plans, largely by land use ordinances and building
regulation measures. 
4.1.3 Levels of government
There are three levels of political-territorial organization for government in
Venezuela: central government, state government, and municipal government. The
Constitution of the country and the organization of the state distribute urban
planning competencies (ordering, execution, and control) among these levels of
government (see Table 4.3). At the national or central level, the Constitution (1961),
the Central Administration Act, and the Territorial Ordering Act (LOOT) assign
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Agency Function Rank Level of Government
Central Government
Central Government
Central Government
Central Government
Related to Central and State
Governments, regional scope
State Government
State Government
Municipal Government
Ministry
Ministry
Autonomous agency
Autonomous agency
Autonomous agency
State level agency
State level agency
Municipal agency
Infrastructure
Planning and
Housing Provision
Housing provision
Housing rehabilitation,
squatters regularization
Infrastructure, Housing,
Industrial parks
Infrastructure
Housing
Infrastructure
Ministry of Infrastructure
Ministry of Urban
Development MINDUR
National Institute for
Housing INAVI
Squatters foundation
FUNDABARRIOS
Regional
Development Corporation
State Public Works
State Public Housing
Municipal Public Works
Source: Territorial Ordering Act, 1983; Law of Housing policy, 1993;
Organic Law of Municipal Regime, 1989.
Table 4.2 - Government Agencies involved in urban infrastructure and housing
execution and control as complementary responsibilities. Ordering is not specifically
assigned to central government, although some analysts see that this competence is
implicitly attached to central government in their interpretation of some passages
from the Act (Geigel Lopez-Bello, 1993).
The participation of state government in urban planning is limited. The government
has few responsibilities in the ordering or control of urban planning, although it is
entitled to invest in the execution of plans and infrastructure projects. The Territorial
Ordering Act (LOOT) erodes the position of states as planning entities by declaring
regions – an amalgamation of several states corresponding to a geographical and
economical continuity – to be the operating units for national investment and
planning policy. The Act of Urban Ordering (LOOU) excludes the regional level
from urban management, but it also defines its role in urban planning as
complementary and subordinated to national and municipal policy in ordering
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National administration
Source: Ministry of Urban Development, 1992
Table 4.3 - Urban planning responsibilities of public administration
Level
Institutions
Urban ordering
Management of
implementation of
urban ordering
Public works
Project and execution of public works of national scale,
those that extend over several states, and those works
that by nature, scale and costs should be done
by national institutions
Concentrated
National
Ministries of Infrastructure
and Environment
policies, guidelines and strategies in accordance with
the Economic and social plan of the nation producing
PNOTs, coordinated with urban regions, and interested
institutions; Coordination, control, and advisory tasks
for urban regions; Research and regulations
Produce urban action programmes UAP) of PNOT;
Coordination and control of implementation of UAPs;
Development of the National System of Urban
Information
Deconcentrate
State
State Offices of ministries of Inf. And Environment
PROTs coordinated with state government and
agencies; POUs coordinated with local government
authorities and other local agencies
Produce urban action programmes corresponding
to urban regions; Control of implementation
of action programmes
Support central administration or public works
Support local state and municipal administrations
or public works that exceed their technical
and financial capacity
Type
functions. Again, in certain other Acts, responsibilities are specified more vaguely,
enabling state governments to demand more comprehensive responsibilities in
urban planning.
At the level of local government, local government authorities have adequate legal
entitlement to undertake the work of the planning, execution, and supervision of
urban planning. It is at this level of government where these functions are
specifically defined, and where there is more room for independent policy decisions.
It could be said that planning authority rests at the municipal level without major
restraints from other levels of government (central or regional). Urban planning is
defined as being independent, comprehensive, and municipal in nature.
4.1.4 Decentralization context
In considering the characteristics of urban planning in Venezuela, decentralization
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Sub-national administration
Functional Functional Territorial Territorial
MunicipalNational and State Regional State
Autonomous agencies and
State-Owned Companies
Produce research studies about
their sector to be used as input
for ordering plans
Produce studies about their
sector, to be used as input for
action programmes for all levels
Support state and municipal
governments for public works in
their sector that exceed their
technical and financial capacity
Project and execution of public
works of regional scale, those
that extend over several states,
and those works that by nature,
scale and costs should be done
by regional institutions
Agencies of Regional Planning
Economic and social guidelines
to be used as input for ordering
plans, economic and social
development plans
Economic and social guidelines
to be used as inputs for action
programmes at regional level
Project and execution of public
works of state scale, and those
that exceed the technical and
financial capacity of local
government authorities
State Governments
Coordination of ordering plans
of all the urban systems present
in the states, with Ministries,
Local government authorities,
and other agencies
Coordination of urban
action programmes
Projects and execution of public
work of municipal scale
Local government authorities
POUs and PDULs and other
plans outside urban areas
(industry, leisure, cemetery,
and so forth.)
Produce urban action
programmes corresponding to
POUs of cities and other urban
areas of local government
authorities
must be taken into account. After almost fifteen years (starting in 1986), the political-
administrative process has changed the traditional centralized structure of
government into a structure where responsibilities, resources, decisions and
participation are dispersed through different levels of government. It is important to
note that the administrative sub-divisions that have been essential to decentralization
– states and local government authorities – were present in Venezuela before
decentralization. The federal (state) and local (municipal) entities were instrumental
in the exercise of government as branches of a centralized power ruling over many
aspects of the sub-national governments.
Before 1986, urban utilities such as the national water company, the planning
institutions, power companies, and transport services were also centralized
functions, often in the form of state monopolies. The organizers of these public
services in the country followed their particular understanding of geographical
regions, technical scales, and sub-national administrations, finally organizing these
functions as independent structures with parallel state and municipal subdivisions,
but in all cases in vertical and centralize d organizations.
The process of decentralization has been political and technical, with a bias towards
the political side. State governors, mayors, state legislatures, and municipal councils
have been elected since 1989, when the Decentralization Act came into force. As
expected, this Act has legitimized the political structure, which found itself in crisis at
the end of the 1980s (Rojas, 2000), even in the light of recent debates on
constitutional reform (in 1999 a new Constitution was passed). The decentralization
of responsibilities and resources has not occurred in step with the political process.
Fiscal decentralization has lagged behind political decentralization – that is, the tax
authority has not been deployed at decentralized levels of government at the same
time as they have been created or improved in the extent to whish they are
representative. Functional decentralization – the transfer of responsibilities and
resources – occurred much later than the appearance of the empowered sub national
levels of government. 
4.1.5 Role of Caracas in the urban system
Caracas is the biggest city in the country and the most urbanized, with an adequate
level of services in most of legal settlements (such as water, sanitation, electricity,
and solid waste disposal) and with relatively good accessibility of urban services in
squatter or illegal settlements. Urban planning in these settings differs from that in
other urban agglomerations in the country. The problems of Caracas, the guidelines
proposed in urban planning documents, and the bottlenecks in the process are more
similar to capital cities in other Latin-American countries than to other cities in
Venezuela. The main problems of urban planning in the city are suburbanization,
metropolitanization, the regularization and consolidation of illegal settlements, the
maintenance of physical and social cohesion in the city, the high demand for
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housing, environmental control, and coordination of the infrastructure provision.
An important feature influencing all relationships in urban planning in Caracas,
particularly in the assignment of responsibilities and distribution of functions is
that, as a capital city, all levels of government intervene in urban planning. Not only
does the convergence of three levels of government in the territory of the city make
urban planning difficult in Caracas; the way in which they operate concurrently and
overlap in functions also adds to the complexity. 
4.2 Territorial scales
There are various administrative and operational territorial definitions for physical
planning in Caracas. In this section, the different territories operational in the city
are discussed in the section on territories, considering the definitions, extensions,
and description of the different spatial concepts in use. A discussion follows on how
these definitions and administrative subdivisions are used or overruled in the
practice of physical planning in the section territorial concepts and practice:
mismatch. Finally, in the section on expectations, the territories and definitions that
are becoming standard approaches in urban physical planning in Caracas, and their
potential as formal definitions (administrative, institutional, abstract) for the
metropolis, are identified from this situation of mismatch.
4.2.1 Territories
In Caracas, government intervention in physical planning is not based on a
metropolitan scale, either formally or informally. For this research study, the
metropolitan scale is understood as any of the possible definitions of Greater
Caracas that includes at least the five local government authorities of the valley, and
at most the valley plus the Miranda heights local government authorities and the
coastal areas that include the air and sea ports. Concepts such as Capital Region,
Caracas Metropolitan Area, and Greater Caracas comply with this condition of
metropolitan scale (see Table 4.4). These concepts and administrative areas
sometimes overlap the geographic areas of the city that are identified as Caracas
Valley, the Central Coast, Miranda Heights, the Tuy Valleys, and the Leeward Coast
(see Table 4.5). 
The Capital Region concept is used by the central government for infrastructure
|95|
MIRANDA
VARGAS
Libertador
0 50 km
Petare
El
Hatillo
Chacao
Baruta
Figure 4.1 - Caracas, local government
authorities in the valley
plans, guidelines, strategies and investment. In the field of urban planning, the
capital region is limited to the provision of definitions of urban development goals
(that is, what is or should be urban or rural in the region), through general policies
of land use and housing provision goals. The territory of the Capital Region
definition covers more than the Caracas valley, including different geographical
areas and three different state level administrations. The effect of the Capital region
definition on physical planning is not perceived directly by the planning authorities
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Concept Document/agency Administrations included
MunicipalState
Table 4.4 - Metropolitan concepts in use in urban planning in Caracas
Metropolitan Council
of Governments
Libertador (DF)
Sucre
Baruta
Chacao
El Hatillo
Capital Region
Caracas Metropolitan
Area AMC (statistics)
AMC (planning)
AMC (planning)
Greater Caracas
Metropolitan Council
LOOT / Ministry of Urban
Development and other
central government agencies
Statistics Office, Central
Bank (for price indexes)
Plan of Urban Ordering
(not sanctioned)/MINDUR
Metropolitan Office of
Urban Planning
(closed in 1989)
Strategic Plan/ Foundation
for the Strategic Plan
of Caracas
All local government
authorities of the Miranda
State and Federal District
(23 local government
authorities)
Vargas State
Miranda State
Federal District
Federal District + part of
Miranda State (valley local
government authorities)
Not specified
Federal District (Included
Vargas State as local
authority)
Part of Miranda State
Valley local government
authorities
Libertador
Sucre
Baruta
Chacao
El Hatillo
Not specified
Libertador (DF)
Vargas
Sucre
Baruta
Chacao
El Hatillo
Libertador (DF)
Sucre
Baruta
Chacao
El Hatillo
Federal District + part of
Miranda State (valley local
government authorities)
at local level: it comprises a numeric reference (on housing provision goals,
inhabitants, density), and a framework of operation (guidelines for land use,
intergovernmental transfer procedures) rather than a steering effect on physical
planning. Local agencies can Act independently in the planning, implementation,
and monitoring of physical planning without interference from guidelines set by the
central government concerning the capital region. Nevertheless, this non-
interference transforms quickly into non-coordination, since the framework of
regional plans proposed for the Capital Region is in many cases omitted, or ignored
by local planning agencies. The difficulties of central government agencies such as
the Ministries of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Urban Development in
supervising these guidelines in the resulting policies of sub-national authorities
arise from poor communication, unwarranted confidence in sub-national agencies’
compliance with regional regulations, and conflicting interests.
|97|
Geographical realm State Municipalities
Table 4.5 - Geographical areas and political sub-divisions in the Capital Region
Libertador
Sucre
Baruta
Chacao
El Hatillo
Caracas Valley
Central Coast
Miranda Heights
Tuy Valleys
Leeward Coast
Federal District
Miranda State
Vargas State
Miranda State
Miranda State
Miranda State
Vargas
Andrés Bello
Acevedo
Brión
Buroz
Páez
Pedro Gual
Carrizal
Los Salias
Guaicaipuro
Urdaneta
Lander
Cristobal Rojas
Plaza
Zamora
Paz Castillo
Independencia
Simón Bolívar
The Central Bank and the National Office for Statistics use the Caracas Metropolitan
Area AMC statistics mainly to determine indexes. AMC statistics are relevant,
because they recognize and define the territory of an economic market, which is an
implicit acknowledgement of the AMC as a single economic space. Although the
consumer price index is aggregated to cover the AMC, other indexes related to the
economic structure of the city remain defined in state terms and are not aggregated
into AMC form, as are those on employment, commuting, housing conditions, and
so forth. In any case, the statistical definition of the territory that the AMC covers is
not used explicitly by any agency related to physical planning in the city.
The Caracas Metropolitan Area (AMC) concept that should come from the Plan of
Urban Ordering (POU) of Caracas, drawn up under the coordination of the Ministry
of Urban Development (MINDUR), is not relevant, since it has not been defined.
From 1989, MINDUR has delayed drawing up the POU for Caracas through a) their
own restructuring as a ministry; b) the shift in role from overarching planning
authority to coordinator; c) the development of local plans with particular visions
away from a coordinated POU. In the last ten years, no POU for Caracas has been
sanctioned, the number of local government authorities has expanded from three to
seven in the valley alone, and the previous metropolitan reference – the AMC used
by the Metropolitan Office of Urban Planning (OMPU) – has been abandoned.
The OMPU is then the remaining link with the past; prior to 1989, OMPU worked
as an advisory board for the local government authorities of that time, Libertador,
Vargas, and Sucre (now divided into Sucre, Baruta, Chacao, and El Hatillo). The local
government authorities acting in cooperation supported the advisory board
financially. It gave advice to local government authorities on urban planning issues,
maintained cartographic, cadastral and planning information for the whole
metropolis; on several occasions, OMPU proposed a metropolitan master plan.
Although its advice was not binding on the participating local government
authorities, OMPU provided the only form of a relationship with a metropolitan
plan, because the proposed metropolitan master plan never succeeded in gaining the
approval of the local government authorities in the city. 
The OMPU was no longer attractive to local government authorities after 1989,
when the new Municipal Act gave them more powers on planning issues.
Consequently, the OMPU fragmented into several Local Urban Planning Offices
(OLPUs), each inheriting a portion of the OMPUs archives and pool of personnel.
The AMC concept that was implicit in advice and plans from the Metropolitan Office
(OMPU) permeated in the first years of municipal administration after 1989 into the
new OLPUs, because the concept was embedded in most of the plans and
documents used by the new administrations as their starting point. At the time of
the interviews undertaken for this research, few traces of those concepts remained,
since all the local government authorities in the valley have developed their Local
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Urban Development Plans (PDULs) and have put into motion their development
goals, land use perspectives, and urban design visions.
Greater Caracas is a definition proposed by The Foundation for the Strategic Plan of
Caracas (FPEC, 1995). The FPEC is a private institution that states as its mission: “to
promote and coordinate the process of strategic planning in metropolitan Caracas”
(FPEC, p. 2, 1999). Its membership includes 17 agencies operating in Caracas. The
Great Caracas definition is the result of diagnoses and studies undertaken by the
FPEC to determine its territory and other key elements of their plans. The concept
includes their analysis and also their expectations, since it has been recognized as
one of the best territorial definitions for the strategic plan. It is, again, of little
importance to current planning policies in the cities, because there is still no
Strategic Plan and no direct connection of such a plan with agencies exercising
planning authority in the city, nor has consensus on the strategic plan been reached
within all the levels. A positive element of the Great Caracas definition is that it
resembles territories that are operational in the development and planning of many
public utilities such as water and sanitation, the power company, the Metro
company, and some companies of solid waste management.
The Metropolitan Council is a forum of the mayors of the local government
authorities in the valley. This council has little influence over the actions of planning
agencies in the city. There is an agreement to communicate and share information
among the local government authorities participating in the council, and also in
urban planning decisions, but this agreement is not followed consistently.
4.2.2 Territorial concepts and practice: mismatch 
Some of the concepts used in urban planning in the city cover the same territory,
while others extend beyond the geographical areas, or match the conurbation of the
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Figure 4.2 - Capital Region (Federal District+Miranda State+Vargas State)
valley. Between the local government authorities and the Ministry of Urban
Development there is a fuzzy terrain of unknown approaches. Municipal planning
offices have developed their Local Urban Development Plans (PDULs) with their
own resources and capacities, and with guidelines originating from previous
documents and plans from the Metropolitan Office of Urban Development (OMPU).
Thus the PDULs conception of the greater scale of the city has not been revised or
updated since 1989 (AMC planning OMPU). The Ministry of Urban Development
(MINDUR) is late in fulfilling its duty to produce a Plan of Urban Ordering for
Caracas (POU), so an operative territory for its plan has not been defined. This
failure has caused great impatience at lower levels, because a POU would have
consequences for all PDULs, since it would imply changes to PDULs that are policy
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Metropolitan
definition Influence and use in planning agencies
Table 4.6 - Metropolitan definitions and their use in planning
Central government Local government
Metropolitan Council
(Caracas Valley)
Capital Region
AMC statistics
AMC Planning
AMC Planning
Old OMPU
Greater Caracas
Not used
Used by MINDUR, Central Planning
Office; Earmarking infrastructure
financing by region; Development of
guidelines for 5 year plan
Parallel definition useful as common
ground for exchange of data between
agencies sometimes confirms/replaces
planning AMC
Used by MINDUR in the POU of
Caracas. Not sanctioned, therefore no
influence in lower plans
Not used
   Used by autonomous agencies
• Metro Company
• Water and Sanitation Agency
• Power supplier
• Telecom company (extended to Central
Coast and Tuy Valley)
• Solid Waste management companies
Not used
reference for applying to infrastructure
fund of Central Government;
lip service in local plans
referential concept for planning,
not binding
Binding guidelines for PDULs, as it is
not sanctioned, tension for future
effects in PDULs.
Remain in planning documents,
ordinances, cadastres, and cartographic
information. Diminishing influence
Not used in planning
Sources: Ministry of Urban Development, 1992;
Strategic Plan of Caracas Foundation, 1999; Vallmitjana, 1994
instruments of local authorities. The Ministry of Urban Development (MINDUR)
has been unable to complete its system of plans, while the local authorities have
already produced theirs. This situation at the Ministry is a consequence of
decentralization which has led to a decrease in professional capacity, tight budgets,
and changes in the task description of the ministry (from producer of plans to
coordination agency). This decline in capacity is not surprising when it is
remembered that MINDUR officials recognized as late as 1997, eight years after
decentralization, that the ministry was changing from its supplier role in urban
development, mainly as a housing producer, to an active role at coordination levels,
facilitator, and technical advisor to lower government levels. The Centre for
Development Studies (CENDES), a research institution attached to the Universidad
Central de Venezuela (UCV), has levelled strong criticism against this delay, mainly
because the set of actions to be coordinated had already been defined in the various
PDULs. For CENDES, the logical step for the MINDUR is to collect all the PDULs,
use them as input and put together a Plan of Urban Ordering (POU) for Caracas that
should bring about coordination.
The Strategic Plan of Caracas does not opt for a specific territorial definition,
although it considers that the Great Caracas definition should be the starting point of
any of the possible operating concepts for planning in the city. It is important to note
that many actors find it incontrovertible that the Caracas valley should have some
kind of consistent planning policy in geographical and socio-economic terms. The
work of the Foundation for the Strategic Plan of Caracas (FPEC) seeks coordination
that includes all the administrative entities in the valley through a system of plans,
or by setting up consulting boards.
If anything could be considered to resemble a consulting board, or an information
exchange agency, that was the council of mayors (1992-1998). The territory of the
participating administrations resembled that of the Caracas Valley. Nevertheless, the
council had a disjointed performance with regard to urban planning; its main
achievements were in solid waste management and urban public transport
coordination (Research interviews, 1999). Even more interesting to note is that the
cohesion of the council was stronger between valley local government authorities
than between these local government authorities and other peripheral
administrations such as those in the Tuy Valley or on the Central Coast. 
4.2.3 Expectations
So far, the territorial definitions and their mismatch with the current practice of
physical planning in Caracas have been discussed, with the conclusion that the
metropolitan scale emerges as a frequent reference in the attempts to implement
physical planning. Is the metropolitan scale also reflected in the expectations of the
actors involved in the sector? 
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During the research interviews conducted in 1999 with senior public servants in
physical planning in all the local government authorities of the city, the office of the
Strategic Plan, the ministries, and several research institutions (CENDES, IESA,
USB), mentioning the metropolitan scale always raises interest. For institutions at
central and state government levels this is logical, because their mandate is directly
related to broader territorial scales. For planning institutions at local government
level there is increasing interest in finding ways of improving local plans by
incorporating them into metropolitan guidelines. 
Officers in all local planning institutions in the valley aspire to a metropolitan
framework which to which the decisions included in their corresponding PDULs –
essentially about land use and building volume – could relate, justify, expand, and be
reinforced as policy. In any case, the local planning institutions anticipate a POU
(Urban Ordering Plan) in which their PDULs could be inserted, and as the POU is
the matching document from central government, they expect this to become the
authorization of their policies of urban development on a local scale. They hope to
gain a partner, whoever that might be – a central government organization, or a
metropolitan government that supports their local plans – instead of the current
situation where a matching POU document is lacking. This lack is the cause of
much unrest and the argument for obstruction from Central Government. As an
officer of the Baruta local authority expressed it: “We would like a return to the
Office of Urban and Metropolitan Planning OMPU(see page 17), but differing with
respect to our input” (Research interview, 1999). Such a remark does not however
imply a preference for a metropolitan scale; it is rather an expression of the need to
have corresponding plans in the different levels of government, thereby facilitating
intergovernmental relationships; it is clear that the demand for a POU by the local
government authorities in the city is referred to as city scale or metropolitan scale.
This is because the POU is by definition a document that correspond to a ‘city’ or a
‘conurbation’(LOOT, 1983). At the Chacao local authority offices, the manager
interviewed said that she was confident that MINDUR would finally deliver the
POU, and added: “We need ‘something’, we need an instrument to which we could
refer” (Research interview, 1999).
Local planning offices look forward to the introduction of a broader territorial scale
in the current planning spectrum, through plans or coordination frameworks. Such a
scale would enable the clarification of position and intergovernmental relationships
with the upper echelons of government, thereby eliminating the gaps and
uncertainties that characterize the present situation. A broader scale would give local
planning offices, with their enormous powers in urban planning afforded by the Act,
an improved position enabling them to exercise their planning qualities. In short,
they expect central and regional government authorities to limit their intervention in
planning issues of local interest once a framework of metropolitan action is enacted. 
Looking deeper into the motives of these expectations at high management levels,
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the research interviews (1999) revealed that these motives are fairly homogeneous at
the local level, and include the validation of current practices within a broader
framework, gaining cooperation from upper levels of government, homogenous
planning practices, conflict avoidance, and the consolidation of local government
powers. However, these motives appear to be different, and sometimes contradictory,
on analysis of the information collected at state and central government. 
On the side of central government, some officers at MINDUR expect to regain or
take control of the planning system with a POU warranted by a metropolitan
rationale, and therefore officially authorized to influence and change PDULs drawn
up at local planning offices. This control would damage or limit the independence in
which these plans were made.
Obviously, these differences point to political issues at the core of the impasse to
obtaining a metropolitan arrangement; basically, an implementing authority at the
metropolitan scale would be caught between local government and central
government disputes. Such a situation has in fact been found in urban physical
planning in Caracas. For the moment, it is useful to note that the implicit territorial
scale of the missing layer of planning is an intermediate scale between local and
regional levels: a metropolitan scale. Later in the chapter we discuss this implicit
territorial scale – the expected solution found in the statements of those interviewed,
and the hindering political impasse.
4.3 Decisions
In this section, two aspects of government involvement in urban planning are
analysed. These are the investment aspect – understood as the public investment
within the framework of plans; and private sector regulation, understood as the way
in which plans are used to steer or influence the capacity of the private sector to
change the built environment.
In each of these components (investment and regulation), the analysis is structured
as follows: First, the locus of decision-making is presented: who takes the strategic
decisions, at what level of government, and within which institutional framework.
Second, the kind of coordination that has emerged or is visible beyond these loci is
examined, together with whether these coordination efforts correspond with broader
territorial scales. When dealing with coordination, the analysis is broken down into
the following themes: a) the level of coordination (information level, communication
level, agreements, and so forth); b) the background powers; c) the impacts of the
current power-decision arrangement on urban growth (this refers to the basic
statement to choose urban planning); d) the identification or description of the
coordination practices that have a metropolitan scale.
This structure of analysis is first presented for the investment component, and then
for the regulation aspects.
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4.3.1 Investments
The production of plans and their implementation is restricted by the capacity of the
institutions to invest in their urban development plans as important developers. The
main investments are made through housing projects (including social housing
programmes and housing infrastructure), through development corporations, and
through investment in urban infrastructure. The system of plans represents the
framework within which these investments are made. The implementation of
projects within these areas of action represents the physical outcome of government
policy. The analysis that follows considers the locus of decision making in these
three branches of action (housing infrastructure/social housing, development
corporation, and urban infrastructure), and later on whether wide territorial scales
are evident in current practice.
Investment: Locus of decision making
The structure of decision-making processes in the implementation of urban
planning is not restricted to one agency or one level of government. The structure is
a network of relationships and procedures covering many layers of government.
According to the legal framework, the main actors are at the local level. The most
important outcomes are the provision of urbanismo (infrastructure for housing: land
plots, roads, utilities), the provision of housing, and the provision or coordination of
public urban infrastructure such as roads, public spaces, and so forth. Key decisions
in these areas are the amount of public goods to be delivered, and the location of
these goods. For the case of physical planning in Caracas, these decisions translate
into the amount of land destined for housing, the housing target for any particular
plan, and the location of housing developments. 
The three main contours delineating the branches of government policy are housing
infrastructure/social housing; the actions of an urban Development Corporation;
and the provision of urban infrastructure.
The system remains under the heavy sponsorship of the central government (see
Table 0.7), which controls and concentrates almost all financial and fiscal powers in
the system. The financial strength of central government carries more weight in the
decision-making process than in any responsibilities that may be assigned.
Social Housing/Housing Infrastructure. Who decides the amount and location
of social housing/housing infrastructure? In the case of Caracas, local authorities
have little to say on the matter. These decisions relevant to urban planning, the
housing sector, and infrastructure investment are all taken at upper levels of
government. 
For social housing and the rehabilitation of squatters, the most important agencies
are INAVI (National Institute for Housing) and FUNDABARRIOS (Foundation for
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settlement rehabilitation). These autonomous institutions participate in the National
Housing Council (CONAVI), a coordinating agency that sets the housing targets and
monitors all developments in the social housing for the country. 
INAVI (National Institute for Housing) proposes housing developments on land
available in their city, and then assigns construction rights to the developers deemed
most suitable in public competition. FUNDABARRIOS works mainly on existing
illegal settlements (in the Caracas Valley some estimates indicate that 50% of the
population live in these areas; Fadda and Calonge, 1994), and their activities include
projects of land entitlement, legitimization, rehabilitation, and the provision or
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Agency Rank
Level of
government Function/tasks Source of finance
Table 4.7 - Government agencies involved in physical planning execution
Ministry of
Infrastructure
Ministry of
Urban Development
National Institute
for Housing  (INAVI)
FUNDABARRIOS
Caracas Chapter
Centro Simón
Bolívar (CSB)
Miranda State
Public Works
Federal District
public works
Public Works
Libertador
Public Works
Chacao
Public Works
Sucre
Public Works
Baruta
Public Works
El Hatillo
Ministry
Ministry
Autonomous
Agency
Autonomous
Agency
Autonomous
Agency
State level
agency
State level
agency
Municipal
agency
Municipal
agency
Municipal
agency
Municipal
agency
Municipal
agency
Central Government
Central Government;
Federal District
State Government
Central Government
Central Government
Central Government
Federal District
Government
Municipal
Government
Municipal
Government
Municipal
Government
Municipal
Government
Municipal
Government
Infrastructure provision
Housing provision;
Housing infrastructure
Housing rehabilitation;
quatters regularizations
Housing provision;
Housing infrastructure
Real Estate Management
Housing provision
Housing provision;
Housing infrastructure
Housing infrastructure
Housing infrastructure
Housing infrastructure
Housing infrastructure
Housing infrastructure
Housing infrastructure
National Budget
(taxes, levies, etc.)
National budget
National budget
Own revenues (rent payments)
National budget
Development aid
National budget
Federal District assignments
Own revenues (real estate)
State budget: limited taxation power
Intergovernmental transfers
Decentralization  funds (by project)
Federal District budget
Central government transfers
Own revenues (mun. taxes, transfers)
Decentralization  funds (by project)
Own revenues (mun. taxes, transfers)
Decentralization  funds (by project)
Own revenues (mun. taxes, transfers)
Decentralization  funds (by project)
Own revenues (mun. taxes, transfers)
Decentralization  funds (by project)
Own revenues (mun. taxes, transfers)
Decentralization  funds (by project)
improvement of urban infrastructure. INAVI follows a traditional housing provision
approach, with a role similar to that of a promoter; FUNDABARRIOS follows a
contemporary approach in building up on the current structure of the settlements,
promoting self-help, and providing technical support. These activities, and the
decisions about land use and number of housing units, are confronted with plans
such as the various PDULs (Local Urban Plans) now in force at the city.
Nevertheless, the research interviews (1999) revealed that, at the level of the local
government authorities, most often a compromise is reached and the plans are
amended to include FUNDABARRIOS and INAVI development. Since the Ministry
of Urban Development (MINDUR) also participates in CONAVI, it is expected
(mainly by local governments) that this Ministry could serve as a mediator linking
the PDULs (local urban plans) and the projects of the housing agencies. 
In addition to the decision power these agencies have on investment, the
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Figure 4.3 - Scale impact of decisions on Social Housing in Caracas
independence of this power is reinforced by the fact that an important part of the
financial resources of FUNDABARRIOS and INAVI come from specific poverty
alleviation programmes funded by international agencies such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), the Andean Development Corporation (CAF),
and the World Bank. These national institutions tend to become less sensitive to the
urban systems in which they operate through being directly accountable to
international agencies. These agencies strive to reach the targets they have agreed
upon with the international agencies, and to be on schedule with their
disbursements. These priorities seem more important than tailoring their pace with
the local authorities.
Regional and Local governments participation in the provision of housing
infrastructure or social housing is slight. 
Development Corporation. The development corporation of Caracas, Centro
Simón Bolívar (CSB) also has decision power with respect to the real estate
development projects, a decision process that shortcuts the system of plans. The
CSB is a central government agency operating on a metropolitan scale. As with
social housing, since it is a strong partner in the process (backed and funded by
central government), it is possible for the CSB to bend the PDUL’s regulations and
obtain amendments to plans. It is less practicable for CSB to follow this profile in a
context of empowered local government authorities, but before 1989 CSB was a
super-developer, with enormous backing from the presidential office. 
Before decentralization (1989), government land development in Caracas was carried
out by several agencies: the National Institute of Housing (INAVI) mentioned above,
the Federal District Government (GDF), and the urban development company Centro
Simón Bolívar (CSB). The CSB acted as the administrator of public property, and as
the developer of real estate and infrastructure. The CSB’s position in the institutional
hierarchy sets the CSB close to central government and above the municipal
authorities. The power and independence of the CSB arose from its connection with
the presidential office and the city officer, the Governor of Caracas. The CSB acted as
city developer with a public agenda, although it had no representation as a local or
city government authority. The CSB channelled public investment into the city as the
preferred and sometimes technically superior agency, operating as the executive
agency of urban development regardless of institutional hierarchies or government
levels. In short, before decentralization, capital investment in the city was a matter of
central government and the CSB was the executive agency, equivalent to the regional
development corporations fulfilling similar roles in various regions in the country1.
The CSB has survived ten years of cutbacks, either from diminished power or
reduced scope of activities through the devolution of its functions to local
governments, or from budget reductions. Nevertheless, the CSB remains an
important actor in the city. Its imminent close has been forecast on several
occasions, through its evident legal vulnerability under the current institutional
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framework (with its emphasis in political decentralization and subsidiarity); and also
through its financial troubles. However, the authority the CSB now has to enable it
to proceed with urban development or urban plans is less than it had several years
ago. Nowadays, the decisions of the CSB on land use and the profits from real estate
have to be considered by local government authorities and not by its parent (central
government); these local government authorities are equally entitled to reject CSB
plans.
Urban Infrastructure. The decisions on the location and type of interventions in
urban infrastructure are taken by agencies located in the upper levels of the system.
These agencies are the Ministries of Infrastructure and Urban Development and
various public works departments in the state government of Miranda and the
government of the Federal District.
Local government authorities propose projects involving urban infrastructure; their
public works departments define the intervention they favour and relate it to urban
development plans. The opening that has made such opportunities possible is the
implementation in 1992 of the Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization
(FIDES), a central government transfer designed to help sub-national governments
manage capital investment. FIDES is dedicated to investment projects, and is
therefore not available for overhead costs.
All local government authorities in Caracas propose investing in their urban plans
from two sources of finance: their own resources, and an important component
from FIDES. The transfers from FIDES are regulated by the central government,
which carries out strict controls. These controls are partly based on existing plans
operating in the city; the Local Urban plans made at municipal level (PDULs) and
the National and Regional Territorial Planning (PNOTs and PROTs). This
monitoring is only a formality and is not legally enforceable. Central government
control restricts the capacity of local government to have more effective decision
power in matters of urban infrastructure. In all these local government authorities,
difficulties in the transfer of funds were perceived as major sources of
dissatisfaction; the cause was often attributed to central government intervention
and unclear evaluation procedures for projects.
In summary, the locus of decision-making on the investment issues of urban
infrastructure in Caracas remains at central government level. Central government
controls decisions by direct intervention through its ministries and agencies, and
indirectly through restricting the funds available to local and regional governments
for investment. 
Investment: Coordination
Coordination in the implementation of physical planning is not formalized. There
are no directions in the legal framework to implement the coordination explicitly
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called for in the Territorial Ordering Act (LOOT). Clearly, decision-making is
dispersed, but the institutions that have decision power still need to relate their
decisions to other public offices. These institutions need to persuade other actors in
the city to back their decisions, collaborate, and recruit various participants to help
fulfil their objectives and to make the actions resulting from their decisions really
effective. This informal capacity to coordinate is discussed below.
Level of coordination. Considering that central government intervenes directly in
matters of social housing/housing infrastructure, urban infrastructure, and through
the development corporation CSB, coordination – following Mitchell-Weaver et al.
(2000) – at the metropolitan scale is typified as relatively easy, since the CSB or
central government agencies operate at the appropriate scale (see Table 4.8).
However, applying the coordination scale (Metcalfe, 1994) to the same activities
yields a low score, so that one concludes that there is mainly independent decision-
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Table 4.8 - Physical planning. Investment: Level of co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 4.9 - Physical planning. Investment: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864) and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
making by these agencies (see Table 4.9). There is barely any coordination between
the different agencies, either vertically (central, regional, local) or horizontally
(between agencies at the same level of government, that is local government
authorities). At the Instituto de Altos Estudios Administrativos (IESA), a research and
education institution, the researcher consulted stated: “with regard to physical
planning and housing programmes related to it, there is little disposition among the
local government authorities to collaborate with each other. Although they
sometimes enter into agreements with central government agencies for this kind of
investment, they believe that to coordinate is to lose autonomy” (Research
interviews, 1999). 
Almost all institutions involved in the implementation of planning are independent
in the way they carry out their decisions. Two observations were made when
applying evaluations and scales to the level of coordination reached in the city. First,
the exchange of information among agencies is poor and not structured (Research
interviews, 1999). Second, in the cases where attempts for coordination can be seen,
the metropolitan scale – that of the great Caracas valley – is not the referential scale
for coordination. 
The first observation – the exchange of information among agencies is poor and not
structured – is based on interviews with officers in the planning departments of the
five local government authorities of the valley (Libertador, Sucre, Baruta, Hatillo and
Chacao). Although they were dealing with the same issues and problems,
communication between these offices was not structured. They do not meet at
regular intervals, and they do not know what developments there are in other local
government authorities. The participation of central government agencies in the city
does not guarantee that these local level officers are better informed about each
other, since many of the projects of central agencies (ministries, housing agencies,
development corporation) are implemented in collaboration with local government
authorities on an individual basis. 
The second observation – inadequate scale in the event of coordination – is based on
the failure to find any arrangement to channel or coordinate investment. The
territory of action resembled a broad territorial scale. The investments of local
government authorities in urban infrastructure were coordinated with one
neighbouring local authority at the most. The incompatibility of the framework for
investment (that is, the local urban plans) of each local administration prevents
them from carrying out programmes together. At the same time, the impression at
the Foundation for the Strategic Plan of Caracas, which maintains that the issue of
scale as fundamental is that the commitment of the various actors (local government
authorities, public utilities providers, central government agencies) is most irregular. 
To summarize, it is clear that the decision making process regarding investment in
social housing/housing infrastructure and urban infrastructure does not show any
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strong form of coordination. The fact that decision power is located at the higher
levels of government does not ensure that either investment or implementation are
carried out following a framework (of plans) that takes a broader territorial scale into
consideration. 
The underlying powers. What are the forces that sustain this situation of poor
coordination on the metropolitan scale? Apart from the legal and formal limitations
(Constitution, Acts, organization of the state, and so forth), this question became
relevant during the research interviews. The fact that all levels of government have a
share in the decision-making power, or rather that they can coexist without
interfering with each other (and at the same time they do not share resources), led
the interviewer to search for comments and explanations beyond the technical
sphere. It was found many times that officers at planning institutions recognized the
political playacting of their mayors; they also saw that plan implementation was left
to other departments in the municipal government (public works or housing
departments). Other remarks frequently referred to the hostility perceived from
central government agencies such as MINDUR (Ministry of Urban Development),
INAVI (National Institute for Housing), or FUNDABARRIOS (Foundation for
Settlements Rehabilitation). The solid presence of central government agencies
specific to Caracas, such as the Federal District Government and Centro Simón
Bolívar (CSB) was also seen as an indication of the implicit shareholder interest of
the national administration in the city.
Prior to investment, defining the framework of action (plans) is critical. All local
urban plans (PDULs) of the different local government authorities in the valley are
approved, or were about to be legitimized by the councils. These plans have an
impact on the value of land and so they are relevant for the political actors, namely
the mayors. The pressures to assign certain uses to certain portions of land come
from landowners in the city, developers, and political figures at any level (grassroots,
municipal councils, congressmen, political parties, and so forth). These pressures
vary from the expected lobby pressures to benefit private land with the development
of public infrastructure around it, to the recognition of squatter settlements (which
could imply a follow-up of basic infrastructure provision) that bind communities
(voters) to politicians. Those in charge of drawing up these plans have difficulties in
dealing with these pressures and producing an appropriate response. All PDULs in
the city have deep technical rationality; they have been produced in close
consultation with academic institutions, while at the same time mechanisms
incorporating the needs and wishes of communities and groups are considered less
important for these plans and are not often included. 
Our interpretation at this point is that urban infrastructure and public housing also
produce a value change in the affected areas (land price, real estate improvement,
and so forth). This is a change from which those same interest groups of owners,
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developers, and associate politicians would like to obtain profits. In addition, the
fragmented assignment of public works for urban infrastructure and public housing
by different public institutions guarantees that the client groups (developers,
construction companies, and so forth) particular to the political colour of the
administration have the opportunity to receive commissions.
So far, the powers behind the maintenance of the present decision arrangements
have been described as: a) Central Government – specifically the executive branch; b)
favour-dispensing politicians in collusion with private elements. The former
grouping can be noted in the coordination diagrams where the central government
agencies still have to decide about the amount and location of investments (see
figures). The latter grouping is difficult to place with certainty, but can be derived
from the acknowledgement by local officers of pressures to approve or alter
implementation programmes (research interviews, 1999), and from the recurrence
in the media of disclosures of irregular practices regarding investments in housing
urban infrastructure by local authorities. Local government authorities have to be
added to this list, since they also have an interest in keeping coordination low, or
rather maintaining the current fragmented arrangement. Any attempt to limit
autonomy in the expenditure of municipal governments is contested, and any
arrangement that could assign portions of the expenditure to other government
authorities or coalitions is assumed to limit this autonomy. Mayors want to establish
their character, profile, and a legacy of public works in the city that could facilitate
future operations. Avoiding metropolitan coordination gives the mayors of Caracas
the opportunity to maximize their resources for the task of building their profile.
This behaviour of the municipal executives runs parallel to that of the political
parties. In fact, the correspondence is complete, since municipal power in Caracas
seems to be understood as a step towards national power rather than a valid political
end in itself. Several political analysts consulted during the research expressed their
amazement that there were no political projects in any party to consolidate a
citywide hegemony of any form.
Impacts. The major impact of these settings in the delivery of public urban planning
is that there is no effective policy for the medium or long term. The fragmentation of
decision-making makes the formulation and implementation of policy guidelines
difficult. Continuity of the administration goals, whether individual or coordinated, is
difficult to sustain when the agreements are sensitive to political changes in executive
offices, and have poor safety measures to protect these agreements against change.
In the lack of long and medium term policy, planning at the local level is excluded
from its steering function in urban development. Planning offices manoeuvre to
produce short-term plans and prepare supporting studies for public works
investments.
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Metropolitan arrangements Metropolitan agreements in physical planning are at the
moment not operational in the city. Broader territorial scales are not used to
structure plans, investments, or coordination. Investment in the city is channelled
through several different levels of government (profiting from scale fragmentation)
and this situation seems to satisfy the interests of the ruling politicians and
contractors. 
4.3.2 Regulation
Regulation in physical planning refers to control and regulations as presented earlier
in this chapter (see page 10): it is the way in which governments ensure that the
different parties in the city follow the guidelines and uses prefigured in the plans.
Regulation includes the different means and activities available to governments to
sanction their plans and ensure that other parties follow their guidelines; these
basically are the specific ordinances, their issue of permits, inspection of buildings
and urban developments, and the settlement of disputes regarding land use,
building specifications, densities, and so forth. Regulation in Caracas is ineffective,
because of the dispersion of this function in the different levels of government in
the city and the heterogeneous capacity to perform this task shared among different
agencies. As with investment, the analysis described below first considers the locus of
decision-making, and then searches for forms of coordination within the institutional
framework. 
Regulation: Locus of decision making
Key decisions on the regulation of the development of the urban fabric are defined
in the questions that deal with a) which elements of the urban fabric should be
regulated; b) to what extent regulation should be done. These decisions are
imbedded in the responsibilities assigned to local governments in the legal
framework in operation in Caracas. Who takes decisions, at what level, and with
what consequences, are the questions which pinpoint the loci where these decisions
are made in the institutional framework. 
The set of elements susceptible to regulation is defined in the legislation; the set is
very broad. In the tradition of Venezuelan legislation, the text of the Act is detailed
and extremely regulatory, going beyond fundamental principles. This description
also applies to the legislation that defines the planning framework. Basically, almost
every agency related to urban planning at any level of government is entitled to set
codes and regulations. Terms of reference setting out what to regulate are present at
both central and local government level, and the use of this authority is not always
homogeneous. The resulting urban planning regulation code is a patchwork.
Three features of this patchwork code are: a) not all the legislation provisions to
draw up regulations are used, so there are blanks in the code; b) regulations are not
homogeneous throughout the various municipal authorities in Caracas; c) plans
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produce automatic restrictions on land use in the form of reserve areas and
environmental protection areas.
The question of ‘what to regulate?’ lands us in a spot where everything seems to be
subject to regulation; that is the main assumption in planning. Nevertheless,
institutions do not cover all the ground, because operational acts, the fine-tuning of
their terms of reference, and the translation of planning intentions into regulations
(land use, building codes) take up scarce time and resources. In the institutions
involved, the central government establishes the general restrictions to land use in
Caracas through the different ministries that have a say in urban planning.
Moreover, central government agencies pre-determine spatial uses in the city, such
as national parks, a military zone, height restrictions in the proximity of the airport,
and nature reservation land. Local government enforces land use regulations in
accordance with the aforementioned guidelines and the planning instruments made
at local level, such as the PDULs (local urban plans), or specific ordinances to rule
over special areas.
In Caracas, the decisions on what to regulate are derived from the planning
document. The physical plans supposedly have, therefore, a direct monitoring
consequence. But the planning document is not the only source of regulation.
Control on the physical aspect of the city is also the object of direct policy
intervention, producing procedures that cannot be traced back to the plans.
Examples of this are the declaration of special areas with ad hoc regulations, dwelling
tolerance in environmental protection areas, and decisions made by municipal
councils after a special petition from landowners to overlook regulations, which turn
into legal precedents.
The answers to the question ‘to what extent should regulation be imposed?’ are
provided at the municipal level, since this level of government is the locus of
decision. The application of the building code is strictly a municipal matter and the
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Agency Rank
Ministry of Urban
Development
Ministry of
Environment
Ministry of Health
Cadastre Offices
Ministry
Ministry
Ministry
Municipal agency
Level of
Govenrment
Central Government
Central Government
Central Government
Municipal
Government
Functions/
task
Sets major regulations/
Building code
Sets and enforces
environmental regulation
Building code
Sets and enforces
regulation
Table 4.10 - Government agencies involved in physical planning regulation
control of land use ordinances is a responsibility laid totally on local government.
That is not to say that planning offices have a strong grip in this area. Approximately
half of Caracas is built in an unregulated, informal way (Barrios, 1998; Fadda and
Calonge, 1994) . In addition to this, the best monitoring capacity of the municipal
offices is located in their cadastral offices (resources, personnel); their links with the
planning departments are not strong. The cadastre is one of the most important
instruments for a local authority to generate its own resources at municipal level
through the issue of building permit and the collection of property tax. Within the
municipal authority, the extent and the strength of the regulation of the building
environment is more closely related to the executive branch (the mayor) and the
financial department than to the planning departments. This state of affairs is deeply
deplored by the planning executives in the Valley.
Regulation: Coordination
Coordination in the regulation of the built environment is not formalized. The levels
of coordination and the power struggle behind current practice are presented below.
A discussion follows on the impact of the practice of regulation in the current
institutional form, and whether there are any wide area coordination arrangements
emerging from this practice.
Level of coordination. Among the institutions monitoring urban development in
the city, the type of coordination remain relatively easy (see Table 4.11) arrangement,
without much visible improvement in the system. Accordingly, the level of
coordination is ranked low on the coordination scale (see Table 4.12). The type of
coordination reached according to the classification adapted from Mitchell-Weaver et
al. (2000) is, optimistically, that of an informal cooperation among local government
authorities in Caracas, since a minimum agreement in the basic regulation code has
been inherited from previous administrations. Despite this homogeneity in
bureaucratic procedures, there are two features that are both a symptom and a cause
of poor coordination. One is the independence in which the different monitoring
agencies define their regulation base (territory, variables, and so forth), and the other
is the unrelated patchwork that the regulation code has become.
On the bureaucratic side, there is a positive feature in the common ground of
procedures emanating from the original municipal codes of the local government
authorities of Libertador and Sucre. These local government authorities existed
before 1989, when the process of decentralization started. This common ground
makes the building code and municipal codes in the valley more or less
homogenous. Moreover, the staff in the new local government authorities came
from similar functions in these original local government authorities, making the
transition less disorganized.
The local government authorities in the valley do not show a homogenous pattern
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Table 4.11 - Physical planning. Regulation: Level of coordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 4.12 - Physical planning. Regulation: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Criteria addapted from Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864)
and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
on the aspects they regulate. Small local government authorities such as El Hatillo
and Baruta are devoted to property tax, keeping strict records of mutations in real
estate and activities in urban development. Larger local government authorities such
as Libertador and Sucre are less effective in these areas, but their size allows them to
relax as long as the revenue function associated with the application of codes is
compensated by greater central government transfers (the formulas depend on
population size). In the same way, responsibilities delegated by higher-level agencies
(ministries) to local government authorities to monitor urban development or
environmental regulations are not carried out with the same capacity or energy
throughout all the local government authorities of Caracas. In El Hatillo, Baruta and
Sucre the terms of reference regulating the protected of Caracas is followed strictly,
but that is not the case in Chacao or Libertador. Moreover, the prohibition to build in
or near to water sources, streams and basins is rarely enforced in the city. 
It is evident that under these circumstances of low coordination and a
heterogeneous code, achievements at the metropolitan scale are difficult to attain.
The way the government monitors and exerts control has a local scale, which is
closely related to the municipal authorities, and it does not scale up to wider
territorial areas by way of coordination efforts or special arrangements.
Underlying Power. Monitoring the physical planning and the urban development
of Caracas in the usual way allows each municipal office to control and tax its own
jurisdiction according to its particular interests and revenue potentials. The fact that
the municipal administrations are highly dependent on central government
transfers influences their need to improve their efforts to expand their own revenue
sources. Since building regulations, physical planning control, and the cadastre have
together become a complicated, unaccountable patchwork, there are plenty of
opportunities to adapt the application of codes to the most remunerative setting. 
From the research point of view, private developers also gain from the current
setting, because there are many loopholes allowing projects to obtain approval even
when they exceed the quantitative limits (height, volume, number of houses/units,
infrastructure capacity, and so forth) of the general regulations. Meanwhile, these
actions have the negative effect of undermining the existing regulations, since they
become norms through jurisprudence.
Politicians with populist tendencies have also furtively supported illegal settlements;
council members can frequently be found defending squatters (or the votes they
represent) against the application of the Act. The lack of homogeneity in the
regulations provides a cover for this kind of practice.
Impacts. The major impacts of the way the regulation of physical planning is carried
out in Caracas are: 1) the impossibility of preventing negative externalities in the city;
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2) a further undermining of monitoring practice; 3) unexpected changes in
infrastructure demand.
Inappropriate development of land produces negative externalities: on the one hand,
there are environmental consequences; on the other, inappropriate development sets
basic urban infrastructure under stress. Illegal settlements are frequently sited on
unstable ground, with difficult, or even no access to clean water, poor accessibility,
and precarious public transport facilities. The ad hoc solutions that inhabitants of
these areas depend on to get basic utilities such as electricity or water affect the
effectiveness of the public utility networks. 
The public institutions in the city suffer from the mutual political antagonism
between them and their leaders; the regulation of the built environment is a
battleground for this antagonism. The local authority of Libertador has a difficult
relationship with the Governor of Caracas with respect to the tolerance of illegal
settlements, street vendors, or the developments carried out by the Centro Simón
Bolívar (CSB); the fuzzy state of the building code leads to never-ending disputes.
Finally, the uncoordinated way in which the various local government authorities in
Caracas exert control on the development of the built environment, with different
levels of coherence to higher scale plans, is an added burden on infrastructure
provision. Since urban growth is unrelated to the expectations formalized in the
plans, the mismatch of demand for urban infrastructure with its provision increases. 
Metropolitan arrangements? Among the entangled set of directives, plans,
agencies and codes affecting the physical development of the city there are no clear
metropolitan agreements seeking to give the city a homogeneous set of regulations.
There is a lack of metropolitan policy and it seems that none of the different public
agencies dealing with the subject is filling the gap, or looking for forms of
coordination. There is no compulsory coordination where broader territorial scales
are concerned. Even though major guidelines from national Acts are in force, the
authorization they give is not deep enough to provide cohesion in a city like Caracas,
where the various local government authorities interpret these guidelines differently,
so they compete with each other. A serious impediment to metropolitan
arrangements is this tendency to view regulation as an independent topic of urban
management, unrelated to planning, unattached to any metropolitan understanding,
independent of the policies of neighbouring local government authorities, and as
instrument for their own revenue policy of particular local government authorities
(and therefore off-limits to anybody else). 
4.4 Metropolitan arrangements
In this section, the bottlenecks constraining wider territorial arrangements in urban
planning are specified. In the last part, the possibility is discussed of formal
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metropolitan arrangements within urban planning, and the most important
conditions for that to be feasible. These bottlenecks and feasibility observations are
reconsidered in the final chapters.
4.4.1 Bottlenecks
The consolidation of the organizations on a metropolitan scale in Caracas has
several difficulties. Within the scope of this research, urban physical planning in the
city is undertaken in a context of unclear definitions of the territorial extent for
public action, poor coordination between the agencies, the fragmentation of local
government, and the mutual political antagonism of the various actors. These
bottlenecks affect the coordination (within a metropolitan territory) of decision
making in the implementation and regulation of physical planning in Caracas. 
Different scale definitions. There is no definitive scale definition that effectively
covers or incorporates the territory of the city. Political-administrative subdivisions
are inconsistent with respect to the scale of the tasks needed to support urban
development, avoid inequalities, and prevent negative spillover effects. At CENDES
(Centre for Development Studies, a research institution attached to the Central
University), the researcher interviewed stated categorically that the main problem
regarding the government of the city was the failure of the different actors to agree
on what the metropolitan area comprised (research interview, 1999). This failure
presents a fundamental problem to the constitution of metropolitan government, or
the improvement of metropolitan coordination. 
Poor coordination. Communication between the authorities is poor and their
common ground is minimal; their conceptions of territories, duties, and
responsibilities differ. This analysis of poor coordination is confirmed by the scores on
the policy coordination scale (see Table 4.11 and Table 4.12); these are remarkably low,
even for government activities that tend to be homogenous, such as the application of
building codes in the regulation of the built environment.
Fragmentation. There are incentives to territorial fragmentation and the
independent actions of authorities. These incentives are embedded in the legislation,
where there are no financial or institutional provisions for the coordination of policy.
The costs of coordination for local government authorities are higher than those of
keeping the current arrangement, or those implied in further fragmentation.
Antagonism between agencies. The political antagonism between the chief
executive officers at the different levels of government (mayor versus governor)
undermines the ad hoc agreements between planning officers. This antagonism,
together with the fragmentation of local government, affects coordination. There are
many actors, and they tend to join into opposing groups. 
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The first two bottlenecks can be identified as technical issues. Finding the incentives
to apply an adequate or inclusive definition of the metropolitan area, and the
instruments (legal, financial) to stimulate coordination, may be capable of
addressing these issues. On the other hand, fragmentation and antagonism seem
more related to political elements, and probably to the intense dynamics of the
politics in the capital city. The present situation gives opportunities to several
political elements which have gained a portion of power in the city – a governorship,
a local authority, a central government agency – to exert power in the main city of
the country, regardless of the limited impact of this exercise of power, or its futility,
when considering metropolitan issues. Under these circumstances, the political
context impedes coordination.
4.4.2 Feasibility
The feasibility of a coordinated system for urban physical planning is low. The
dynamics of urban development, added to those of the ongoing political process of
decentralization, disturb coordinated action. Furthermore, improving coordination
in urban planning has consequences and is perceived as a threat by the interest
groups attached to the present arrangement of decision-making. Fiscal
decentralization as an instrument to stimulate and accelerate coordination, and the
consensus on a coordinating body for physical planning, are the visible features of a
metropolitan arrangement in this function. 
Fiscal decentralization. A feasible metropolitan arrangement has to be strongly
backed by central government, since this is the only government level with sufficient
fiscal power. This power is fundamental in the provision of the metropolitan
authority with financial support. Despite attempts at fiscal decentralization and
improved transfer mechanisms Situado Constitucional, FIDES), in most of the
decision processes analysed the central government has the last word. A
metropolitan authority without the support of the central government could not
therefore be expected to fulfil its responsibilities, even with the total support of all
the local government authorities in the metropolitan area. An area of tension
between the two levels of government would remain. 
Central government can ring-fence transfers that are related to urban infrastructure
– for which central government is already an important provider – and make these
funds conditional on metropolitan coordination. In this way, a step can be taken
towards channelling the involvement of central government in urban physical
planning through metropolitan arrangements.
A coordinating body. The metropolitan arrangement of urban planning could be
better positioned as the responsibility of a metropolitan government rather than of a
collaborative board, or corporation of local government authorities. This suggestion is
made in view of the poor coordination capacity of the various planning public
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agencies in the city. There is little capacity to follow through the implementation of
plans in the city and a metropolitan office could improve this situation. The disposition
of officers at municipal planning agencies to tackle metropolitan problems is noted as
a strong indication of the feasibility of a formal forum for exchange, follow-up and
coordination.
Obviously, a metropolitan arrangement would disrupt the precarious balance between
local and central government in Caracas. The issues of handing over decision power
and responsibilities to another level of government are sensitive. In the physical
planning function, implementation gives the authorities prestige as well as spending
opportunities; regulation, perceived as the legitimate taxation area of local
administrations, is an important source of revenue for local government authorities.
A decision-making arrangement that seeks to produce homogenous policy in the
metropolitan area is only feasible if these political bottlenecks can be resolved. That
is to say, the distribution of responsibilities has to facilitate metropolitan
effectiveness while avoiding (or compensating for) damage to the current urban
planning stakeholders (local government authorities, ministries, state governments,
Federal District). 
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Note
1 It must be noted that these development agencies overlapped administrative boundaries, and
sometimes participated not only in housing and urban development but also in industrial
development, such as the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) in the southeast industrial
pole of Venezuela. It had interests in: urban development, hidroelectrichydroelectric power
plants, steel and alluminiumaluminum mills, mining, farming and tourism in the areas
around the conurbanationconurbation of Puerto Ordáz/San Felíx (also known as Ciudad
Guayana), Ciudad Bolívar and wide portions of Bolívar State. Similar agencies were also active
in other relevant regions in the country, such as Corporación para el desarrollo de la región
oriente (CORPORIENTE), Corporación para el desarrollo de la región del Lago (CORPOLAGO),
and so forth. 
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Caracas: Urban Public Transport
Urban transport, like spatial planning, is an important function of urban
government (see chapter 2). Where bigger urban agglomerations are concerned, the
selection of the appropriate scale of actions is important in supporting urban
development, providing accessibility, avoiding inequalities, and preventing negative
spillover effects. In addition, the locus of decision-making in the institutional
framework of urban transport is important in achieving effectiveness on key issues
of strategic relevance.
In the first part of the section below entitled Background, the structure and features
of urban transport are presented as the background against which the analysis has
been performed. The second part documents the Territorial scales operative in the
city: this is the spatial focus. Under Decisions, the third part, the analysis is discussed
more fully; selected elements of urban transport structure are evaluated according to
the way in which decisions have impacted on the territorial scales. This evaluation
identifies the people who take decisions, how these correspond to territorial scales,
and what kind of institutional layouts have been set up to have these decisions
correspond with appropriate scales. The fourth and last part of the section,
Metropolitan arrangements, is devoted to the results of the previous analysis in the
scale (metropolitan) that is relevant for this research; there is a summary of the main
findings.
5.1 Background
The analysis documented in the following sections was carried out within the
specific framework described below. Since this research is based on observations of
the practice of the provision and management of urban transport, it is necessary to
specify the context of the practice in Venezuela and Caracas.
This section provides a general overview of the urban transport sector and then four
important constituent parts corresponding to background issues pertaining to this
research: a) elements of urban transport; b) levels of government that intervene on
urban transport; c) decentralization context; d) the role of Caracas in the national
urban system. For each of these parts the issues are presented and briefly discussed.
These background issues are presented, because they are considered determinant to
the sector. The two first issues (elements of urban transport, level of government)
are given from the perspective of the country’s legislative structure. It seems logical
to look briefly at this structure and set it against the form that urban transport has
taken under the vicissitudes of urban government practice and from the
implementation of urban transport policies in the course of time. Decentralization is
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presented, because it is a process that influences the relationships between
governments, agencies and actors, since decentralization aims to provoke change.
Decentralization is an ongoing process in Venezuela, with evident influence on the
practice of urban management and therefore of urban transport. Finally, Caracas’
role in the urban system is a feature that corresponds with the simultaneous active
presence of different levels of government in the capital city; this feature is strong
enough to influence the way in which the institutional framework works out. 
5.1.1 Overview
An estimated 5.7 million people travel in Caracas each day. Of all these trips, 47%
are made in private cars; the rest are distributed unequally over six other modes of
public transport, namely: metro; metro bus; private, and public buses; por puesto
(minibus) jeep (operating mainly in squatters’ settlements with steep topography).
The urban extension of Caracas is strongly related to the development of roads.
Since the end of the 1930s, oil industry revenues had allowed the state to develop a
road infrastructure that favoured car ownership. This policy responded to the
increasing displacement distances produced by urban growth, which at that time
was characterized by isolated urban developments in the valley.
In 1945, a road network was proposed for Caracas following the principles of the
Rotival Plan of 1939. The grid of roads developed during the 1950s facilitated the
urban expansion of the city to the east, displacing land use from agricultural
purposes. In fact, road infrastructure policy became an important component of
state intervention in urban development. The intention of this intervention is
evident in the F. Fajardo highway. It differs from the existing traditional grid of
streets and extends to the east on the east-west axis of the valley, dissecting the valley
longitudinally. The highway was laid out on its optimal route with regard to the
development visions for the city.
The second set of motorways was built during the 1960s to connect the great valley
with other secondary valleys and urban centres in the capital region. In this period,
the west-east axis was reinforced with the construction of the Cota Mil (Level
Thousand) highway on the outskirts of Avila’s mountain range in the north limit of
the valley.
From the first studies in the 1950s, the absence of a serious project of mass public
transport was considered remarkable. At the end of the 1960s an ‘origin-destination’
study showed the impossibility of dealing with circulation and atmospheric pollution
without a reliable system of urban public transport. The construction of a Metro
system was proposed as early as 1968. The objectives included the reunification of
urban space, accessibility to and from employment and housing locations, and
provision to meet increased demand. The restricting of car use was also on the
agenda, as was the coordination of the various transport systems into an efficient
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network. Work began on the Metro in 1975 and the first line was opened in 1983.
This first line also follows the central axis of the city (west-east), serving the areas of
higher population density. The two secondary lines serve secondary valleys and are at
right angles to the first line.
The construction of the metro system had an important impact in the city; it was
contended that the metro saved the city from collapse through reducing road
congestion, increasing public transport efficiency, and improving accessibility.
Unfortunately, this initial impact has not been sustained and road congestion and
urban public transport performance have deteriorated, partly through the poor
integration of the metro system with other modes of transport. The introduction of
this new mode of public transportation did not in itself lead to the restructuring of
the comprehensive transport system in Caracas. Basically, the objectives of the
different actors did not match up. Public providers, in this case the Metro Company,
strive for effectiveness – impacting on congestion, trip duration, accessibility in
general – and private involvement in urban public transport (buses, minibuses,
jeeps) responds to economic criteria (profit maximization). These private partners
can adapt to contextual demand, thereby creating duplications and redundancies
that affect the efficiency of the system.
The road infrastructure is dense, but incomplete. The discontinuity in the network
of streets and roads provokes traffic jams and reduces the efficiency of private car
and public transport. At the same time the supply, efficiency and safety of public
transport is inadequate, which encourages people to use their private cars, so that
congestion is aggravated. Moreover, the metro lines 2 and 3 feed the main axis close
to overload.
5.1.2 Elements of urban public transport
In Caracas, urban public transport is provided by various government agencies, or
by private providers under government supervision. The provision of passenger
transportation is an important branch of government intervention in urbanized
regions. However, government intervention is confined to certain elements of urban
transportation, namely:
• investment, 
• route design, 
• planning, 
• regulation, 
• maintenance, 
• pricing. 
These elements can be clustered according to their political value into three groups:
first, a group related to hard investment in public transport (buses, metros, tramways,
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terminals, and so forth.); second, a group including route design, planning,
regulation, and maintenance; third, a group involving pricing. This classification is
arbitrary, but it reproduces the differentiation present in cities such as Caracas. 
Investment refers to investments made for the purchase and maintenance of
transport systems (metro, tramways, and so forth), transport units (metro cars,
buses, trolleys, trams), and infrastructure to accommodate these transportation
modes (bus stops, bus terminals, metro stations, bus parking, garages, passenger
shelters, signals). 
Routes, planning, regulation, and maintenance refer to the management and planning
of public transport routes, the regulation of the conditions and range of the service,
and the maintenance of infrastructure, units and systems.
Pricing refers to the intervention of government agencies in the regulation and fixing
of public transport fares.
This classification is relevant to the analysis of the coordination of urban public
transport in Caracas. The classification facilitates the gathering within these
categories of information that might seem dissimilar at first sight, and assists the
establishment of these clusters of elements as the functional components on which
the various levels of government exert their authority. 
5.1.3 Levels of government
All three levels of government (central, regional, local) are acting in urban transport
in Caracas. In most cases, their responsibilities in relation to the different elements
of urban transport are assigned according to a geographical scale. However, the
previous distribution of power (central government agencies, former municipal
subdivisions) remains in force at some point (the Ministry of Transport still holds
fare/pricing authority, while in the new decentralized setting this is assigned to local
government). 
Central government is actively involved in urban transport together with certain
Ministries, specific agencies, and (indirectly) through the Government of the Federal
District (which is designated by the central government executive). The strategies for
infrastructure investment handled by the Ministry of Infrastructure (MINFRA), the
Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC), and specific agencies are set up
to deal with projects, programmes, or transport infrastructure of a substantial scale. 
MTC is mainly responsible for producing and enforcing the general regulations
concerning urban transport, setting national standards for the different modes of
transport, including types, fare tables, and is the preferred institution for the
management of transport subsidies.
Two of the specific agencies are important for urban transport in Caracas: the
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Subway Company (CAMETRO), and the Urban Transport Foundation (FONDUR).
CAMETRO operates as a state-owned firm. It deals with the investments, planning,
management, and maintenance of the metro system, which includes three
subsurface metro lines and several bus lines. FONDUR is responsible for the
management and implementation of investment programmes targeted to improve
urban transportation. These programmes are often funded by, or carried out in
partnership with international development agencies (IADB, the World Bank, the
Andean Development Corporation). The status with regard to ministry hierarchies is
independent for both CAMETRO and FONDUR, although they are both expected to
work in conjunction with the appropriate ministries.
Of less importance at the present time, given its limited range, is the Railway
Company (FERROCAR); like CAMETRO and FONDUR, it operates as a minister-
level independent agency.
Central government is responsible for major investments, providing the framework
of regulations and norms governing urban transport, and the administration of
programmes of subsidies; these subsidies affect prices.
Of the Regional Governments in Caracas, those of Miranda State and Vargas State
have little structured participation in the urban transport sector. Regional
governments act as partners for central government agencies (CAMETRO,
FERROCAR) for major infrastructure investments.
The Government of the Federal District (the special regional level government for
the national capital) participates directly in urban transport, running a service with
several bus lines of its own; however, the impact of this operation is limited. This
involvement of the Government of the Federal District works as a direct subsidy to
specific groups; implementation is not coordinated with other agencies or levels of
governments.
Local government authorities are empowered to undertake several duties concerning
urban transport. In Caracas, almost all the local government authorities have an
urban transport authority that combines the functions of investment, planning,
route design, regulation and pricing. Each local government authority has produced
a mix of services and practices in urban transport. These mixes contain different
combinations of transport authority, urban transport departments, public bus
companies, and transport police (to enforce regulations). Local government is
responsible for planning, route design, regulation, pricing, and, to a lesser extent,
for minor investments in infrastructure and transport systems.
5.1.4 Decentralization context
The decentralization of government (1989) and public services management has also
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led to changes in the urban transport sector. Basically, the role of municipal agencies
has increased in importance, since they have become legally entitled to greater
involvement in the sector. Nevertheless, major infrastructure investment remains a
central government responsibility; many local government responsibilities in urban
transport are not clearly demarcated with respect to other levels of government. The
process of devolution operates at different depths depending on the political weight of
an urban transport element (pricing), the level of active lobbying by local authorities,
and the specific political balances between central and local governments (opposition
parties, coalitions, and so forth). Basically, whatever (according to the decentralization
argument and the legislation) should be in the hands of the urban governments
(regional or local), is still under discussion and negotiation.
5.1.5 Role of Caracas in the urban system
The primacy of Caracas in the urban system of the country (see chapter 3) has direct
consequences for the delivery of urban transport in the cities. The main impacts are
the heavy demand for urban transport in Caracas compared with other urban
agglomerations in the country, and the appreciation that urban transport in Caracas
is a matter of national interest.
Heavy demand for urban transportation is related to population size and the growth
of the city, the largest in the country. Population growth and the subsequent
expansion of the urbanized areas affect service quality, produce new transportation
needs (new service areas, new volumes) and impose unexpected on loads the
existing infrastructure.
Urban transport in Caracas is of national interest, so that central government is
involved. This involvement provides a justification for some responsibilities of urban
government regarding urban transport to be shared among different levels of
government, and for some decisions to be taken at central government level.
Investments in infrastructure, and the operation of the Metro system are part of this
vision, where elements of the sector are kept close to central government. Moreover,
as transport costs are an important component of household expenditures –
affecting transportation fares (by raise or by subsidy), it is a political issue of vital
importance for governments. Being the biggest city emphasizes this, because there
are more people whose household income is affected, and because these fare
changes are promptly emulated in other cities. 
5.2 Territorial scales
There are several administrative and operational realms for urban transport in
Caracas. They vary because, although authority is given to municipal realms, operations
are arranged at a technical level according to technical definitions of a service area.
These technical levels are relevant, because finance and intergovernmental transfers
are associated with them.
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5.2.1 Territories
The administrative territories are those within the municipal boundaries, while the
realms on which many technical decisions taken for the sector (selection of transport
modes, number of units for urban public transport, the design and assignment of
routes) relate to territories and areas defined by use, density, traffic volume, and
accessibility. Below are the territories derived from a) the administrative boundaries,
and b) the technical definitions. 
The administrative boundaries in force in Caracas define the territory of action of the
different actors of urban government. The state and municipal boundaries reflect
the realms on which the established urban governments exert their authority in the
city. Thus, the Federal District, Miranda State and Vargas State are the realms for
regional government action in urban transport, and Libertador, Sucre, Vargas,
Baruta, Hatillo, Chacao the territories for the corresponding municipal agencies in
charge of urban transport. 
Definitions of territories in force for urban transport in Caracas are fairly
independent of the areas defined by the administrative boundaries. They are
technical definitions. Urban transport in Caracas has been defined and subdivided for
practical purposes into a metropolitan area, urban centre, urban area, inter-urban
area, and squatters’ locations. 
Metropolitan area. For planning and logistic purposes, the metropolitan area is
the major realm in the city. The supply and demand of urban public transport is
surveyed within this territorial definition. Statistical data describing the transport
sector in the city have largely been obtained from within this metropolitan frame of
reference. This data collection is undertaken by the MTC (Ministry of
Communications and Transport), the National Statistics Office (OCEI), and
CAMETRO. 
The other definitions, more specific to accessibility, physical conditions, or type of
agglomeration (in terms of type of buildings and urban features) also operate in the
city. These definitions are either subsets of the metropolitan area, or are included
within the metropolitan area previously discussed.
Urban centre. This is the core of the city, consisting of the historic centre and the
main conurbation along the valley. The accessibility of the centre is an important
public service issue, related to the organization of the city and the functioning of
Caracas as a capital. Most government agencies (Ministries, Congress, Presidential
Palace, Supreme Courts, and so forth) are located in the city centre.
Urban area. This includes the urban centre and incorporates most of the
contiguous urbanized areas of the great valley. The urban area corresponds to the
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major valley, including all the routes and transport services needed for accessibility
to the city centre, adjacent urban areas (formal and informal) that spread along the
valley. Some terms used to classify urban public transport in the city are associated
with this territorial definition. This is the case for the definition of routes, such as
the rutas urbanas and rutas troncales. The former refer to the superficial public
transport routes operating within the formal city grid, and the latter to routes
operating within the surrounding informal settlements. At this point, the
classification of routes is established in relation to the type of built environment,
marking the difference between a formal city structure – legally developed built
objects situated on streets laid out in a grid and with access to feeder roads – as
opposed to illegal squatter settlements with limited road access situated on the
periphery, or in interstices between legal developments,.
Suburban area. Under this definition fall all the urbanized areas of the capital
region that are not contiguous with the agglomeration of the great valley, but have a
strong functional relationship with the urban area in terms of commuting. The
suburban area therefore corresponds to the urban sprawl and the adjacent valleys
beyond the main valley. The southeast and southwest areas are included here and, as
is the case with the urban centre, certain routes are associated with this territorial
definition. Those routes operating between these areas and the city centre are called
rutas suburbanas, or suburban routes. As in the city centre, transportation routes
serving informal settlements are subsystems referred as feeder roads.
Interurban routes refer to connections between urban and suburban Caracas and
other important locations (cities, towns) in the city system that do not form part of a
continuous urban spread, because of geographical barriers and urban development.
These routes connect with locations in the Tuy valley, and areas east of the main
valley (Guarenas, Guatire), which have a substantial number of inhabitants
commuting daily to the main valley. Urban transportation between Caracas and La
Guaira is also referred to as interurban, because these two locations are divided by
the mountain range, with less opportunity for continuous urban sprawl.
Nevertheless, the functional relationship between Caracas and La Guaira and
adjacent locations is strong, in terms of both commuting patterns and trade. La
Guaira is the location of the main seaport and airport of Caracas; it is the centre of
the coastal tourist facilities, and it also provides a housing alternative for city
commuters.
Squatters. Although these areas are found everywhere in the metropolitan area of
Caracas – and therefore in any of the previous categories – their precarious
accessibility makes them a realm apart in terms of public transport. Often located on
steep mountainsides with poor road infrastructure, these settlements are
incorporated into the urban transport system with their own particular classification
of rutas troncales or feeder routes
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5.2.2 Matching and non-matching territories
This system of overlapping territorial definitions and classifications of activities in
urban public transport runs in parallel with that of the actual territories of
administrative authorities, inciting three effects in the management practices of the
agencies involved in urban public transport. These effects are divergence, the
coexistence of dissimilar sets of territorial definitions among agencies, and the
overlapping of authorities within the city. 
Divergence. Institutions at local government have to interact with other agencies,
mainly those of the central government, that use a different territorial definition for
their projects in urban transport.
Coexistence. No set of territorial definitions, either administrative or technical, is
consistently preferred to the other. The divergence in objectives and realms does not
produce a call for homogeneity in the definitions used by the different public
agencies involved in urban transport.
Overlap. The authority of the agencies of urban transport frequently overlaps onto
other scales of action in the city. Municipal agencies suddenly acquire a de facto
metropolitan authority when the routes assigned cross the boundaries of other
administrative realms, or the pricing policy becomes a standard for the whole city.
This is the case when a bus or minibus route runs across several local government
authorities (an administrative definition), while the route itself is defined as ‘urban’
(a technical definition). The responsibility for setting fares and prices, undertaking
design or changing routes, and setting the conditions of the service could be in the
hands of just one particular local government authority, although its effects (fare
increase, change in routes) have an impact on the metropolitan scale.
5.2.3 Expectations
The preferred strategy of public agencies coping with these effects is that of the
extension of authority and influence. Instead of seeking coordination, some agencies
try to influence the sector beyond their administrative boundaries. Examples of this
tendency are central government agencies such as CAMETRO or MTC that operate
on a metropolitan territory, regardless of any administrative subdivisions. Moreover,
the urban public transport department of the Libertador local government authority
is in charge of key elements in the pricing mechanisms in Caracas, using an
assumed metropolitan authority with the tolerance of other local government
authorities in the city. 
At central and regional levels, wider territories are the prevailing concept, regardless
of administrative subdivisions, while at municipal levels the extension of influence
beyond their assigned territories is a common practice, as the Libertador local
government authority exemplifies. 
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Inquiry into a common expectation among the officers in the urban transport sector
revealed an interesting consensus. The metropolitan scale is seen as a relevant scale,
together with the hierarchy that comes with it, and it should resolve (or at least
clarify) the mismatch of administrative territories and operational realms (research
interviews, 1999). Nevertheless, activities or programmes aiming to enhance
coordination, or produce arrangements that reflect an appropriate scale, such as a
metropolitan transport council, are very rare. Agencies involved in urban transport
recognize the metropolitan scale, but deal with their scale problems at the scales
immediately available to them (local, bilateral, and so forth).
With regard to other sectors or functions (spatial planning, infrastructure, housing
projects, and so forth), expectations are also rather optimistic, with practice lagging
behind. The urban transport territories do not match the administrative territories;
neither do they tie in with plans, nor are they related to planning and management
in the metropolitan area. 
5.3 Decisions 
The strategic decisions with a metropolitan impact (that is, those decisions that
correspond with the metropolitan scale and have an effect on the city as a whole),
related to the functional region and focused on a) investment, b) route design,
planning, regulation, and maintenance, and c) pricing, are located in the
institutional map as follows.
This section documents the analysis of three aspects of government involvement in
urban transport. These are: the investment aspect (understood as public investment
within the framework of plans); a group of elements of urban transport including
route design, planning, regulation, and maintenance; pricing.
For each of these components, the analysis is structured as follows: first the locus of
decision-making is presented: who is taking the strategic decisions, at what level of
government, and within which institutional framework. Second, what kind of
coordination has evolved, or is visible beyond these loci, and in particular to what
extent these coordination efforts correspond with broader territorial scales. For
coordination, the analysis is reported according to the following themes: a) the level
of coordination (info level, communication level, agreements, and so forth); b) the
underlying powers; c) the impacts of the actual power-decision arrangement on the
provision of urban transport; d) the identification or description of the coordination
practices that have a metropolitan scale.
5.3.1 Investment
In this section, an analysis of the investment component of urban transport is
presented. Attention is first paid to the locus of decision making in this area, followed
by the identification of the forms of coordination within the institutional framework.
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Investment: locus of decision making
Two aspects of urban public transport demand public investment: capital investment
in infrastructure (roads, streets, motorways, metro railways, bus stops, signals,
information); investment in the moving elements of the system (the acquisition of
new units and the maintenance of vehicles in urban public transport). These latter
forms of investments are backed up by loans and subsidies from central and local
government. For the purpose of this study, attention is concentrated on the latter
aspects – the acquisition and maintenance of vehicle fleets – because this is the part
of investment that is present in all the government levels acting in Caracas.
Investment in transport infrastructure is the concern of central or regional
government (Miranda State government).
The central government agency responsible for investment programmes in urban
public transport is the Urban Transport Foundation (FONTUR) which channels funds
from the national government, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), World
Bank, and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) into transport investments.
This agency has been established independently of the Ministry of Transport of
Communication (MTC) in order to retain its flexibility. This is required to provide
development agencies such as IADB and CAF with a direct reach to beneficiaries
through their programmes of urban transport improvement. FONTUR is a
coordination office, responsible for setting up and following through investment
programmes as well as operating as the government agency or government
counterpart to IADB and CAF. The implementation of investment programmes is
frequently handed over to local government authorities, since they have the technical
information concerning routes, volumes, number of vehicles, state of roads, and so
forth
CAMETRO investment programmes remain of national interest; they are proposed,
debated, and approved at central government level. CAMETRO has ministerial
status as its president is present at the infrastructure cabinet. As a (state-owned)
company, several local government authorities Caracas have seats in its board.
CAMETRO investments are devoted mainly to the maintenance of the three existing
metro lines and the financing of the planned expansions of the system. capital
investments for expansion are financed through the central government via the
international market.
Investments in surface transport (via FONTUR) and the metro system (CAMETRO)
are unrelated and uncoordinated. They are executed by different agencies. The
investments are only referred to sectoral budgets (that is, MTC plans and budgets) or
national budgets as items in the same category.
The locus of decision-making with regard to investments in the sector has to be
|135|
positioned close to central government, which has relatively more financial power
than the other levels of government. Nevertheless, the different modes of
intervention, through the ministries and special agencies such CAMETRO or
FONTUR, show that there is no direct representation on the metropolitan scale.
Investment: coordination
The coordination of the investments of the different actors in urban transport is not
structured. The decision-making power is at the top levels of government (central
and regional), which facilitates scale gains but hinders the participation of other sub-
national governments in the process. FONTUR assigns resources to local
government authorities on a project basis, although no evidence was found of any
coordination between local government authorities (Research interviews, 1999) and
FONTUR (FONTUR, 1999). However, the increasing participation of local
government as managers of urban transport leads them to attempt to bring decision-
making power on investments within their constituencies. The isolation of
CAMETRO with respect to its municipal counterparts and its access to finance
through central government justifies the lack of coordination efforts made by this
agency with respect to the other actors. CAMETRO does not need the local
government authorities; it is sheltered from politics, since it reports to the central
government. The capacity to coordinate is discussed below.
Level of coordination. On the metropolitan scale the level of coordination is low,
or is rated as a ‘relatively easy’ arrangement (see table below). The coordination
scores are higher on the local scale, or as evaluated by isolated cases of bilateral
collaboration. Moreover, the cases in which the metropolitan scale is involved, such
as investments in the metro systems, bypass coordination since the metro company
has little communication with urban governments. If a need arises to improve
certain lines, or extend the service to certain areas, most of the work to acquire the
investment capacity (financial support) is undertaken by CAMETRO with the
government authority concerned: thus, locally.
In the same way, the investments facilitated by FONTUR are coordinated between
two levels of government (with FONTUR as the central government agency) and the
local government agency that implements the project. In brief, FONTUR’s
programmes to improve the condition of urban transport services are locally driven,
lack a metropolitan scale, and are seldom in phase with similar programmes in the
city. As a result, a FONDUR programme to improve ‘feeder’ routes – investing in
fleets, improving management, and so forth – will have no follow-up in the
connecting ‘urban’ routes. A ‘trunk’ route is often confined within one local
government authority, while an ‘urban’ route will cross more than one local
government authority. Local government authorities are less interested in proposing
improvement projects for such boundary-crossing routes for political reasons, and
FONTUR is unable to compel local government authorities to join such projects.
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Table 5.1 - Investment. Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 5.2 - Investment. Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864) and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
X
X
For surface urban public transport, service providers decide independently on the
range of investments. Thanks to their high volumes, the routes along the important
east-west axis have more opportunities for capital investments, so that units are
better and maintenance is regular. The local government authorities, acting as they
do independently of each other, lack the capacity to establish a uniform basic profile
for the condition of the fleets (technical aspects, emissions, passenger capacity, and
so forth) or set norms for urban transport units in the valley.
The Underlying Powers. The fragmented state of urban government allows
government investments in urban transport to be made at different levels and with
different agencies. Various political actors situated in urban governments acquire
allocation power, which is convenient in a political context traditionally prone to
granting favours, pressure from interest groups, and clientelism.
Two of the main investment agencies in action in Caracas, CAMETRO and
FONDUR, have reasonably adequate support from the central government to carry
out their programmes. The central government supports urban public transport in
the metropolitan area of Caracas, but through its own agencies. Nevertheless, even
though the actions of CAMETRO to expand and improve the actual subway system
have an important economic rationale in terms of the benefits to users, its political
support seems at times to be at stake, thus testing the capacity of central
government – mainly of the executive branch – to sustain this enterprise. 
In the case of FONTUR, its lack of capacity to coordinate at the metropolitan level
does not mean that it is ineffective in achieving its institutional goals. Its interests
are basically met in a) directing investments towards the improvement of urban
public transport, and b) coordinating the use of development aid in an efficient way
(that is, on schedule). The main goal of this agency is to activate as much aid finance
as possible. Its institutional position, close to central government and separate from
the ministries and sub-national government authorities, is consistent with this goal,
since bureaucracy can be avoided.
The main interest for local government authorities is the allocation of investment.
That consists of the allocation of FONTUR-related finance to urban public transport
routes, either by creating new routes or by giving private operators access to finance.
Such operators require finance for the renovation and maintenance of their fleets.
Technical issues are always given due consideration, but the political advantages of
the direct allocation of investment in urban transport tend to receive most attention.
New routes with new units have a short-term impact in political terms. Similarly,
gaining the support of private operators (individuals or cooperatives) by facilitating
finance is relevant for elected authorities, since these operators are often organized
in cooperatives of bus owners with strong links with the unions, which in turn have
the capacity for political mobilization. The costs of generating coordination capacity
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for initiating and maintaining a coordinated investment programme (of several local
government authorities) is too high compared with the potential gains. For mayors
and transport agencies at the municipal level, collaboration with FONTUR to
implement investment programmes it easier on the local or micro-local scale. 
The interests of private service providers of urban public transport (individuals,
firms, cooperatives) are some of the most important in the investment component of
urban public transport. Basically, the power of the transport union is substantial,
because of its links with the political parties, its mobilization capacity, and its power
to bring the city to a standstill in the event of a negotiation impasse. Although the
programmes of FONTUR (and therefore of the development aid agencies) are
intended to bring about the modernization of the sector through the required
conditions (credit is conditional on improved operations, modern management, the
constitution of firms, compliance with service schedules, multimodal tickets, and so
forth) the union is unyielding in retaining its political power and perceives most of
these conditions as an attack. CAMETRO’s decision to operate in parallel with the
private sector rather than in combination with it confirms the perception that
dealing with private providers is the difficult side of urban public transport. The
providers of urban public transport are influential in the investment programmes
implemented by FONTUR-local government authorities; they demand priority for
union members and raise the barriers for new entrants. In the same token, their
influence is also apparent in the way conditions (for access to credit) are written to
suit union members. Furthermore, the political alliance of mayors with some sectors
of the private providers is also translated into preferences in local investment
programmes for these actors, either by favouring their participation in the
investment programmes, or by protecting the established urban public transport
routes they control.
Impacts. The main impact of the actual arrangement through which investments in
transport is implemented in the city is the aggravation and reinforcement of the
fragmented state of the urban public transport system. Few efforts are made to
coordinate investments among the different modes of urban transports (metro
system and surface transportation). Investment is made through programmes
isolated from each other; CAMETRO operates independently of FONTUR, while
within FONTUR the programmes of different local government authorities compete
with each other, so their investments are not coordinated. The present investment
pattern limits the opportunities of addressing the fragmentation of the system. In
the present situation, strategic goals for the metropolitan area, such as the reduction
of congestion or a consistent fare system for all modes, are difficult to implement. 
Metropolitan arrangements. Other than CAMETRO, which is fairly metropolitan
in its operation and coverage (its territory of action is the main conurbation of
Caracas, regardless of municipal boundaries), there are no metropolitan
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arrangements for investments in urban public transport in Caracas. However, there
are two initiatives regarding urban transport investment that refer to the
metropolitan scale. These are the Caracas Strategic Plan, and the Urban Transport
Partnership. These institutional arrangements have a limited reach and in any case
are not currently in force; they are paper programmes or projects with no current
impact on the way investments in the urban public transport are made. 
The Caracas Strategic Plan initiative (which is strongly supported by CAMETRO)
typifies an approach to the metropolitan scale, although it is not specific to urban
public transport; the strategic plan embodies future scenarios for Caracas and
includes spatial, economic, and logistic elements of urban development. The issues
at stake for urban public transport in the strategic plan are the creation of a
metropolitan system that resolves the differences between modes (metro and
surface) with regard to pricing, quality, and continuity, and the necessity for this
integrated system in the scenarios presented. The support of CAMETRO for this
initiative is explained by the necessity of this public company to complement and
extend its operation in urban public transport with the independent systems of
private providers and municipal operators providing public transportation in
Caracas. CAMETRO is citywide in its operation and investments – and so
metropolitan in the definition relevant to this study. CAMETRO operates
independently from the other actors in urban transport (especially from private
providers of surface transport), so that its coverage is partial. 
The Mancomunidad del Transporte, or Urban Transport Partnership, is a project of the
mayors in the city to establish a metropolitan authority for urban transport. The
forum of the council of mayors proposed this authority as a medium-term measure
to cope with the congestion problems, although it has not been seriously followed
through and still remains a project proposal.
5.3.2 Planning, regulation, maintenance
This section documents the analysis of the elements of planning, regulation, and
maintenance as a group component; this analysis is similar to that for investment
presented above. The analysis reported below commences with the locus of decision-
making in this area, and follows with the search for forms of coordination within the
institutional framework.
Planning: Locus of decision-making
The planning and regulation of urban public transport involves two main actors: the
local government authorities; the metro company CAMETRO, which is a central
government agency. Local government authorities plan and regulate the majority of
urban public transport operating in the city (buses, minibuses, taxis, jeeps, and so
forth). CAMETRO is independent of these municipal regulations and is able to take
decisions concerning planning on the metro system. CAMETRO is accountable to
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the central government, its natural regulatory authority in the hierarchy, acting
through the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC).
The MTC formulates major infrastructure plans for the country and coordinates
with regional and local authorities. Urban transportation falls under one of the
Ministry’s many strategic guidelines. The capacity to plan and regulate has been
transferred to lower government levels. 
One local government authority in Caracas has a particularly important role in
planning and regulation. This is Libertador, which because of its size and its
historical role as the main local government authority, draws up the plans for most
transport strategies and regulates the majority of city routes. Many routes cross
municipal boundaries, extending into interurban realms; ultimately, the transport
office of Libertador bears the management load of the system alone. The regulations
for the sector – defining the characteristics of urban transport units with which
providers must comply, the fare tables, schedules, hardware design (bus stops,
maps, and so forth), the location of bus stops and terminals – are formulated in
Libertador and quickly followed up by the other local government authorities. This
follow-up strategy also occurs in the case of fare changes, in which Libertador’s local
government authority acts as the municipal counterpart to central government and
unions.
Decisions about the maintenance of the system, the vehicle fleets and traffic
management infrastructure (bus stops, stoplights, terminals, and so forth) are
distributed as follows: local government authorities take decisions on the traffic
management infrastructure, and transport firms take decisions regarding their
fleets, although they are obliged to follow the municipal regulations. For the metro
system, the operating company is empowered to take these decisions; the company
has an agreement with the local government authority to reach certain quality of
service levels.
The locus in the institutional network where decision are taken concerning planning,
regulation and maintenance is positioned in the central government level, with a
specific additional element in the participation of Libertador local government
authority.
Planning: coordination
The capacity to coordinate in the area of planning, regulation and maintenance in
urban planning, taking into consideration a metropolitan scale, is discussed below
in relation to four themes: the level of coordination, the underlying powers, the
impact of the state of coordination on the functioning of urban transport, and the
emergence of metropolitan tendencies around this functioning.
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Level of coordination. There is little coordination between the agencies
responsible for the planning, regulation, and maintenance of urban transport.
Information sharing or comparative procedures are the most common forms of
exchange (see table below). However, these practices are essentially remnants of a
system with one powerful local government authority (Libertador), and the tendency
of smaller local government authorities to follow the decisions taken in Libertador.
Otherwise, when they do not concur, the local governments propose plans,
regulation measures, and maintenance programmes of their own accord. This
occurs mainly when they are dealing with the transport requirements in localized
areas of their jurisdiction, such as the local routes connecting up informal
settlements.
The bigger actors, such as the Ministry of Transport and especially CAMETRO, keep
coordination at metropolitan scale at a low level and limit the participation or
objective sharing with local authorities. In practice, these central government
institutions represent an important share of urban transport, but their planning is
not directly connected with urban government.
The Underlying Powers. Every urban government agency, whether at central,
regional or local government level, has some formal say (through the constitution,
municipal and decentralization acts) in planning urban public transport. Some of
these agencies exert their powers through taking action in the sector, as the central
government does through the MTC or CAMETRO. At the municipal level, the
difference between the influence of Libertador local government authority and the
other local government authorities in the valley is substantial. Nevertheless, local
government authorities such as El Hatillo, Sucre, Baruta, use their powers to
regulate the sector within their jurisdiction – thus on a local scale – in order to
influence urban public transport and gain technical or political benefits. The
approval of routes, regulations or maintenance are instruments which affect other
actors, such as private providers who would consider serving a route, or
implementing a fare increase, or a new maintenance standard. Similarly, the reach
of urban public transportation to certain communities and locations is affected by
the decisions taken at municipal level to extend a route, set fare prices, or design
extended timetables. This strategy has been widely used in a political context, with
the appearance of rutas populares favoured by municipal regulations, or new
concessions. This has happened on poor income or lower middle class
neighbourhoods, and has been promoted vigorously for election purposes.
Impacts. The lack of effective coordination in planning, regulation and maintenance
produces an urban transport system that is heterogeneous in quality, unreliable, and
poorly maintained. The limited reach – in territorial terms – of most of the local
plans for urban transport impedes improvement in service provision, such as
consolidated time schedules, regular shifts. The low level of coordination achieved at
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Table 5.3 - Planning and regulation. Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 5.4 - Planning, regulation and maintainance. Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Research interviews (1999). Addapted from Mitchell-Weaver
et al (2000, p. 864) and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
X
X
inter-municipal or inter-governmental levels detracts from a metropolitan service
standard other than that of CAMETRO, which acts independently.
With regard to regulation and maintenance, since service providers are regulated at
the municipal level, the lack of consistent practice in the metropolitan area leads
service levels to fall to the lowest requirements. Private providers operating under
concession in Libertador and Petare have older vehicle fleets than those operating in
Baruta, El Hatillo and Chacao local government authorities. The maintenance
checks on buses and minibuses are stricter and more frequently carried out in
Chacao than in other local government authorities. This inconsistency in policy
means that higher standards in one particular local government authority do not
guarantee improvement in service at metropolitan level.
Metropolitan arrangements. The most promising initiatives in the urban transport
sector remain the Caracas Strategic Plan and the Urban Transport Partnership.
These initiatives propose coordination for planning, regulation and maintenance.
The partnership for urban transport is a project that is still irrelevant to the sector’s
dynamics.
The documents of the strategic plan of Caracas do not specify actions in urban
transport apart from general coordination powers. Establishment of a regulation
arm is not specified. Nevertheless, since CAMETRO is an important promoter of the
strategic plan, the emphasis in urban transport coordination is to be expected. 
5.3.3 Pricing 
In this section, an analysis of the pricing component (fares and tickets) of urban
public transport is presented; this is similar to the analysis of investments, or
planning, regulation and maintenance reported in the preceding paragraphs. In the
analysis below, first the locus of decision-making in this area is considered, and then
the search for forms of coordination within the institutional framework is described.
pricing: locus of decision making
Pricing in the urban public transport of Caracas is a responsibility assigned to local
government, but because of its political sensitivity the Ministry of Transport and
Communication (MTC) intervenes as the agent of central government in the process
of fixing fares and transport prices in Metropolitan Caracas. This Ministry also works
out and publishes official guidelines for urban, suburban, and interurban transport
price scales. These include bus and minibus fares, metro ticket prices, and taxi fares.
The local government authority carries out the final negotiations for setting fares
with the urban transport unions and the private providers. This process implies
decisions of a metropolitan reach – prices tend to be homogeneous in the city
according to the categories of urban transport (urban, suburban, interurban, trunk
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routes, and so forth: see page 7). However, since this is a metropolitan issue, only
the local government authority of Libertador participates in the negotiation rounds
leading to agreements on fares. Libertador is over-represented in the process since
other local governments in the city do not participate and simply follow the
agreements arrived at in Libertador as the benchmark for their own fare scheme. 
The public transport companies are the counterparts of the government authorities
in this process; the majority of these companies are organized in cooperatives
federated in one metropolitan union Central Unica de transportistas del Distrito
Federal y el Estado Miranda, usually known as the Central Unica del Transporte.
Cooperatives and small firms from the Federal District and the Miranda State have
representatives in this union, making it an entity that covers the metropolitan area
and the capital region. These cooperatives and small firms are not incorporated as
companies, but rather as associations that preserve the individual rights of the
participants. The preferred formula is the sociedad civil, which allows all the partners
to retain the ownership of their vehicles (bus, minibus, taxi). The Central Unica de
Transporte is therefore a union of small businesses that is recognized at the same
time as a trade union. It operates like a trade union in price negotiations, where
price increases are demanded as vehemently as salary increases are claimed by more
traditional unions. 
Pricing agreements therefore have three participants: the Central Government; the
local government authority of Libertador (alone, or in company with similar
authorities in the city); the metropolitan union. Following along this line, the
subsidies that affect prices are granted by the central government to the transport
companies and cooperatives (indirect subsidies). The union plays a strong part in
channelling applications and in the disbursement of these subsidies for its affiliates. 
The pricing process set-up usually involves these three actors: the MTC as a
politically sensitive technical agency, carrying out the executive strategy and having
the final word on prices; the local government authorities, thrusting their technical
concerns and service improvements into the negotiations; and the union, forcefully
pressing for the maximum short-term benefit.
Metro system fares1 are assigned independently of this process in agreements
between CAMETRO, MTC, and the local government authority of Caracas
(Libertador). Subsidies are included in the price (which keeps them low) or are
granted to CAMETRO in the form of an allowance to build up debts (also thereby
keeping ticket prices low) underwritten by the central government. The agreements
made between CAMETRO, MTC, and Libertador relate to technical or functional
issues and also take political issues into account. The prices of superficial transport
and the metro system are not indexed or homogeneous. 
The locus of decision-making is therefore close to central government, since it is the
apparent policymaker with regard to subsidies and income targets, moving towards
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local government with one local authority acting in behalf of several local authorities
in the city. The union’s presence reinforces the central government locus, since it is
the only adequate counterpart for a metropolitan guild in the absence of a
metropolitan agency for urban transport.
pricing: coordination
Coordination in the process of pricing urban transport is not formalized according
to the expected legal framework (in the hands of local government authorities),
although there is a relatively effective system in place that covers the metropolitan
area. Decision-making power may be in inappropriate levels of governments
according to the legal framework, but overriding this through keeping decision
making at the upper levels of government provides opportunities for scale gains.
However, the increasing participation of local government authorities as managers
of urban transport means that they attempt to bring decision powers on pricing
closer to their constituencies. The capacity to coordinate is discussed below.
Level of coordination. Where the exchange of information between local
government authorities is the main mechanism used, the level of coordination is
low (see table). All levels of government endeavour to have a clear and homogenous
scale of transport fares, so they share information with regard to private providers’
demands for fare increases, the number of units in service in their jurisdictions, and
the granting of subsidies. It is also important to note that the local government
authority of Libertador has de facto extraterritorial powers in the negotiation rounds
to achieve fare agreements, since its actions in this regard determine the follow-up
actions of the other local government authorities in the valley. Local policies to
subsidize transport (routes run by the local authorities’ own companies, direct
subsidies, and so forth) drop out of this practice of information exchange, because
these are effectively restricted to inbound routes. Local government authorities
seldom subsidize each other in this regard. 
The Underlying Powers. Transport fares have an important impact on the income
patterns of poor people resident in Caracas. The practice of protecting income
through holding back this element – by subsidy or by price manipulation – is
fundamental in the central government’s social programmes. Traditionally, urban
public transport prices are heavily subsidized to avoid low-income households
having to expend too much of their income in transportation, since most people in
this income group use public transportation frequently and extensively (OCEI,
1990). The central government sees the setting of prices in urban transport as part
of its social policy workplace. This attitude is emphasized in Caracas by its primacy
in the urban system; the largest city in both population and spatial terms. 
Urban public transport remains structured as a subsidized service in Venezuela; the
participation of private firms is not encouraged, realistic prices are not achievable
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Table 5.5 - Pricing. Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 5.6 - Pricing. Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Research interviews (1999). Addapted from Mitchell-Weaver
et al (2000, p. 864) and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
X
X
X
under present circumstances, and operators (private owners of vehicles) remain
subsidy targets. This subsidy-dependent structure also provides an argument for
government involvement. That is not to say however that government intervention
and subsidies dispensation should be centralized: rather that it should be well
coordinated. But the scale of the disbursements in a city such as Caracas and the
ongoing tension between the central and sub-national levels of government reveal
why the central government seeks to retain control. This area could provide the edge
for political leverage.
In addition, some of the consequences of poor pricing policy are relatively serious
for local governments, whether they are bad timing or inappropriate price levels. In
the late 1980s and early 1990s social unrest in Caracas was often associated with
steep rises in urban transport fares. As a result, the local government authorities
tend to avoid exercising control in these matters, or demanding further devolution
from central government. This reluctance is also apparent in the unequal burden
borne by the Libertador local government authority in the pricing process: the other
local governments find the arrangement to their liking.
Impacts. The arrangement by which the central government remains in control of
pricing policy and local authorities remain at a distance from real decision power
has two kinds of impact. First, the arrangement hinders opportunities for improving
services through competition, since prices are fixed by the government at unrealistic
levels, and knowledge of the need that a local government might have for certain
local routes or special fares conflicts with the fixing of prices in the upper levels of
government. The second impact is that the arrangement maintains the distance
between the ruling authority (central government) and the regulating bodies (at local
level), which have difficulties in keeping fares and quality under control. Eventually,
this dissonance between price and quality control affects fares, since the quality of
the service falls below that for which the price was set. Users therefore pay more for
a service of poorer quality.
Metropolitan arrangements. The present situation is a sort of metropolitan
consensus with respect to urban transport fares: a consensus by default, taking into
account the lack of participation by the majority of the urban local government
authorities. Nevertheless, there is no agency or agreement in place that resembles
the metropolitan scale. The difference in pricing and fare systems (Metro vs the
others) reveals the lack of coordination, and perhaps not only the institutional
reserve with regard to capacity. CAMETRO is avoiding the implementation of
multimodal tickets in collaboration with the present private providers and is instead
promoting something similar through the Caracas Strategic Plan. There is an
evident lack of multimodal transport planning at all levels. 
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5.4 Metropolitan arrangements
In this section, the bottlenecks constraining metropolitan arrangements in urban
public transport are specified. The last part is a discussion of the possibility of
formal metropolitan arrangements within urban transport, and the most important
conditions for that to be feasible. These bottlenecks and feasibility observations are
referred to again in the final chapters.
5.4.1 Bottleneck
The loci of decision-making for several components of this urban utility are relatively
broad in scale, since they tend to be at government levels that cover more than one
local government authority. This multiplicity is not in itself a bottleneck and could
be interpreted as a positive development; however, coordination with other
government acting in the metropolitan area is not optimal, with negative effects on
the final outcome of service provision. The major bottlenecks in this situation are: a)
poor coordination; b) the intervention of metropolitan agencies; c) a tendency to
avoid conflict; d) a legacy of clientelism 
Poor coordination. There are few coordination efforts taking place in urban
transport. Bilateral programmes in Caracas, the most sophisticated forms of
collaboration, are often between central and local level governments, whilst
horizontal coordination among local government authorities is rarely found.
Direct intervention of metropolitan agencies. The pattern of action of
CAMETRO with regard to investment and planning reveals this agency’s preference
for acting independently. CAMETRO tends to avoid collaboration with municipal
authorities, union representatives (from the Central Unica de Transporte), or any
other partner active in urban public transport. The scale of action of CAMETRO is
metropolitan, and so super-municipal, which explains why CAMETRO and the local
government authorities are unequally matched. The CAMETRO scale of action has a
technical justification and financial independence, while local government
authorities have political legitimacy and a statutory responsibility for urban
transport. CAMETRO planning and investments is effective in limited terms,
because there is little coordination with whatever transpires at municipal levels, or
the interaction of the private providers with the metro system, or ways in which
private providers could complement the system. CAMETRO does not approach
private providers or union representatives from Central Unica de Transporte directly,
preferring to leave that to the municipal authorities (through the transport
departments that deal with private providers), and efforts to improve this
relationship are inadequate. A situation of reciprocal laisser faire between
CAMETRO and the private providers of urban public transport (buses, minibuses,
taxis) results in redundant travel capacity on certain routes, unplanned transfer
points, and few facilities for intermodal travel.
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Conflict avoidance. In the course of the research, all local government authorities,
with the exception of Libertador, were found to prefer to maintain the status quo with
regard to price agreements and investment plans. The local authorities would rather
leave urban transport issues in the hands of the central government and the
Libertador local government authority than seek active participation. The provision of
urban transport is ridden through by controversial elements, such as sensible price
negotiations, and the transport union as a powerful counterpart. For investment in
urban transport on a metropolitan scale, local government authorities are also
reluctant to take control, because the coordination capacity that would be required
would have to be built from scratch.
Clientelism Legacy. In contrast with CAMETRO, the practice of private providers
has been localized and short term. Transport companies – including the
cooperatives that make up the larger part of urban public transport in the city – exert
pressure to obtain and keep routes that run parallel with those of the subway system;
peripheral branches are considered less important. The programmes of investments
patronized by FONTUR and several local government authorities that have failed to
establish a continuous transport system reinforce this practice. The political leverage
of the transport union (Central Unica de Transporte) is utilized to obtain benefits
from these programmes. Decentralization from central government (devolution,
intergovernmental investment programmes) has not necessarily brought about the
modernization of the political counterparts; the Central Unica de Transporte has the
same objectives of maximizing profits that preceded the decentralization process
(1989) and trades its political support (vote support and strike temperance) with
mayors, elected officers and career politicians. Transport companies and the
transport union (Central Unica de Transporte) operate in a traditional fashion,
remaining closely linked with political parties or groups, which see their enclaves
(the local government authorities) as the base for clientelism. The fact that the local
government authorities in the city have different political orientations at their top
levels, together with the lack of any metropolitan criteria for urban public transport,
gives ample scope for channelling investment in urban transport and assigning
routes according to vested interests.
5.4.2 Feasibility
There are few indications suggesting that Caracas could have decision-making
arrangements in urban transport appropriate for a metropolitan scale. The
institutional arrangements are not adequate to provide the necessary coordination
capacity, and those agencies acting on the metropolitan scale tend to operate
independently. Nevertheless, the subway system, as the only system of metropolitan
reach, has influence and could enhance its role as the promoter of coordination in
urban transport. The proposed partnership for metropolitan urban transport also
represents an important initiative.
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CAMETRO and its role. The continuity and relevance of CAMETRO in urban
transport is evident to all the actors in urban government. CAMETRO has resisted
volatile changes during government transitions: investment plans may be slowed
down, but top-level executives remain in position during transitions. CAMETRO is a
founding member of the Strategic Plan, and its collaboration with municipal
authorities is increasing (Research Interviews, 1999). The local government
authorities have recently endorsed CAMETRO’s plans for a fourth subway line, in
the face of attempts by the central government to cut or downsize the project (El
Nacional, 2000). Although it is weak, there is a consensus with respect to the
importance of the system for the city. The company is perceived as an effectively
managed company, because of its continuity in its professional levels, its medium-
term goal achievements, and its economic development (Pareto’s rule, economic
gains, and so forth) approach to investment. All indications suggest that CAMETRO
should continue to be an important actor in urban public transport. 
Any proposal for a metropolitan arrangement for urban transport has therefore to
incorporate CAMETRO. Similarly, the impact of the subway system in the city could
be greater if coordination were improved among the local authorities, the private
providers (organized within Central Unica de Transporte or apart), and the new
entrants (private firms, urban transport companies) at the metropolitan realm.
Although reciprocal interests would seem to be served here, the bottlenecks are
substantial. CAMETRO will not join forces with the municipal authorities, because
of the unresolved fragmentation; it keeps its distance from the transport unions
representing surface transportation, because its lack of cooperation is well known.
While the municipal counterparts and unions lack the technical expertise and
metropolitan vision of CAMETRO, the company lacks the ability to operate in
political realms. Its approach to other actors cushioned in the Caracas Strategic Plan
Foundation (FPEC) remains technically oriented and does nothing to resolve the
political misalignment: CAMETRO is shielded from the political debate and
contestability (part of its success), but is inhibited from securing any compromise
with other actors that are contestable. This misalignment is a key issue to be
addressed in a feasible metropolitan arrangement for urban transport.
Partnership for metropolitan urban transport. This project is the result of the
dissatisfaction of the mayors with the level of improvement in the provision of urban
transport in Caracas. Their appreciation of the deficiencies of administrative
fragmentation, redundancy, uncoordinated investment, and the lack of any
metropolitan criteria for urban transport has occasionally led the mayors in the city
to propose setting up a metropolitan authority for transport. In addition, the
development agencies’ demand for further aid has a metropolitan agency as a
prerequisite, which makes the option interesting.
The capacity of local government authorities to set up such an organization is
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remarkably low. This project has failed to build up any momentum, either through a
lack of political commitment or organizing capacity, or a need to compromise with
important interest groups.
The similarities in interest and goals, with those of CAMETRO linked to the
strategic plan and those of the local government authorities linked to their timid
project for a metropolitan agency, show that the public institutions involved in urban
transport in Caracas have similar concerns with regard to the scale of their actions.
That these initiatives come from different sides – technical and political – and still
do not converge show that bringing these approaches together is fundamental to an
effective metropolitan transport service. 
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Note
1 In Caracas two system of transport fares are in practice: one for the metro, consisting of
magnetic tickets to be used in trains and buses of the metro system, and cash for all other
forms of transport. Intermodal tickets are not used.
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Monterrey: Physical planning
In Monterrey, physical planning is also a key function of urban government (see
theoretical framework). As stated earlier for Caracas, the scale of action and the locus
of decision-making for this public function are key factors in supporting urban
development, avoiding inequalities and preventing negative spillover effects. In
addition, the locus of decision-making in the institutional framework of spatial
planning is important for achieving effectiveness on key issues of strategic
relevance.
The first part of this chapter is a review of the background, the structure and
features of urban planning against which the analysis was performed. The second
part describes the territorial scales operative in the city; scale is the spatial focus. The
analysis is reported in the third part, decisions; selected elements of urban planning
structure are evaluated with respect to the impact decisions have on the territorial
scales. This performance evaluation identifies the decision makers (loci), how they
correspond to territorial scales, and what kinds of layout are constructed so as to
make these decisions correspond with the appropriate scales. The concluding fourth
part, metropolitan arrangements, is the result of the preceding analysis of the scale
(metropolitan) that is relevant for this research, and a summary of the main
findings.
6.1 Background
The analysis reported in the following sections was developed within the framework
explained below. Since this study concerns observations made of the practice of
urban planning, the context of this practice in Mexico and Monterrey needs to be
specified.
This section is divided into four parts, each corresponding to one of the important
background issues: a) elements of urban planning; b) levels of government that
intervene on urban planning; c) the decentralization context; d) the role of
Monterrey in the Mexican urban system. The issues are presented and briefly
discussed for each part.
These background issues are considered structural to the sector. The first two
(elements of urban planning, level of government) derive from the legal structure in
force in the country, the region, and the city. This structure was set against the form
that urban planning has taken from the practice of urban government and the
implementation of planning policies in the course of time. Decentralization is
presented, because it is a process that influences the relationships between
governments, agencies and actors, since its aim is to precipitate structural changes
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in the government apparatus. Finally, the role of Monterrey in the Mexican urban
system is explained to make clear the features that derive from the institutional
arrangement of the country, the political structure, the tensions between the regions
and the centre, and the economic role of Monterrey in a context of trade
liberalization. 
6.1.1 Elements of urban planning
In Mexico and in the city of Monterrey, physical planning is a public good delivered
by government. Three important features of this public good are: 1) it is a
component of national development policy; 2) it is focused in territorial
development; 3) its main objective is to give direction and balance to territorial uses,
whether rural or urban growth, in accordance with desirable social objectives
(democratic planning, economic development, environmental considerations,
planning of communities). An illustration: the strategy of territorial planning in the
National Programme of Urban Development 1990-1994 (PNDU), defines its three
lines of action as: a) the development of systems of urbanized regions with high
potentiality; b) the development of connections linking the various urbanized
regions (urban corridors, transport infrastructures); c) a hierarchical distribution of
services (Plan Estrátegico Monterrey 2020, 1995). This strategy is clearly related to
the liberal doctrine of the Mexican government; the main lines of development are
designed to facilitate the full achievement of the potential of economic development
of regions rather than to cross-subsidize regions. As Iracheta (1995, p. 355-356)
affirms: “Today’s problem is less likely to be regional imbalance; it is rather to
change the economic model. The emphasis is therefore on global economic
planning and not on territorial planning.” 
A simplification has been made to describe the elements of urban spatial planning.
Three major groups of competencies are used: planning, execution or
implementation, and control.
Planning refers to the processes of the formulation of plans, documents, and
instruments to implement spatial transformations. These plans are predominantly
concerned in defining land use. Other forms of government action in the urban
realm, such as investment in infrastructure, management processes, action plans,
and regulations, are dependent on or closely related to land use proposals
incorporated in the plans.
In Monterrey, urban development is defined in the State Urban Development Act
(1999) as: “the rational and systemic planning of actions that – with social
participation, and based on the corresponding responsibilities of the state and local
government authorities – aims to transform small communities and towns. The Act
establishes the principles of planning – to set objectives, goals, strategies, and
priorities, and also to assign resources, responsibilities, and time schedules, and
further to coordinate action and evaluate results” (Art. 5). Until this Act came into
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force in 1999, spatial plans were drawn up by state-regional agencies. The situation
has now changed, since local governments are now entitled to draw up spatial plans
for their jurisdictions.
The execution and implementation of urban planning strategies are the activities
following up the planning stage. The programmes of urban development are the
execution instruments of plans preferred by urban government in Mexico. They may
be general, or specific to one issue such as urban development planning, land use,
housing, infrastructure, transport, city equipment, community participation, urban
image, and so forth. A programme forms an essential action instrument of
government involvement in the city. 
These programmes direct public investments in the city and are often linked to
planning objectives, such as the National Programme of Solidarity (Pronasol), and
the Housing Development Fund for Monterrey (Fomerrey). However, the agencies
responsible for implementing programmes of urban development are not
necessarily equivalent to the planning agencies; neither do they necessarily operate
at the same level of government. These agencies are often corporations that operate
under a raft of mandates and objectives from different government levels and
different planning levels. In such cases, a programme may not be bound to the
planning authority (or government level) that formulated the plans. This disparity is
relevant, since it shows how development programmes, although based on plans
produced at clearly defined government levels (federal, regional, or local) could
operate independently, combining objectives derived from these different levels.
Nevertheless, it is often the case that development programmes are carried out by
federal or regional government and the activities undertaken in the pertinent sector
(housing, poverty alleviation, education, and so forth.) are then absorbed, or
replicated at lower levels of government authority.
In summary, programmes are instruments that facilitate the necessary investment
and the carrying out of government objectives, which are sometimes stated in spatial
plans. Programmes are often institutionalized in exclusive agencies, whether in
central, regional or local level of government. 
Control and regulations is understood as the government action that looks at the
actual transformations of the urban areas, and their efforts to keep these
transformations in line with the actual plans. The government is basically exerting
its authority to steer the action of third parties (other public agencies and the private
sector) within the parameters of plans. Regulation could be inter-governmental, that
is, one branch of government checks whether other institutions observe the
guidelines. Regulation could be carried out on firms, citizens, and any institution
active in the building process; through such measures as issuing building permit,
assigning density levels, applying sanctions to illegal developments, promoting or
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demoting urban development, and so forth. These duties need supporting
documents that could establish the legal authority of the agency responsible for
regulation, including the types of use, transformations, allowances, procedures and
sanctions. In the case of intergovernmental regulation these documents are: Acts
that establish the relationships between the different branches of government;
spatial plans on a national scale (these define guidelines to regional and local
governments); spatial plans on a regional scale (these define parameters for local
government action). For the regulation of the spatial realm of the city, the acting
agency sums up these guidelines according to their own objectives (that is,
municipal regulations) that are often the consequence of the goals and targets stated
in local plans. 
6.1.2 Levels of government
There are three levels of political-territorial organizations for government in Mexico;
the federal government (the top, or central level of the system), the state
government, and the local government authorities. The constitution of the country
and the organization of the government distribute urban planning competencies
(planning, execution, and control) over these government levels.
At the federal level, the Constitution and the General Communities Act assign the
responsibilities of execution and control to the federal government. Basically,
national strategies are set and a framework created to coordinate the fulfilment of
these strategies throughout the different levels of government. The investment,
production, provision and concessions of public works made on the national scale
are the execution component of these attributions. The monitoring of these activities
in lower government levels (regional and local) represents the control attribution. 
The state or regional government is responsible for planning and execution at the
corresponding scale; in this case study, that is the scale equivalent to the state of
Nuevo León. The capacity of regional planning agencies and the control they have
had over the urban development plans over the years make these regional agencies
key participants with regard to planning in the city. These agencies have acted as the
planning authority for the cities without any major restraints from other levels of
government.
At the level of local government, the local authorities have sufficient legal
entitlement to undertake the planning, execution and control of urban planning. At
this government level, these functions are more specifically defined. Urban planning
falls under the attributions of the local government authorities (The Local
Government Administration Act, 1991). The description of the roles in the various
pieces of legislation make clear that the municipal level is viewed as the central link
for intergovernmental coordination in the area of urban planning.
All three of these levels are active in Monterrey. It is the state capital, so central
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government agencies are located there, as are the state government agencies and
institutions. The urban agglomeration constituting the city comprises seven local
government authorities. 
6.1.3 Decentralization context
Since 1983, urban planning in Mexico has evolved in the context of the
decentralization of government and political power. There have been changes in the
traditional centralized structure of government, which has been partially trans-
formed into a structure where responsibilities, resources, decisions and participation
are dispersed through several levels of government. A political transformation is
taking place whereby the authorities of sub-national governments are being elected,
and these authorities are often composed of different parties from those in power at
the central level. The functional devolution that this process delivers has
nevertheless taken place, although slowly and with some reluctance, as evidenced in
the fact that in Mexico each level of government has a tendency to keep its hold on
traditional decision areas rather than allow a full transfer to lower levels of
government, even though decentralization and devolution has changed these
relationships. Central government seeks to maintain its hold on functions
transferred to the regional government, and the regional government seeks to
remain dominant on functions that, according to new legal frameworks, should be
in the hands of the local government authorities.
At the start of decentralization, urban utilities had different degrees of centralization
and so they have therefore been subjected to different types of reform. The state
governments maintain their control of water companies, the planning institutions,
power companies, and urban transport services. With decentralization, many of
these utilities should have come under the local government authorities, but this has
not always been the case. On the municipal side, there are financial constraints, lack
of capacity, reluctance, and self-interest (that of evading conflict-prone utilities), and
on the regional side a loss of power is implied. In Monterrey, the water company
remains regional, or under the administration of a regional level agency and
reporting to the state governor. The case for public transport is similar, where the
most important public agency, the Metropolitan Transport Council, is also a state
office. For urban planning purposes, public transport is a public function in
transition from the regional office Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Obras Públicas
(SEDUOP) to the municipal offices in the state of Nuevo León.
6.1.4 Monterrey in the Mexican urban system
As the third largest city of Mexico, Monterrey plays an important part in the urban
system of the country and in the tension between the centre and the region. The
large geographical distance from the urbanized centre of the country (that gravitates
around Mexico City) has protected Monterrey from falling under the direct influence
of the urban development of the capital, as other cities like Puebla or Toluca have
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done. Even Guadalajara, closer to the capital than Monterrey, has a different position
in the centre-region dispute. Monterrey is therefore more independent and views
critically the developments in the central regions of the country, where development
and growth are more closely related to endogenous reasons than to national
strategies. Nevertheless, Monterrey (together with Mexico City and Guadalajara)
belongs to the top level of cities in Mexico that are in an advanced stage of
metropolitanization, where growth trends are less pronounced than the national
average, and where suburbanization, periphery growth, and deconcentration are
important features (Negrete Salas, 1995). 
Another factor defining the position of Monterrey in the urban system is its role as
an economic powerhouse, with three important characteristics supporting this
position: a) its early introduction of capitalist modes of production and
industrialization; b) the consequent capitalist culture that remains dominant and is
in command of the growth processes; c) its proximity to the US-Mexican border,
which facilitates exchanges with the large US economy.
This combination of factors shows that the attachment of Monterrey to central
government policy is less strong than that of other urban agglomerations. In urban
planning it seems that Monterrey, far away from the zones of concern in the
neighbourhood of Mexico City as it is, has been able to follow its own policies without
major interruptions, although the coordination of national plans and transfers remain
important questions. There is a political dimension in the pressure for the regional
development of Monterrey and Nuevo León, which reflects the failure of policies
designed at central government level: “The failure of policies of regional development
in Latin America, based on the attitudes of the central authorities to the rest of the
nation, has reached such a limit that regional development has been transformed into
a factor of political struggle” (Iracheta, 1995. p. 353).
Monterrey itself represents a case of urban primacy within its own state. Nuevo
León’s population is concentrated in the capital city (87% of the state population).
This concentration has consequences in government action, because the population
realm of the regional government hardly differs from that of the local government
authorities of the city. In fact, both levels are urban governments affecting almost
the same areas and serving the same populations. This analysis corresponds with
that of Duhau, who asserts that: “From a functional and political point of view, in
metropolitan cities local administration is carried out simultaneously by the state
and local government authorities” (Duhau, 1998. p. 76).
Monterrey maintains a growing functional interdependence with Saltillo, the capital
of Coahuila State and just 80 kilometres away. This interdependence can be
observed in patterns of demographic growth (population, employment, housing,
education, and so forth) and is manifest in the trades and modes of the Monterrey’s
citizens. Sobrino (1996) already sees a tendency towards megalopolization in
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Monterrey-Saltillo – parallel to that of the Mexico City agglomeration; this tendency
is based on the competitive advantages Monterrey-Saltillo evidently enjoys in the
neo-liberal economic model and in the productive chains being generated in the
territory.
6.2 Territorial scales
In this section, the focus is the spatial component and spatial definitions used in
urban planning in Monterrey. The different territories functioning in the city are
considered under the section territories: the definitions, extensions, and description
of the different spatial concepts approaching broader territorial scales. A discussion
on matching and non-matching territories follows; this deals with the contradictions
between those definitions and the planning actual territory in Monterrey. Under
expectations, the possible territorial scales in urban planning practice are identified
from the concepts of territories in actual use.
6.2.1 Territories
In Monterrey, government intervention in spatial planning is not based entirely on a
broader territorial scale. According to the criteria defining a conurbation and a
functionally urbanized region, such territorial action should cover at least the nine
local government authorities in the city. The most important territorial definitions
are: a) Metropolitan zone/ Monterrey Metropolitan Area; b) Metropolitan Study
Area; c) Monterrey-Saltillo. 
Metropolitan zone / Monterrey’s Metropolitan Area (AMM). The metropolitan zone is
what has been defined as the area of the Monterrey conurbation and its immediate
expansion area. Several local government authorities are also defined; the zone has
developed from the initial four local government authorities in 1950 to the current
nine. This has been a flexible definition that has followed the historical
developments in the urban expansion in the city. 
Monterrey Study Area (AEM) Strategic Plan. This definition is used in the strategic
plan of Monterrey to indicate the area most directly related to the core metropolitan
area with regard to urban sprawl, environmental externalities, and potential
economic development. The definition includes the AMM and the ‘expansion’ area,
the local government authorities, which have been designated as possible
conurbation areas in the future.
Monterrey-Saltillo. This definition is proposed by some researchers to cover the urban
region that includes the two cities: Monterrey, or the AMM, and Saltillo, the capital
of Coahuila State that is 80 kilometres to the southwest. 
6.2.2 Matching and non-matching territories
There is a consensus within SEDUOP, the municipal level planning offices, and the
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national agencies over their understanding of the AMM. The definition provided by
the Act and that used extensively for the master plan and the strategic plan
correspond to the same territories. The documents are referential to partial plans
drawn up at the municipal level; they are followed insofar as they do not interfere
with the local government objectives in territorial planning issues. The AMM is the
reference definition, but it is not imposed on local level actions. The main reason
why the AMM remains the main definition used by actors involved in urban spatial
planning is that for several years planning in Monterrey has been in the hands of
one agency: SEDUOP. However, the new Urban Communities Act may change this
situation in favour of more planning responsibilities at local government level, but
the local government authorities in Monterrey are not expected to challenge this
definition by proposing an alternative. On the contrary, the AMM is a reference
definition for many officers in the local government planning departments in
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Table 6.1 - Territorial concepts in use in urban planning in Monterrey
National and state
constitutions, PNDU/
Secretary of Human
Development and
other central
government agencies
Nuevo León,
Coahuila
Administrations included
Monterrey
Guadalupe
San Nicolás
Garza García
Santa Catarina
Apodaca
General Escobedo
Juaréz
García
Monterrey
Metropolitan
Area (AMM)
AMM the local
government authorities:
Concept Document / agency
State Municipal
Nuevo León
AEM
(study area)
Strategic Plan of
Monterrey
Nuevo León AMM’s the local
government
authorities +
Cadereyta
Santiago
Ciénega de Flores
Salinas Victoria
Pesquería
Mina
Hidalgo
Abasolo
El Carmen
Dr González
Zuazua
Marín
Higueras
Monterrey-Saltillo AEM+Saltillo
Monterrey, also because many of these officers worked at some stage of their careers
in the SEDUOP itself.
Collaboration proposals put forward for the planning offices of the various local
government authorities in Monterrey (Santa Catarina-San Pedro) often depend on
partnerships of 2 or 3 of the local government authorities. The proposals do not seek
to draw on metropolitan-wide resources.
6.2.3 Expectations
The introduction of an operational broad territorial scale is an interesting issue in
many of the planning agencies in Monterrey involved in urban planning. At this
point ‘operational’ has to be interpreted as more binding than the referential
definition that AMM conveys. This firmer binding is logical for institutions at
central and state government levels, because their mandate is directly related to
broader territorial scales. For planning institutions at local government level
however, interest is rising for finding ways of improving local plans by incorporating
them into metropolitan guidelines. Officers in all local planning institutions aspire
to having a metropolitan framework to which the decisions included in their
corresponding partial plans – essentially about land use and building volume –
could relate and be justified, expanded, and reinforced as policy.
The metropolitan scale is accepted at local government in the terms defined by the
strategic plan. However, the strategic plan is not followed or implemented in its
entirety, and there are no institutional arrangements for coordination. Expectations
are evident for the introduction of a broader territorial scale, a framework that would
facilitate coordination. The urban planning agencies and their chief officers are
interested in an intermediate scale that would enable them to negotiate.
Research interviews (1999) revealed that these interests were fairly consistent at the
local level, but opposed to the vision that officers at the regional level have of the
utility of the metropolitan scale as an operating scale for urban planning. Officers at
the municipal level consider the intermediate metropolitan scale appropriate for the
determination of agreements with other local government authorities, thereby
reaching metropolitan arrangements. At the regional level (SEDUOP), the public
servants begrudge their loss of authority and see the metropolitan scale as exclusive
to their activities and expertise; they see the metropolitan scale as the means of
regaining their authority over the municipal planning offices.
The coordination of action and decision-making is not the main priority for the
municipal planning offices. For the majority of chief officers in the local government
authority planning agencies within the AMM, the main problem is autonomy from
SEDUOP to prepare plans and control urban development (Research Interviews,
1999).
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At the offices of spatial planning in the different local government authorities of
Monterrey, the expectation is that the consolidation of the metropolitan scale as an
operating scale would help to define the positions and intergovernmental
relationships with other levels of government. Basically, the main hope is for the
municipal planning offices to assume their assigned planning powers completely
and without the intervention of regional government officers. 
On the side of regional government, some officers at SEDUOP expect to regain or
take control of the planning system through the mechanisms of coordination (these
mechanisms had not been defined at the time of the field work) that are expected to
emerge in the city after the major changes in the institutional framework have taken
place. The officers expect that through the compromises for coordination that are
stipulated in the Urban Development Act, they would be able to propose an
agreement whereby SEDUOP would retain control over key decisions. Basically, the
transfer of authority to issue land permits to local government is seen as a mistake
that could be rectified in this way. 
In short, expectations with respect to the use of a common metropolitan definition
in a more formal way are differently expressed at the different levels of government.
Regional government sees a common definition as an opportunity to regain or
maintain control on urban development, and local government sees it as an
opportunity to limit the intervention of regional government in local planning and to
gain autonomy. 
6.3 Decisions
This section documents the analysis of two aspects of government involvement in
urban planning. These are the investment aspect – understood as public investment
within the framework of plans; and private sector regulation – understood as the way
in which plans are used to steer or influence the capacity of the private sector to
change the built environment.
The structure of the analysis for each of these components (investment; regulation)
is as follows. First, the locus of decision-making is considered: who takes the
strategic decisions, at what level of government, and within which institutional
framework. Second, what kind of coordination has emerged, or can be observed,
beyond these loci; in particular, to what extent do these coordination efforts
correspond with broader territorial scales. The analysis of coordination is divided
into the following themes: a) the level of coordination (info level, communication
level, agreements, and so forth); b) the underlying powers; c) the impact of the actual
power-decision arrangement on urban growth (the basic statement is referred to
here of deciding on urban planning); d) the coordination practices that have a
metropolitan scale.
This structure of analysis is also used for the investment component and the
regulation aspects.
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6.3.1 Investment
The production and implementation of plans is restricted by the capacity of the
institutions to invest in them as influential developers. The main investments are
made through housing projects (including social housing programmes or housing
infrastructure), through development corporations, and general investment in urban
infrastructure in. As mentioned above, the development programmes are the most
important instruments for institutional investment. The system of plans represents
the framework within which these investments are made. The implementation of
projects within these areas of action represents the spatial outcome of government
policy. The analysis that follows first considers the locus of decision making in these
three branches of action (housing infrastructure/social housing, development
corporation, and urban infrastructure), and then whether wide territorial scales are
evident from the actual practice.
Investment: Locus of decision making
The structure of decision-making processes in urban planning execution is not
restricted to one agency, or one government level. It is a network of relationships
and procedures that covers many government layers. According to the legal
framework, the main actors are at the local level. The most important outcomes are
the provision of urbanismo (infrastructure for housing: land plots, roads, utilities),
the provision of housing, and the provision or coordination of public urban
infrastructure such as roads, public spaces, and so forth. Key decisions in these areas
are the amount of public goods that have to be delivered, and the location of these
goods. For the case of spatial planning in Monterrey, these decisions translate into
the amount of land allocated to housing, the housing target for any particular plan,
and the location of these developments. 
The three main branches that contour government policy are housing
infrastructure/social housing, the actions of agencies for investment programmes
(such as Fomerrey, Pronasol), and the provision of urban infrastructure. The system
remains under the close supervision of the central government (see Garrocho and
Sobrino, 1995), where almost all financial and fiscal powers in the system is
concentrated. The financial strength of the central government carries considerably
more weight in the decision-making process than any responsibilities that could
possibly be assigned.
Social housing/Housing infrastructure. Who decides about the amount and
location of housing infrastructure? In the case of Monterrey, local authorities do not
have total decision power on this range of decisions. Such decisions that are relevant
to urban planning, the housing sector, and infrastructure investment are taken at the
upper levels of government, whether regional or central. 
For social housing and squatters’ rehabilitation, the most important agency is
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FOMERREY. This development fund puts forward proposals for housing
developments on available land in the city (owned by FOMERREY, or assigned
through the Act) and then assigns the implementation of these developments to the
best-qualified developers in a public competition. These activities, and the decisions
about land use and the number of housing units, are set against rough plans such as
the different partial plans now in force at the city. 
The participation of the regional government is minor, but relevant in the key
decisions in the provision of housing infrastructure and social housing. Participation
is through SEDUOP, which still holds the power to decide the amount and location
of housing investments. This is a statewide agency and some non-urban local
government authorities lack the capacity to assume the functions related to housing,
so SEDUOP is the responsible agency for these cases. As the housing coordinating
agency for non-urban and some urban local government authorities, SEDUOP has
the position and the power to negotiate with other elements participating in the
sector, such as national agencies, or urban local government authorities which have
taken on housing responsibilities. Moreover Fomerrey, the leading agency in the
sector, is run under the same regional government mandate as SEDUOP, so that
these two agencies are set at practically the same government level, facilitating the
influence and exchange of information between them.
For social housing/housing infrastructure, the locus of decision-making is at
regional level, through Fomerrey, or through SEDUOP. Joint decisions with local
government for the development of social housing/housing infrastructure are also
possible. The first case operates in institutions that manage on a city scale above that
of the metropolitan realm. For joint decisions, the responsible institutions operate
on a local – sub-metropolitan – scale. 
Urban Infrastructure. The decisions on the locations and types of intervention
for urban infrastructure are taken by agencies located at the upper levels of the
system. These are the Ministries of Infrastructure and Urban Development, and the
Department of public works of the Nuevo León State Government. Municipal level
government authorities propose projects related to urban infrastructure, where their
departments of public works take over control on the definition of the kind of
intervention they favour and how it relates to urban development plans. 
When funds are scarce, public agencies and institutions tend to converge and join
forces for infrastructure investments, but decisions on the location and type of
infrastructure do not correspond with those of authorities with metropolitan
capacity.
In summary, the locus of decision-making on the investment issues of urban
infrastructure in Monterrey is at regional government level, through the
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Table 6.2 - Physical planning. Investment: Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 6.3 - Physical planning. Investment: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Criteria addapted from Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864)
and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
X
FOMERREY and SEDUOP. The central government has some access to these
regional level decisions by direct intervention through its ministries and agencies –
mostly with respect to urban infrastructure and indirectly through restrictions on
the funds (intergovermental transfers) available to the local and regional
government for investment. 
Investment: Coordination
The investments made in social housing/housing infrastructure and urban
infrastructure as part of spatial planning are not coordinated within a metropolitan
range. There are no directions in the legal framework calling explicitly for
coordination. Clearly, decision-making is dispersed, but the institutions that have
decision power still need to relate their decisions to other public offices. Other actors
in the city need to be persuaded to support the decisions of others, or collaborate
with them, so as to coordinate different participants in the fulfilment of their
objectives, and to make the actions resulting from their decisions really effective on
the metropolitan scale – the scale of the whole conurbation, or AMM. This informal
capacity to coordinate is discussed below. 
Level of coordination. Almost all institutions involved in implementing planning
do so independently. Two observations were particularly striking with respect to
evaluations and scales applied at the level of coordination reached in the city. First,
the exchange of information among agencies is poor and not structured (see Tables
6.2 and 6.3). Second, in the cases showing that attempts at coordination had been
made, the metropolitan scale (resembling the AMM) was seldom the referential
scale for coordination.
The first observation is based on the results of the interviews with officers in the
planning departments of the five local government authorities of Monterrey
(Research Interviews, 1999). Although the officers deal with the same issues and
problems, communication between them is not structured. They do not meet at
regular intervals, and they have no knowledge of developments in other local
government authorities. Participation in the city by central and regional government
agencies (Pronasol, Fomerrey) does not guarantee that these local level offices are
any better informed about each other, since many of the projects of these
institutions are implemented in collaboration with the local government authorities
on an individual basis. The directors (secretarios) of the city’s local government urban
planning offices meet on an informal basis (casual meetings in restaurants), without
any institutional support, and with an open agenda. These meetings facilitate the
exchange of information, but any commitment to attend these meetings and form
part of this informal network is based on personal motivation. 
The second observation – the inadequate scale in the event of coordination – is
based on the failure to find any arrangement to canalize, or coordinate investment
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on a territory of action resembling a metropolitan scale. Among the local
government authorities, their investments in urban infrastructure (such as the joint
drainage collector project of the local government authorities of Apodaca and
Escobedo, joint solid waste management of the Santa Catarina and Garcia
municipalities) were coordinated with one neighbouring municipality at the most.
The incompatibility of the framework for investment (that is, the partial urban
plans) of each local administration prevents them from carrying out programmes
together. At the same time, reactions at SEDUOP, which maintains that keeping
control on a metropolitan scale is fundamental, is that the commitment of the
different actors (local government authorities, public utilities providers, central
government agencies) is irregular in time. As a result, whatever the initiatives for
coordinated investment projects, they tend to be sporadic and isolated, at least in the
view of the SEDUOP counterparts for the research interviews. 
The existing and proposed arrangements for coordination are more in the nature of
a priori power bargaining instruments than structures to facilitate joint decisions.
The SEDUOP presses for acceptance for its proposal for coordination, which is
based on the endorsement of a coordination document. This is an agreement drawn
up by the various actors (SEDUOP and the local planning offices) to form one
metropolitan body, while the operation and responsibilities of this body are unclear.
The arrangement is an inflexible, hierarchical structure with the SEDUOP at the top. 
To finalize, it is evident that the decision-making process regarding investment in
urban infrastructure has no strong coordination structure and a metropolitan scale
does not provide a key to coordination efforts. Neither does the fact that the decision
power is at the higher levels of government bring any assurance that investment and
implementation are made following the implementation of a framework (plans) that
takes a broader territorial scale into consideration. The local government authorities
tend to agree in general terms regarding intergovernmental transfers, general
investment programmes, and earmarked funds, but once the financial capacity has
been achieved (or the funds actually transferred) there is little room for confidence
that the coordination will ensue of the metropolitan intention of the investment
plans (metropolitan coverage for drainage collectors, solid waste management, the
harmonization of public services, improved accessibility, and so forth.). The local
government authorities tend to act independently of each other and there is no
supervising or coordinating body, or any agreement to compensate for this
fragmented action.
The underlying powers. All levels of government have some share of power (they
have the opportunity to take certain key decisions regarding investments) in the
decision-making process, which is the result of a system that searches for a political
balance. This system accommodates different forces influencing various elements of
spatial planning. Officers in the local planning institutions recognize the political
ploys of their mayors, who support plans that are in line with investment
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programmes with a spatial impact (infrastructure, housing). In some cases a
mayor’s support is biased towards public works departments, which then take the
lead as the producer of urban policy. The planning office perceives this situation as
an imbalance.
Another perception commonly reported by the officers in the municipal planning
departments is a hostile attitude to the local level displayed by the regional office
SEDUOP and the urban development programmes such as Pronasol and Fomerrey.
The regional and central agencies assume the responsibilities and attributions that
correspond to the municipal administration, and the attempts of these upper level
agencies to achieve the coordination with municipal departments are received with
some scepticism. 
The framework of action (spatial plans) is critical for the further investment by
public or private sectors; this critical nature exposes the system within which
decision-making operates to the influence of various actors and interest groups. In
Monterrey, the councils have recently approved all the partial urban plans of the
various local government authorities, or are in the process of so doing. The
assignment of land use derived from these plans defines the potential development
of several areas, and have an impact on their land values. The capacity to influence
this element of urban development (land use/land value) is important, since mayors
can define urban development policy, affect the use of several areas, liberalize
restricted areas, and so forth. At the same time, this discretionary power is
susceptible to pressure. This varies from a landowners’ lobby seeking priority for
investments involving private lands, to politicians representing the inhabitants of
communities in poor areas supporting investment in urban infrastructure.
Behind this decision-making layout surrounding spatial planning, governments at
all levels are interested in exercising their control on decision-making. The
consequences of land value mutations are important in financial terms for
landowners and urban real state development. In Monterrey, industrial real estate,
business parks, and other forms of real estate development seem to be ahead of the
spatial plans provided by public institutions. Real estate developers operating in the
business and industrial parks market often carry out their developments ahead of
infrastructure provision by government, providing themselves with networks on
their estates and connecting them up to public networks (roads, water, sewerage,
electricity, and so forth), and forcing public agencies to respond to their demand for
services. In this way, the supply of public goods, such as urban infrastructure, social
housing/ housing infrastructure, tend to follows demand, and so it lacks flexibility.
The influence of the demand side through business coalitions, conglomerates, and
lobby groups is important and reveals the underlying power in the present situation:
that of the private sector. The empowerment and proliferation of local authorities
suits these influence groups, since the scale of public action is reduced and access to
|170|
government officials is more feasible. Few of these influence groups need to provoke
public action on the metropolitan scale; if that were the case, central government or
regional government would be appropriate levels to approach. 
On the side of the local government authorities, the mayors and the officers of the
planning departments acknowledge that, in planning terms, their duties refer to
local scales. With the new Urban Development Act (1999), the opportunity given to
the local government authorities to take control of investments in housing and
urban infrastructure is perceived as a step forward in decentralization. Mayors and
planning offices are keen to claim this power; it is a matter of consolidating new
attributions rather than coordination within the metropolitan realm. From this
perspective, avoiding metropolitan coordination is preferable. 
Impacts. These settings impact on the delivery of public urban planning, affecting
the achievement of medium and long-term goals. Since decision-making is
fragmented, implementing policy guidelines (whether from master or strategic
plans) tends to be difficult. At this moment, no continuity is observable in the goals
of the various administrations and agencies across the metropolitan territory. The
political changes, the different levels of support of the planning departments, and
the activities of various interest groups undermine the long and medium term
policies of urban development and spatial planning.
Without any effective medium or long-term policy, there is no capacity to steer urban
development from the public side. Plans produced at the local level, and the
matching public investments made in the city, follow private sector developments
and become government ratifications of these developments.
Metropolitan arrangements. The arrangements drawn up for the collaboration
and coordination of the agencies do not cover the metropolitan territory. Bilateral
agreements are favoured. Although the new Urban Development Act specifies the
institutionalization of metropolitan coordination, it is not yet operational. The efforts
of SEDUOP to facilitate metropolitan coordination under a broad agreement have
not yet proved successful. 
6.3.2 Regulation 
The regulation of urban development activities is the final function of spatial
planning; regulation comprises monitoring of the various parties in the city to
ensure they adhere to the guidelines and uses prefigured in the plans. As with
investment, the analysis reported below first considers the locus of decision-making in
this area, and then the forms of coordination within the institutional framework. 
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Regulation: locus of decision making
The way in which urban government defines its role as the regulator of the
development of the urban fabric in relation to spatial planning is to take a position
on a) what elements of the urban fabric should be regulated; b) the extent the
regulation should take. The legal framework within which urban government
operates in Monterrey provides the formal justification for these duties.
Identification of who takes these decisions, at which level, and with what
consequences these two points are resolved, reveals the loci within the institutional
framework where these decisions are made. 
The discrepancy in Monterrey and other Mexican cities between what is liable to
regulation and what is eventually regulated is a relevant topic for this research. Both
the present and previous State Urban Development Acts in Nuevo León tend to be
extremely regulatory, incorporating detailed rules and procedures. Of course, such
criteria as population density, height limits, proportion of green areas, and so forth
are established, but these legal instruments are extended into excessive details on
how local government authorities should monitor adherence to these criteria. The
Acts lay down guidelines for the organization of local government authority
regulatory bodies, set out typical land use permits, assign the value of the fines and
penalties, and so forth. The new Urban Development Act of Nuevo León (1999) is a
typical case of an extremely normative framework, with a heterogeneous group of
municipal agencies responsible for its application.
Almost every agency involved in urban planning at any level of government is
entitled to set codes and regulations. The discussions provoked by the 1999 Urban
Development Act, mainly on the reach of the regional legislation into municipal
action, showed that this remains an issue of defining the scale of action, restrictions,
and responsibilities shared by the different levels of government intervening in the
city. The discussions revealed the importance of the task of finding out how to
organize the mandates assigned to central, regional, and local government levels
(mandates allowing these various government authorities to decide what to
regulate): basically, the task is the definition of the loci where decisions are made.
The framework for regulation incorporates the following three features: a) not all of
the legislation provisions are used to make regulations, but they are detailed enough
to be used as a regulation code; b) regulations for the various municipal authorities
in Monterrey are not homogeneous; c) top-level regulation by the SEDUOP (regional
level) remain the reference practice.
What to regulate? The main regulation on spatial planning in Monterrey concerns
land use. The assignment of uses, targeted population densities, and the regulation
of building characteristics comprise the subsequent regulated items. Spatial
planning documents provide the referents for the determination of all these items,
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which should in theory guarantee homogeneity throughout the AMM in the
application of the regulation code. However, in practice, the authorities intervene
directly and propose partial regulation codes (through the regional or local
government authorities). The authority that acts directly in the regulation of the built
environment is the central, regional, or local government authority. Since the
metropolitan realm is not represented in these administrative tiers, it is precisely the
issues of metropolitan concern that are in conflict. Local governments are reluctant
to apply guidelines inherited from central or regional government authorities, since
they are perceived as intrusive rather than scale-related. This situation is difficult,
since the regulation code provided and enforced by SEDUOP on a metropolitan
scale is in danger of being devalued by the fragmented action of Monterrey’s local
government authorities.
The planning document defines the basic regulations and their reach. Planning
efforts are harmonized and completed with a direct monitoring consequence. For
example, the Strategic Plan proposes that part of the San Pedro municipality should
be developed as a medium-height residential development, but this proposal is
accompanied by the enforcement of a code that forbids buildings taller than six
stories. The enforcement agency is the municipality of San Pedro, which is interested
in developing some of these areas with other characteristics. Direct policy
intervention overrules this planning-monitoring pairing where authorities can
undertake land uses or urban developments that are not incorporated in plans. In
most cases, this pairing is allowed for communities or land uses that would
otherwise be impossible to change, or special cases successfully argued by private
developers. This a postiori acceptance of land use adds to the land use legislation
and, through the accumulation of precedents, affects the general restrictions for
urban growth.
The legal body responsible for the extent of regulation is basically the local authority,
since the locus of decision-making is at this level of government. The local authority
applies the building code; that is not to say, however, that there is a direct
relationship between the planning offices and those responsible for controlling the
urban environment. Monitoring offices are often detached from planning
departments. The issue of building permits and the administration of property tax
are important revenue generating activities that tend to be within the close proximity
of the mayors. 
Regulation: Coordination
On the metropolitan scale (AMM), there is no formal coordination among the actors
responsible for the regulation of the built environment. The levels of coordination
and the power struggle underlying actual practice are presented below. A discussion
then follows on the impact of current institutional forms, and the coordination
forms emerging in Monterrey.
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Table 6.4 - Physical planning. Regulation: Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 6.5 - Physical planning. Regulation: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864) and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
X
X
X
Level of coordination. In Monterrey coordination is poor among the offices
responsible for controlling urban development. They communicate with each other
and share some procedures, but coordinated action or policy has not yet been
structured into institutions, procedures, meetings, or binding agreements.
Communication between the chief officers takes place informally. Under the new
Urban Development Act, there are no instruments allowing for them to learn from
each other, or to incorporate elements of the spatial planning regulations for one
municipality into those of another. 
Procedures tend to be homogeneous. With regard to procedures the new Urban
Development Act is specific. It explains in detail the procedures for issuing land
permits, discussing changes in land use, and definitions of the possible uses of land.
The staff of the local government authorities are often experienced officers who have
worked in SEDUOP, which is the common school of reference for practices at the
local level. This common source adds to the homogeneity in the procedures across
the city that conceals differences in policy, capacity, resources, and content in the
regulation of the urban fabric. 
It might be expected that the processing of a land use permit, or the issue of a
building permit, would be similar for all the local government authorities, but there
are observable differences in policy. Some local government authorities use the
regulation of private activity in the building environment as a way of attracting
private firms to settle in their jurisdictions; other local authorities exact property tax
from the locations already occupied where there are few mobility chances. The local
authorities differ in terms of size (territory and population), capacity (staff) and
revenue (transfers); these differences influence this pattern of diverging policies.
The larger local government authorities have integral policies of planning and
regulation (Santa Catarina, San Pedro), while smaller local government authorities,
or the local government authorities with large medium and low income populations
opt for demand-following strategies. The latter, such as Escobedo or Apodaca, resort
to less integral action; the tension between planning, investment, and regulation in
spatial planning is reflected in the different departments in the local administration
and the competition to reach the mayor’s agenda.
Few activities are undertaken to regulate the built environment in Monterrey on a
metropolitan scale. Poor coordination, the different capacities of the actors involved,
and bureaucratic homogeneity compromise the opportunities of having an ordered
development that reflects or incorporates the metropolitan scale.
Underlying powers. Each municipal office is able to control and tax the built
environment within its jurisdiction without interference from any of its neighbours:
a useful situation allowing particular interest and revenue objectives to be set. The
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local government authorities’ dependence on central government transfers increases
their need to resort to their own sources of revenue. Land use regulations, building
permits, spatial planning control, land registration, are typical areas allowing local
government to strengthen their finances. 
Impacts. The major impacts of the way in which spatial planning is regulated in
Monterrey are: 1) the impossibility of preventing negative externalities in the city; 2)
a further undermining of monitoring practice; 3) unexpected changes in demand for
infrastructure.
The inappropriate development of land produces negative externalities; on the one
hand there are environmental consequences, and on the other basic urban
infrastructure is put under stress. Since most negatives externalities have a
metropolitan impact, such as water shortages, environmental pollution, and
congestion, the impact of uncoordinated regulation is negative for the whole city.
The externalities problem and lack of consistency in the regulation of urban growth
can be observed in Apodaca, a municipality that has to cope with problems arising
from the city’s deficient drainage system. Apodaca is the lowest topographic area of
the city, and periodic overflows from the rainwater drainage system cause
considerable damage to the public and private infrastructure. To date, the call for a
homogeneous building code to prevent these periodic floods has met with little
success. 
Uncoordinated regulation affects infrastructure planning and provision. The lack of
monitoring capacity in the city, the different levels of tolerance and encouragement
for real estate development and popular communities modifies the demand for
infrastructure. This modification is hard to follow in a context of fragmented policy;
it reduces the effectiveness of infrastructure investments in Monterrey. 
The system of spatial planning in Monterrey yields a snapshot diagnosis of the state
of the city, but no dynamic observation of its development has been implemented.
The lack of institutional structures permitting the metropolitan-related demands to
be followed can be seen in the mismatch of infrastructure investments and the
actual needs of the city. The value of planning as a forecast of urban growth and as a
guideline for future action is therefore undermined by poor monitoring and
regulation practice. 
Metropolitan Arrangements. There are no clear metropolitan agreements with
the aim of giving the city a homogeneous set of regulations. The fragmentation of
policy in several local government authorities represents the present and future
outcomes, although in the past the role of SEDUOP as the main regulator of urban
growth was important. In the current transition from urban planning controlled by
regional institutions to more power for local government authorities, the basic
tendency is towards divergence. National and regional guidelines remain as
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references for unified action in the city, but their binding power is relatively weak,
since the local agencies have enough authority to decide the direction of their
regulation policy of urban planning. The prevailing scale is therefore the scale of the
local government authorities. The mandates enforcing the national and regional
guidelines are not strong enough to give cohesion to the regulation practices of the
various local government authorities of Monterrey. Until now, the incomplete
devolution of planning responsibilities and resources has let SEDUOP act as a metro
agency with regard to regulations.
6.4 Metropolitan arrangements
In this section, the bottlenecks that constrain wider territorial arrangements in
urban planning are specified. In the previous part, the possibility was discussed of
having formal metropolitan arrangements for urban planning, together with the
most important conditions for that to be feasible. These bottlenecks and feasibility
observations return in the final chapters.
6.4.1 Bottlenecks
The institutional arrangements that could improve decision-making in the
implementation and regulation of physical planning in Monterrey have several
bottlenecks. Basically, neither the loci of decision-making, nor the scale
corresponding to these loci are adequate. 
Poor coordination. Communication among the acting authorities is poor. There is
no common ground for information exchange; the situation is also brought about by
the local government authorities’ different capacities and perceptions of problems.
There is little chance of correcting distortions of scale, or inadequate decision-
making processes through some form of coordination. Communication among the
different actors could not provide a basis for coordination. 
Other priorities. The planning offices in the various local government authorities in
Monterrey are more interested in engaging in their legal duties than creating
coordination. Their main priority regarding urban planning at the local level has
been to strengthen their position by assuming planning responsibilities. The efforts
they have made have been to accelerate the devolution of responsibilities from
central and regional levels of government. To establish territorial-wide alliances is
not on the agenda of the most active institutions such as the mayors, the planning
offices, or the regional legislators. The approval of the new Urban Development Act
is therefore considered as a turning point that makes the task of planning
responsibilities by local agencies definitive.
Lack of capacity. There are no initiatives to build capacity for metropolitan
coordination or metropolitan management. Even at SEDUOP, which is now called
on to assume a more important role for coordination after its premature demise in
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the new Urban Development Act, the transition from factotum to facilitator has not
been established. The organization has experienced the shocks of releasing power
and exclusive tasks, but it has not cushioned these shocks properly. More efforts
have been made to create mechanisms and arguments to retain power than to
acquire the capacity to assume new roles within the institutional framework. 
With respect to the municipal agencies, they have no interest in, or resources to
allocate to, the task of building up the capacity for coordination on the metropolitan
scale. Even though this lack of interest reflects the low place of metropolitan
coordination on the list of priorities of the local government authorities, the
subsidiarity principle has been followed closely.
Legacy. The legacy of confrontation between the regional planning office and the
local planning offices in the struggle for more devolution and decentralization
prevents the regional office from taking on its role as metropolitan facilitator. The
perception of hostility between the two levels of government is a bottleneck for
possible coordination arrangements.
Heterogeneous capacity. Municipal levels planning offices have different levels of
capacity, problems, and priorities. This disparity is evident in the diversity of
planning policies within the metropolitan area. Some local government authorities
are ambitious in their planning action, seeking to keep ahead of demand with
proposals for land use, industrial parks, environmental restrictions, and property tax
strategies. Meanwhile, other local government authorities lag behind their residents’
demands, preferring to deal with contention and defer problems. Moreover, the
capacity of the local government authorities of Juarez and Garcia is not comparable
with that of the other local government authorities in the AMM, because they are
smaller and are still under the regional supervision of SEDUOP for planning
purposes. 
With this variation in capacity, collaboration and information exchange was found
among planning officers at comparable levels of technical capacity. Metropolitan
coordination is thereby avoided, because it is perceived as a forum for turning
particular problems into common territorial issues. Officers are keen to establish the
differences in the nature of their problems and the capacity of their departments and
cite this as an explanation of the way they approach collaboration in a selective way.
6.4.2 Feasibility
In Monterrey, it is difficult to take key decisions of urban planning at the appropriate
scale of the city. The institutional arrangement of Monterrey is not suitable for the
implementation of metropolitan urban spatial planning. However, there are some
indications that could lead to improved action. These are: a) a consensus on the
extent and definition of the metropolitan territory; b) the activities of the
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development programme’s agencies; c) the expressed necessity of the regional
government to redefine the role of the planning agency.
Consensus on metropolitan territory. There are no major disparities in the
perceptions of the metropolitan realm. The definition of the strategic plan, including
the nine local government authorities of the conurbation, is understood to be the
referential definition of the territory of the city. 
The confrontational context of decentralization and devolution in Mexico, Nuevo
León, and therefore in Monterrey, where every government agency at any level
searches for consolidation, has dispersed and fragmented decision-making
processes. The coincidence of scale and decision-making at the metropolitan level in
Monterrey has not been realized, because of the lack of institutional structures,
capacity, and incentives.
Programmes. The programmes for intervention in social housing/housing
infrastructure (Fomerrey), and urban infrastructure, have a territory of action that is
close to that of the AMM even if they operate separately from the municipal or
regional government. They are the recipients of direct transfers from the central
government and earmarked transfers, and they are responsible for the
implementation of programmes funded by multilateral organizations (WB, UNDP,
IADB). They work in partnership with the local government authorities for social
housing, housing infrastructure or urban infrastructure, but their partnerships are
on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, it could be said that these programmes have a
part to play in metropolitan coordination with respect to their particular functions.
The planning phase of planning implementation would benefit from integration.
This would make spatial planning documents more effective. Better integration of
programmes and plans would lead to a shift towards action plans, a comparable level
of planning capacity in the different planning offices in the city, instruments and
procedures for coordination, and improved communication between actors. 
Redefinition of the regional planning agency. SEDUOP, the agency for urban
development and public works, is in transition. This agency has to adapt to its new
role, because it is now the only agency intervening in the AMM with metropolitan
capacity, and because that capacity is its advantage. Planning offices at the municipal
level are unable to assume this role without some major financial and institutional
reinforcement. In the case of the regional office, the new institutional setting
resulting from the 1999 Act brought two changes that strengthen its role of
metropolitan coordination agency: a) SEDUOP is relieved of activities related to local
plans, because these have been transferred to local governments; b) SEDUOP is
legally recognized as a commanding partner in any of the metropolitan
arrangements, because it represents and advises the state government.
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The feasibility of a coordinated system for urban physical planning is poor. The
dynamics of urban development, added to the ongoing political process of
decentralization, put coordinated action in disarray. Furthermore, improved
coordination in urban planning has an impact on the interest groups attached to the
present layout of decision-making; they perceive it as a threat.
Any feasible metropolitan arrangement has to be strongly backed by the central
government; this is the only government level with enough fiscal power. This
condition is fundamental for the provision of adequate financial support for the
metropolitan planning authority. In addition to this, a metropolitan arrangement has
to be placed under a legitimate branch of government in the city, either the regional
government (State of Nuevo León), or a coalition of the local government authorities,
possibly including the regional government, or ultimately a metropolitan
government. Despite attempts at fiscal decentralization and improved transfer, the
central government has the last say in most of the decision processes analysed; a
metropolitan authority without the support of the central government could not be
expected to deliver, even with the total support of all the local government authorities
in the metropolitan area. A metropolitan authority would remain in the tension area
between the two levels of government. Moreover, since it is such an important
provider of urban infrastructure, the central government’s involvement in a
metropolitan arrangement concerned with urban planning makes sense.
In the physical planning function, implementation provides the authorities with
prestige as well as the spending opportunities that could be guided in favourable
directions for political or economic allies. Regulation, perceived as the legitimate
taxation area of the local administrations, is an important source of revenue for the
local government authorities. Improving the layout of the decision-making processes
in spatial planning to produce homogenous policy on a metropolitan scale requires a
balance to be struck between these political bottlenecks. Redistributing
responsibilities is more complicated than building on the current informal
arrangements, because the power relationships are difficult to displace. The
entrenched position of the current holders of decision power on key issues of spatial
planning hinders the implementation of change towards metropolitan arrangements,
because the current power brokers benefit – although only marginally – from the
current situation. The challenge for spatial planning in Monterrey is to achieve
consensus for change. To achieve this political consensus, the gains of each actor
under the current situation should be revised, and eventually compensated for or
negotiated with a view to achieving a consensus for change. This search for
consensus shows that the challenge for metropolitan spatial planning in Monterrey
is a political case.
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Monterrey: Urban Public Transport
Like spatial planning, urban public transport is an important function of urban
government (see theoretical framework). In large urban agglomerations like
Monterrey, the appropriate scale (local, metropolitan, regional, national) for decision-
making is urban public transport; it plays an important part in supporting urban
development, providing accessibility, avoiding inequalities, and preventing negative
spillover effects. In addition, the locus of decision-making in the institutional
framework of urban public transport is also important for achieving effectiveness on
key issues of strategic relevance. This chapter provides some further insights into
the scale to which decisions are related (local, metropolitan, regional, or national),
and the location within the government structure (municipal, state, or central
government, and intermediate agencies) where these decisions are taken. In this
selection, the road component has not however been included (investment in road
infrastructure, highways, and so forth), because in Mexico and Latin America this
component is largely under central government control, a situation that already
defines the scale and locus of decision making and distorts the argumentation for
metropolitan arrangements. The analysis is based on public transportation activities
– the provision, production, route design, coordination, and pricing – for buses,
metro, minibuses, taxis, and so forth
In the first part of this chapter, the structure and features of urban public transport
(bus, metro, minibus) are presented as the background against which the analysis is
reported. The second part shows the territorial scales that are operative in the city; this
is the spatial focus. The analysis is given full consideration in the third part, decisions,
where selected elements of urban transport structure are evaluated according to the
way in which decisions have an impact on a territorial scale. This performance
evaluation shows who takes decisions, how these correspond with territorial scales,
and what kind of institutional layouts are set up to make these decisions correspond
with the appropriate scales. The fourth and last part of the section, metropolitan
arrangements, focuses on the result of the previous analysis on the scale
(metropolitan) that is relevant for this research, summarizing the main findings.
7.1 Background
The analysis reported in the following sections is set within the specific framework
explained in this background section. Since this research study records observations
on the provision and management of urban transport, it is necessary to specify the
context of this practice in Mexico and Monterrey.
This section provides an overview of the sector and four parts that correspond with
the background issues considered important in this research: a) the components of
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urban transport; b) the levels of government that intervene in urban transport; c) the
decentralization context; d) the role of Monterrey in the national urban system. For
each of these parts, the issues are presented and briefly discussed.
The first two issues (elements of urban transport, level of government) are
considered from the perspective of the legal structure in Mexico. This structure and
the form urban public transport has taken are considered: the formal legal structure
on the one hand, and on the other the form that urban transport has taken.
Attention is paid to urban transport developments derived from urban government
practice and also from the implementation of urban transport policies in the course
of time. Decentralization is discussed, because it is a process that influences the
relationships between governments, agencies, and actors, since it aims to bring
about change. Decentralization is an ongoing process in Mexico, with evident
influence on the practice of urban management and therefore on urban public
transport. Finally, the role of Monterrey in the Mexican urban system is explained to
make clear some of the features of the institutional framework that are the
consequence of developments on the national scale: the political structure, the
tensions between the regions and the centre, and the economic role of Monterrey in
a context of trade liberalization policies implemented at national level.
7.1.1 Overview
Various private firms and trade unions provide bus services, the former under
concessions, and the latter as permisionarios, or permit holders. These permit
holders are simultaneously owners and operators (drivers) of their buses, and are
affiliated to a labour union. These permit holders run 87 routes, related either to the
Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) or to the Confederación Regional de
Obreros y Campesinos (CROC). In 1995, these routes comprised 68% of all routes,
with a fleet of 1553 bus units, or 54.6% of the total supply of buses.
The concessionaires have 32% of the routes; they operate 45.4%, or 1247, of the
buses in Monterrey (Comisión de Desarrollo Urbano del Estado de Nuevo León, 1995).
The number of buses in operation in 1990 was 2700 (Quintanilla, 1995) while,
according to the diagnostics of the strategic plan, in 1995 that number was 2800
(Comisión de Desarrollo Urbano N.L., 1995). Chavarria and Villarreal estimate that
there were 2840 units and 891,67 inhabitants per bus (Chavarria and Villarreal,
1995). They also estimate that the number of daily trips taken by public transport in
Monterrey for 1993 was 3,197,150, representing 58.13% of the total number of trips
made in the city (Chavarria and Villarreal, 1995).
The Metro system of Monterrey (METRORREY) consists of two lines. The first is an
elevated railtrack, 18 kilometres long, on the axis of the grand avenues Aztlan,
Rodrigo Gómez, Simón Bolívar, Colón and President Benito Juárez. It has been in
operation since April 1991. The number of passengers is estimated at a total of
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85,000 per day. This line has 17 stations located on crossings with the main road
network. The second line is an underground train running from Cuauhtemoc
Avenue (a transfer station with line 1) towards the Macroplaza. This line is to be
extended northwards to San Nicolas de los Garza and Escobedo (residential local
authorities); it is expected to have high density and intensive use when this
expansion has been completed.
In contrast with the bus network, which is operated by a large number of
concessionaires and permit holders looking for profit maximization, Monterrey’s
metro is run and funded by the public corporation METRORREY. This corporation
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Figure 7.1 - Main streets and avenues
is a state-owned company, supervised by the Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Obras
Públicas del Estado – SEDUOP – which in turn is a department of the state
government executive branch.
7.1.2 Elements of urban public transport
In Monterrey, urban public transport is provided by a small number of government
agencies (Metrorrey, local government authorities), or a service delivered by private
providers under government supervision. The provision of public transportation for
passengers is an important service of government intervention in the urban realm.
Government intervention is specific to some elements of urban transportation; these
elements are:
• investment, 
• route design, 
• planning, 
• regulation, 
• maintenance, 
• pricing.
These elements can be clustered according to their political value into three groups:
the first relates to hard investment in public transport (buses, metros, tramways,
terminals, and so forth); the second includes route design, planning, regulation, and
maintenance; the third refers to pricing. This classification reproduces the
differentiation of public tasks in cities such as Monterrey. The road component is
not included in this selection (investment in road infrastructure, highways, and so
forth), because in Mexico and Latin America this component is largely under central
government control. The participation of urban government (regional government,
metropolitan arrangements, local authorities, and so forth) in the provision of roads
remains complicated and entangled in the various modes central governments use
to manage infrastructure investments. Central governments are – in the wake of
decentralization and state reform – opting for such formulas for direct provision,
concessions, contracting-out, lease arrangements, and devolution. The inclusion of
this component in the analysis of metropolitan arrangements in urban transport
would lead to too many exceptions and distortions. 
Investments. This group includes investments being made into the purchase and
maintenance of transport systems (metro, tramways, and so forth), transport units
(metro cars, buses, trolleys, trams), and light infrastructure to complement these
transportation modes (bus stops, bus terminals, metro stations, bus parking,
garages, passenger’s shelters, signals). 
Routes, planning, regulation, and maintainance. This group includes the
management and planning of public transport routes, the regulation of the conditions
and reach of the service, and the maintenance of infrastructure, units and systems.
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Pricing. This group includes the intervention of government agencies in the
regulation and setting of public transport fares and prices.
7.1.3 Levels of government
All three levels of government (central, regional, local) are actively involved in urban
transport in Monterrey. In most cases their responsibilities in the various elements
of urban transport are assigned according to scale, but certain remnants still in force
date from the previous responsibility arrangements made at the time when
government was more centralized. 
Central level. Central government is active in urban transport through the
Ministries, and indirectly through the development agencies. Apart from setting the
strategies for investments in infrastructure, which are handled by the Secretariat of
Public Works, specific development agencies are set up to deal with projects,
programmes or transport infrastructure on a substantial scale. 
Regional Level. The participation in the urban transport sector of the Regional
Government in Monterrey, that of the state of Nuevo León, is important. Regional
government acts as the counterpart of the central government agencies for major
infrastructure investments, and is recognized in transportation studies as the leader
through the Metropolitan Council for Transport. This regional body is – in the view
of its officials (research interview, 1999) – focused on urban transport management
for the metropolitan area of Monterrey. The Council is responsible for planning,
route design, regulation, pricing, and (to a lesser extend) for minor investments in
infrastructure and transport systems.
The urban rail company, METRORREY, is a one-purpose agency responsible for the
metro system and accountable to the regional government. However, because of the
size of the investment involved, METRORREY is also related to the central
government agencies in the sector, such as the Secretariat of Public Works. An
administrative council under the presidency of the Governor of Nuevo León State
manages METRORREY. Certain state level officers and representatives of the private
sector and labour unions constitute the Council (METRORREY, 1995).
Local Level. Local government authorities in Mexico are authorized to undertake
several duties concerning urban public transport. In Monterrey, local government is
formally – though not actually – responsible for road infrastructure investment and
maintenance. In practice, the central government has more relevance in the sector,
because of its financial capacity with respect to investments and the availability of
technical capacity.
In summary, the regional level acts as the main authority in urban transport with
respect to regulation. Investment in the Metro infrastructure, the granting of
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concessions to bus operators, and the collection of all taxes and levies concerning
private car use are all functions carried out by the State of Nuevo León through the
State Council for Urban Transport (Garza, 1998).
7.1.4 Decentralization context
At the start of decentralization (1983), urban utilities had different degrees of
centralization and so have been subjected to different types of reform. The state
governments maintain control of the water companies, territorial planning
institutions, power companies, and urban transport services. With decentralization,
many of these utilities ought to have been brought under municipal government,
but this did not apply to all cases in Mexican cities. The municipal side is often not
involved, because of financial constraints, lack of capacity, reluctance, and self-
interest (the evasion of the conflict-prone utilities). The regional side has no wish to
give up power and therefore does not seek to decentralize. In Monterrey, the water
company remains regional in operation; its administration is in the hands of a
regional level agency, which is accountable to the state governor. Similar
arrangements apply to urban public transport, where the Metropolitan Council of
Urban Transport is the most important public agency acting in the city, and ranks as
a state level office. Urban planning, is a public function in transition, relocating
from the regional office Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Obras Públicas (SEDUOP)
to the municipal offices in the state of Nuevo León. The Metropolitan Transport
Council retains a strong position on issues such as investment, often acting as the
advisory agency for central and local government (the council is attached to the state
government, so it fulfils this advisory function automatically). The Council is the
main authority for routes, planning, regulation and maintenance; it is the only
authority dealing with route design and planning. It also plays an important part in
price (fare, tariffs) negotiations, since it is the agency that approves (or rejects)
proposed price increases and levels.
The decentralization of government and public services management, although
incomplete, has led to changes in the urban public transport sector. Basically, the
role of the municipal agencies has increased in importance, since they have become
legally involved in the sector to a greater extent. The process of devolution has
different depths depending on the political weight of the element of urban transport
involved (pricing), the level of active lobbying by local authorities to acquire more
power, and the specific political balances between central and local governments
(opposition, coalitions, and so forth). Basically, according to the decentralization
argument and the legal structure, the location of functions which should now be in
the hands of the urban governments (regional or local), is still a matter of discussion
and negotiation.
7.1.5 The role of Monterrey in the urban system
Monterrey (together with Mexico city and Guadalajara) belongs to the top level of
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cities in Mexico that are in an advanced stage of metropolitanization (Iracheta, 1997;
Sobrino, 1996). Growth trends are less pronounced in relation to the national
average, and suburbanization, periphery growth, and deconcentration are important
features (Negrete Salas, 1995). 
Monterrey, the third largest city in Mexico, plays an important part in the urban
system of the country and in the tension between the centre and the region. The
large geographical distance from the urbanized centre of the country (that gravitates
around Mexico City) has prevented Monterrey from falling under the direct
influence of the urban development of the capital, as other cities such as Puebla or
Toluca have done. Even Guadalajara, closer to the capital than Monterrey, has a
different position in the centre-region debate. Monterrey is therefore more
independent and critical with respect to the developments in the central regions of
the country, which makes its development and growth more related to endogenous
reasons – such as industrial expansion, opportunities for international trade
resulting from the proximity of the U.S.-Mexican border, the strong growth of
coalitions – than to national strategies such as deconcentration, import-substitution
strategies, and so forth
Another fact that defines the position of Monterrey in the urban system is its role as
an economic powerhouse, with three important characteristics supporting this
position: a) its early economic development as an industrial city, dating from the
beginning of the 20th century; b) the consequent capitalistic culture, which remains
dominant and also commands the growth processes; c) its proximity to the US-
Mexican border, which facilitates exchange with the large U.S. economy.
This combination of factors indicates that Monterrey is a city in which attachment to
central government policy is less strong than in other urban agglomerations closer
to the capital. Monterrey is more closely related to the growth and development
patterns of the cities in the northern region of Mexico, such as Tijuana, Mexicali,
Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, and Saltillo. 
In the case of urban transport, it seems that Monterrey, situated far away from the
zones of concern in and around Mexico City, has followed its own policies without
any major interruptions, although the question of the coordination of national plans
and transfers has remained important. There is a political dimension in the
endogenous pressure for the regional development of Monterrey and Nuevo León,
which corresponds with the failure of policies designed at central government level:
“The failure of policies of regional development in Latin-America, based on the
views that central powers have had with respect to the rest of the nation, has reached
such limits that it has transformed regional development into a factor of political
struggle” (Iracheta, 1995. p.353).
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Monterrey itself is an example of urban primacy within its own state. Nuevo León’s
population is concentrated in the capital city (87% of the state population). This
concentration has consequences for regional government action, because the
population realm of the regional government hardly differs from that of the
municipal governments in the city. In fact, both regional and municipal government
authorities are involved in much the same areas, serving the same population. This
analysis corresponds with that of Duhau (1995) with regard to simultaneous
government, but an equivalence of territorial coverage is also indicated. Duhau
concludes that, for Mexican cities: “From a functional and political point of view,
local administration is carried out simultaneously by state and municipal
governments in metropolitan cities” (Duhau, 1998. p.76), to which it may be added
that for primate cities – such as Monterrey – this functional and political overlap is
also spatial in terms of the territorial coverage of the governments involved.
Monterrey maintains its interdependence with Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila State,
and a mere 80 kilometres distant. This interdependence can be observed in patterns
of demographic growth (population, employment, housing, education, and so forth)
and is manifest in the business activity and behaviour of Monterrey’s citizens.
Sobrino (1996) has already seen a tendency towards megalopolization in Monterrey-
Saltillo (parallel to that of the Mexico City agglomeration); this tendency is based on
the competitive advantages of Monterrey-Saltillo that are evident in the neo-liberal
economic model, particularly with regard to the trade opportunities generated by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the productive chains that are
being generated in the territory.
The main impacts of this position of Monterrey in the urban system are the high
demand for urban transport in Monterrey compared with other urban
agglomerations in the region, and increasing car ownership. In addition, the
national and regional governments take an interest in urban transport in Monterrey
as a matter of social and economic concern.
The high demand for urban transportation is related to the population size and the
growth of the city, which remains one of the largest in the country. Population
growth and the subsequent extension of the urbanized areas affect the quality of the
service, generate new transportation needs (new service areas, new volumes), and
burden the existing infrastructure with unforeseen loads.
Urban transport in Monterrey is of regional interest and so regional and central
government authorities are both involved. This dual involvement justifies the sharing
of responsibilities for urban transport over several levels of government, with some
decisions taken at central government level. Investments in infrastructure and the
operation of the Metro system form part of this vision, with some elements of the
sector kept close to central or regional government. Moreover, since transport costs
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are an important component of household expenditures, altering transportation fares
(whether raising or subsidizing them) is a political issue of vital government
importance. This importance receives extra emphasis in Monterrey, because it is the
biggest city in the state with more people whose household income is affected, and
because these fare changes are promptly emulated by other urban agglomerations in
the region.
7.2 Territorial scales
There are several administrative and operational territorial definitions for urban
transport in Monterrey. Authority over urban public transport is accorded to
municipal governments by law, but operations are arranged according to the
technical definitions of the service areas. This operational/technical level is relevant,
because finance and intergovernmental transfers are associated with these technical
definitions.
7.2.1 Territories
The territories related to a local government authority are those within the municipal
boundaries, whilst the realms for which many technical decisions are taken
(selection of modes, number of units, routes) relate to sectors and areas defined by
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Figure 7.2 - Administrative boundaries
use, density, traffic volume, and accessibility. Below are the territories arranged
according to a) the administrative boundaries, and b) the technical definitions. 
Administrative boundaries
The administrative boundaries in force in Monterrey define the territory of action of
the various actors in urban government. The state and municipal boundaries reflect
the territory over which the established urban government authorities exert their
influence in the city. Thus the state of Nuevo León is the territory for regional
government action in urban transport, and Monterrey, San Pedro, Santa Catarina,
Escobedo, Juarez, Apodaca, Garcia, San Nicolás and Guadalupe are the territories for
the corresponding municipal agencies responsible for urban transport. 
Technical definitions
The main definitions in force for urban transport in Monterrey are not coterminous
with the areas defined by the administrative boundaries. Urban transport in
Monterrey has been defined and subdivided for practical reasons into the
metropolitan area, the central square, the urban area, the inter-urban areas, and the
squatter locations. 
Metropolitan area. For planning and logistical purposes, the metropolitan area is
the major territory in the city. Transport services, their demand and supply, are
referred to this area. The following definitions (central/first quadrangle, urban area,
suburban area) are included within this metropolitan area.
Central/first Quadrangle. This first quadrangle is the traditional core of the city,
comprising the historic centre and the main conurbation along the valley. The
accessibility of the centre is an important public service issue, one that is related to
the organization of the city and the functioning of Monterrey as State Capital. The
central quadrangle accommodates government offices and buildings, the traditional
commercial zones, business offices, and the symbolic and emblematic centre of the
city on the Macroplaza. The major facilities located in and around the Macroplaza are
the City Hall of Monterrey municipality, the State Congress, the Governor’s office,
the most important museums, the Catholic Cathedral, the Central Library, and the
Central Post Office. The central quadrangle is also the location of the Central Bus
Station, where all intercity and interregional buses arrive and depart. The central
quadrangle is included in its totality within the administrative territory of the
Monterrey municipality.
According to the studies in the Strategic Plan of Monterrey (Comisión de Desarrollo
Urbano del Estado de Nuevo León, 1995, pp. 221-222): “The main feature in relation
to the origin/destinations patterns is that a large number of trips in the metropolitan
area have the central quadrangle as their destination. Of all daily trips, 20% are
linked to the area between Cuauhtémoc, Colón, Zuazua and Constitución Avenues,
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which shows the centralized character of commercial, service, and cultural activities
in Monterrey. Furthermore, in the analysis of modes of transports used in the city, it
could be seen that this area is virtually the only relevant centre node.”
Four sub-centres are emerging: three of them correspond to the municipal centres
of Guadalupe, San Nicólas, and San Pedro. The fourth is located to the northeast of
the conurbation, in the Lincoln Avenue corridor.
Urban area. This includes the central quadrangle and incorporates most of the
urbanized areas of the main valley. The urban area corresponds with the major
valley, including all the routes and accessibility needs for the city centre or the
central municipality of Monterrey, and adjacent urban areas in the neighbouring
local authorities of Guadalupe, Santa Catarina, Escobedo, Apodaca, San Nicólas, and
San Pedro.
Suburban area. Under this definition fall all those urbanized areas of the capital
region that are not contiguous to the agglomeration of the great valley, but that have
a strong functional relationship with the urban area in terms of commuting. The
suburban area therefore corresponds with the adjacent valleys and urban sprawl
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Figure 7.3 - Local authorities included in the urban area definition
beyond the main valley. Juaréz and García are suburbs; the local government
authorities of Apodaca, and Santa Catarina cover sectors and neighbourhoods
defined as suburban.
Interurban routes facilitate travel from urban and suburban Monterrey to other
important locations in the regional city system that do not form part of the
continuous urban spread, because of geographical barriers and urban development.
Also, the area between Monterrey and Saltillo is referred as interurbano, since these
two locations are connected by a narrow valley, with less potential for continuous
urban sprawl. Nevertheless, the functional relationship between Monterrey and
Saltillo as adjacent locations is strong, from both commuting patterns and trade.
Urban growth in Saltillo and Monterrey is perceived to be interrelated. 
7.2.2 Matching and non-matching territories
The provision of urban public transport in Monterrey is therefore balanced between
the formal definitions related to legislation and the constitution, and the operational
definitions, which operate in the sector in practice. In the agencies responsible for
urban public transport situations arise where this balance is based in the acceptance
of different sets of definitions, or simply the acceptance of the overlapping of
authority within the city. But, in any case, there is a general failure to accept or use
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one fixed assumption about an authority’s territorial coverage (scale), either in
formal or operational terms; this situation is referred to here as divergence. 
In the case of divergence, local government institutions have to interact with other
agencies, mainly in regional government – SEDUOP, the Metropolitan Urban
Transport Council, Metrorrey – that use a different territorial definition for their
projects in urban transport. The basic assumption is that they have no common
territorial definition, either in the legal framework or in management practice, so
that these agencies have to resort to overlaps and tacit acceptance in fulfilling their
mandate to provide urban public transportation.
As noted above, there are multiple territorial definitions and mandates on the sector,
and they come to terms with actual practice by way of coexistence and overlapping.
The term coexistence has been chosen, because no set of definitions is consistently
preferred above the others. The divergence in objectives and territorial definitions
does not produce a call for homogeneity in the definitions used by the various public
agencies involved in urban transport. With regard to overlapping, the authority of the
agencies of urban public transport frequently overlaps, or extends beyond the scales
of action that correspond to them. Immediately the assigned routes overlap into
other administrative realms, the municipal agencies acquire a de facto metropolitan
authority.
7.2.3 Expectations
In this situation of mismatch, the preferred strategy of regional public agencies is
that of the extension of authority and influence. Instead of looking for coordination,
the public agencies try to exert their influence on the sector more widely than within
their administrative territory alone. Examples of this extension are provided by such
regional government agencies as METRORREY, or the State Council for Urban
Transport that operate on a metropolitan territory, regardless of the administrative
subdivisions in the city, which divide the metropolitan territory into nine local
authorities. the research interviews (1999) revealed that, at METRORREY,
coordination with local authorities is secondary to Metrorrey policy, where efforts for
coordination are mainly directed to the cooption of private providers (permit holders,
private firms). In the same way, the Council for Urban Transport has undisputed
authority as a metropolitan agency, whether from local government authorities or
the central government (research interviews, 1999). At the Council itself, its
influence as a metropolitan authority is explicitly understood and exploited (research
interviews, 1999).
We are led to assume that, at central and regional level, wider territories are the
prevailing concepts regardless of the administrative subdivisions. The regional
Council for Urban Transport is responsible for most urban transport decisions,
although the technical ranks in the different municipal agencies in the city seek
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more power. This expectation of the staff of the local authorities has not been
fulfilled, since the majority of urban authorities, namely the mayors in Monterrey,
endorse the present situation and allow the regional agency – the Council for
Transport – to assume command. Nevertheless, this metropolitan agency looks for
more coordination and collaboration at the municipal level, because investment
programmes from the central government and the development agencies are now
being targeted to local level authorities rather than regional authorities. Therefore,
the Council for Urban Transport (officially, a regional institution) now finds that
fulfilling its responsibilities is difficult without cooperation agreements with the
local authorities. The reasons for metropolitan coordination are then, a) the
technical reasons involving scale, and b) the financial reasons that reflect the
changing pattern of transfers. 
7.3 Decisions
The strategic decisions of metropolitan weight have been analysed with regard to
their territorial adequacy – whether they relate to, or build on a metropolitan scale.
The decisions included in the analysis are those related to the elements specified for
urban public transport (see 7.1.2: Elements of urban public transport). The
classification comprises: a) investment; b) route design, planning, regulation, and
maintenance; c) pricing. It is used below to subdivide the analysis. 
For each of these components, the analysis is structured as follows. First comes a
description of the locus of decision-making: who takes the strategic decisions, at
what level of government, and within which institutional framework. Second comes
an assessment of the kind of coordination that has emerged or is visible beyond these
loci, especially whether these coordination efforts correspond with broader territorial
scales. 
The analysis related to coordination is specified according to the following themes:
a) the level of coordination (info level, communication level, agreements, and so
forth); b) the underlying powers; c) the impacts of the actual power-decision
arrangement on the provision of urban transport. From this analysis, the
coordination practices that have a metropolitan scale are identified or described.
7.3.1 Investment
In this section, an analysis of the investment component of urban transport is
presented. First, consideration is given to the locus of decision-making in this area, and
then the results of searches for forms of coordination within the institutional
framework are reported.
Investment: locus of decision making
The acquisition of new buses, minibuses, and so forth and the maintenance of
vehicle fleets are the main investments involving vehicles in urban public transport.
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These forms of investments are supported by loans and subsidies from central and
local government authorities.
The State Council of Transport has previously been identified as the most important
actor in the sector. Basically, the Council is an advisor to the state (regional)
government and strongly influences decisions involving transport infrastructure,
transport units, fleet improvements and expansion, credit programmes, and so forth
Although the Council is not the agency actually involved in disbursements, it is the
agency that provides and support the arguments for the investment decisions. 
METRORREY, also operating at state level, has the decision power to direct its own
investments. The legislation that marks the foundation of METRORREY stresses the
goal of self-sufficiency (Metrorrey, 1995). However, since the influence of the state
governor in METRORREY activities is statutory, in theory all investment decisions
need the governor’s explicit support; in practice this supremacy translates into a
heavily weighted vote for the governor in METRORREY decisions, although these
decisions are mainly prepared, argued, and steered by the technical staff of
METRORREY (Chavarria and Villarreal, 1995).
It can, however, be said that the state’s Council for Urban Transport plays the
leading part linking these two agencies – the state council and METRORREY. The
Council covers more elements of urban transport in the city than METRORREY, and
has relationships with many actors in Monterrey, both public and private. The
Council also enjoys a favourable political position since it is a planning and
coordination agency rather than a one-purpose enterprise such as METRORREY. 
An example of this interaction where the State Council takes the lead was seen in
the intermodal transport programme initiated in February 1999. This programme
represents the first attempt to integrate the metro system with surface
transportation, making use of intermodal tickets, discount fares, and the definition
of selected transfer stations on the metro lines. The agency in charge is the state
Council for Urban Transport, bringing routes, access to credit, logistics and volume
guarantees to private sector transport operators, who became the concessionaires for
the bus lines (called metrobuses because of their integration with the metro system).
The contractual agreements were also the work of the state Council for Urban
Transport. The role of METRORREY is limited to that of the infrastructure backbone
for the intermodal programme. METRORREY is responsible for ticketing, providing
appropriate bus stops and space at the transfer stations, and supporting logistics.
The state council undertakes the monitoring of the development of the system – the
number of passengers, number of trips, intermodal use, public acceptance,
commercial performance, and so forth.
The state Council for Urban Transport has the power to provide, or facilitate the
provision of credit, for certain operators and certain routes in the intermodal
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programme. The council also has the power to decide where METRORREY should
provide transfer stations and bus stops. In short, the decision power on investments
in this programme is located in the state council. In this case, the state council has
the edge when it comes to investment decisions, so that the part it plays in the
programme is more influential than that of METRORREY. 
For public surface transportation unrelated to the metro system (buses and
minibuses), private providers are in control of capital investments for their fleets.
Nevertheless, the lack of efficient management in this sector affects the frequency and
quality of these investments. The ageing of the fleet is to be deplored: 1% of units are
less than 3 years old, 29% are between 3 and 5 years old, and the rest (70%) are older
that 5 years. Of this last group, a significant number of units (933 units, or 28% of the
total) were brought into service before 1980. According to the analysis and prognosis
in the strategic plan of Monterrey, all units will be older than 5 years by the year 2000
(Comisión de Desarrollo Urbano, N.L., 1995). This data and the remarks received at
the Council for Urban Transport show that decisions on investments in public
transport by private providers are in general terms independent of government
expectations and difficult to phase in with government investments. As one officer
said: “Public transport companies and permit holders come to the council mainly
with two requests: fare revisions, or new routes. At that moment, it is possible for us
to ask about fleet quality, as a compulsory requirement, but once these fares or routes
have been granted, it is very difficult for us to monitor the state of these fleets. Once a
route has been approved, the only effective moment to exercise control of the quality
of the vehicle fleet is when there is a fare revision, and that could take years. If there is
a general fare adjustment, by central government decree for instance, there is no such
a control at all” (research interview, 1999).
Investments in this sector are only of importance when government agencies – in
this case the Council for Urban Transport, the local authority or central government
– are involved in programmes to subsidize or facilitate credit to concessionaires and
permit holders. The locus of decision-making with regards to investments in the
sector has to be positioned close to regional government, with a dominant role for
the Council of Urban Transport. The central government has more financial power
to implement investment programmes, but once these have passed the sub-national
level, the states have more decision power than the central government, certainly in
the prevailing conditions of decentralization and multi-party politics. 
In metropolitan Monterrey, it is clear that decisions in the area of investments are
made or debated in and around the Council for Urban Transport, which, although by
definition a regional institution, acts rather as a metropolitan agency. Local
authorities are basically the Council’s partners in their role as the legitimate
recipients of intergovernmental transfers; however, in terms of decisions of
metropolitan interest; the Council is still the decisive partner, while the local
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authorities represent their local interests. In any case, although the funding question
moves the Council towards closer relations with local governments, its natural
loyalty is to the government of Nuevo León’s State, as was noted during research
interviews: “By law, urban transport planning is assigned to the state level, thus the
endorsement and the relationship that we have with the state government is both
necessarily legal and convenient” (research interview, 1999). The council is, then, a
regional institution, with local partners and fulfilling a metropolitan function, and
with an undefined position situated between the regional and local government
levels.
Investment: coordination 
The coordination of investments in urban transport is structured de facto around the
Council for Urban Transport. Decision-making power is located in the middle levels
of government (regional). Other sub-national levels are called upon for participation
and collaboration. The interests of the Council for Urban Transport in approaching
local governments is related to the need to gain sufficient financial support for its
actions; local government authorities are a source of finance, because they are the
recipients of transfers from central government, which tend to by-pass the regional
level of government. The Council for Urban Transport is in the situation where its
parent organization – the regional government – has fewer financial resources,
because of the changes in the destination of intergovernmental transfers. The
Council then tries to secure, or steer, the use of these funds by proposing
collaboration and partnerships and joint programmes with local authorities,
assuming the role of metropolitan coordination agency in order to achieve these
objectives. The inclusion of local authorities within these efforts undertaken by the
Council for Urban Transport follows financial, technical, and territorial criteria, so
that the financial resources, transportation profile and the situation of a given
municipality in relation to the metropolitan territory are considered, although no
evidence of the use of the metropolitan scale as a decisive criterion was found. All
local authorities included in the metropolitan area as defined by the master plan, or
the strategic plan, are in principle eligible, but inclusion is not unequivocal since
some programmes (rutas periféricas, Metro-bus intermodal system) exclude the
suburban local authorities Juarez and García. 
Level of coordination. On the metropolitan scale, the level of coordination is
intermediate and, following Mitchell-Weaver et al. (2000), the present arrangement
is rated ‘relatively easy’, demanding few power concessions from the local and
regional governments acting in the city (see Table 7.1). On the local scale, or
evaluated by isolated cases of bilateral collaboration, the coordination scores are
higher. Moreover, the cases that involve the metropolitan scale, such as investments
in the metro systems, bypass coordination since the metro company METRORREY
has few exchanges with local government authorities. If there is a need to improve
certain lines, or extend the service to certain areas, most of the efforts made to attain
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the investment capacity (financial support) are undertaken by the Council for Urban
Transport (a regional level agency) with the government authorities concerned: thus,
bilaterally and locally. 
Investments made by the private providers active in urban public transport, whether
concessionaires or permit holders, depend on government support measures. The
Council for Urban Transport tries to coordinate these actions, phasing the use of
subsidies by private providers with its objectives (speed improvement, time
reduction, cost/time ratio improvement).The Council mainly suggests where to use
the subsidies, and exercises its power in carrying out fare revisions and route
assignments, and negotiating to ensure that subsidies are used on routes and in
areas that are in decline. It is also the case that local authorities run their own
subsidy programmes without regard to the intentions of the Council for Urban
Transport. The role of the permit holders (CTM and CROC related) in providing the
political leverage for municipal authorities should not be underestimated. 
The cases where these capital investments are undertaken regularly, as in the bus
lines rutas panoramicas1, frequently concern the routes serving the central
quadrangle or those at the top of the fare system, where fare revisions are relatively
easy to implement and prices are higher. Research interviews (1999) at the Council
for Urban Transport revealed that endeavours made by the Council to influence this
behaviour, so as to benefit other areas or routes in line with the Council’s
programmes for improved metropolitan coverage, were being undermined by the
availability of subsidies and credit for private providers in local government, central
government, and through the unions (in the case of permit holders).
In conclusion, investments in the private sector are not coordinated at the
metropolitan level; there is a high level of discretion applicable: 1) at individual level:
the concessionaire or permit holder can decide when, how much, and in what to
invest; 2) at local level: the local authorities can implement subsidy programmes
regardless of metropolitan considerations; 3) through the unions that provide permit
holders with access to subsidies and the facilities generated by central government
plans for the sector.
The underlying powers. The fragmented state of urban government (local and
regional government authorities and agencies acting in the urban area) allows
government investments in urban transport to be made at different levels and by
different agencies. Different political actors settled in these fragmented elements of
urban government acquire allocation power, which is convenient in a political
context that is traditionally clientelism-oriented and favour-prone.
The impression gained from the public servants consulted in the local government
authorities and the Council for Urban Transport was that, for local authorities, the
allocation of investment was the main interest (Research Interviews, 1999).
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Table 7.1 - Urban Public Transport. Investment: Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 7.2 - Urban Public Transport. Investment: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Criteria addapted from Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864)
and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
X
X
X
Technical elements are always considered, but the political gains of the direct
allocation of investment in urban transport tend to be maximized. The costs of
generating coordination capacity for initiating and maintaining a coordinated
investment programme (for several local authorities) is too high compared with the
potential gains. For mayors and transport agencies at the municipal level, it is easier
to collaborate with the Council for Urban Transport in implementing investment
programmes on the local or micro-local scale. 
The interests of the service providers (individuals, firms, and cooperatives) are some
of the most important in the investment component of urban public transport. The
power of the transport union is of fundamental importance. For the Council of
Urban Transport, the implementation of the multi-modal programme involving
METRORREY required giving a guarantee with respect to passenger volumes and
the profits for the bus companies (concessionaires and permit holders) participating
in the programme. Should these volumes not be met, the bus companies have a
relatively easy exit strategy, or may cancel routes. According to the research interview
counterparts at the Council for Transport, the commitment of this sector (the
private/unionized providers) for the intermodal programme was barely adequate.
There was also a perception of a reluctance to cooperate in route changes (that is, the
decongestion of the central quadrangle) and other projects proposed by the Council.
The motives underlying the reluctance were in the main the lack of profit
opportunities in the short term for the participating companies, and the high costs
of such changes for the companies involved. It is also worthy of note that the bus
companies perceived having to give up established routes that ran through the
central quadrangle as a huge loss. The Council for Urban Transport had to seek a
bargaining position by binding subsidies to its projects, but it still has to balance the
participation of the three different actors – concessionaires, permit holders CTM,
and permit holders CROC – in transport projects, because they compete with each
other and have a political weight that the mayors and the governor find meaningful. 
The credit facilities and subsidy programmes are designed to facilitate the
modernization of the sector through its conditions clauses – a limit on subsidies for
existing routes, conditions set on subsidies for the provision of alternative routes,
the release of funds in phases and following the monitoring of investments already
made. But the unions tenaciously keep control. These service providers (permit
holders) are influential in the investment programmes implemented by the
metropolitan local authorities. The leaders of the labour unions (who are also leaders
of the permit holders organizations) have access to the decision makers – the
mayors – because they belong to the alliances and political platforms of the elected
officials. They bring this influence to bear by demanding priority for union
members for access to subsidies and credit; in this way they, raise the barriers for
new entries.
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The political alliance of mayors with some sectors of the private providers is also
translated into preferences for these providers in the local investment programmes,
either by favouring the participation of these providers in the investment
programmes, or by protecting the established routes they control.
Impacts. The main impact made on the city by the arrangements through which
investment in urban public transport is made is the aggravation of the discontinuity
of the service and congestion in the urban transport system. Efforts to coordinate
investments among the different modes of urban transports are difficult to
implement. Some investments are made through programmes that are isolated from
each other, as is the case for the municipal programmes. All private investment
tends to be concentrated in the part of the service that operates in the central
quadrangle. This concentration emphasizes the imbalance in coverage, quality, and
quantity of the service between the centre and the periphery. Although the
investment strategies of the government agencies – such as those of the Council for
Urban Transport, or METRORREY – have a metropolitan coverage; however, they
only service a small part of demand. 
Metropolitan arrangements. The Council for Urban Transport forms the core of
a feasible metropolitan arrangement to coordinate investments in urban transport in
Monterrey. The Council is involved in all decisions made by the state government of
Nuevo León and is the advisor to METRORREY; the Council has the power to set the
conditions under which subsidies are granted to private providers of public
transportation. This arrangement replaces coordination among the local authorities;
they prefer bilateral coordination with the Council for Urban Transport to
coordination among themselves, since the Council is present in any urban transport
investment programme in the city. 
The local government authorities are not taking over the coordination function;
neither are they proposing any other form of intergovernmental collaboration
among themselves in the field of urban transport. The urban governments
acknowledge the Council for Urban Transport as the expert agency in Monterrey.
Nevertheless, this agency does not have complete control of the way investments in
urban transport are made, because uncoordinated local authorities and private actors
tend to protect the decision power they have in the allocation of investments.
7.3.2 Planning, regulation, maintenance
In this section the elements of planning, regulation, and maintenance are analysed
as a group component; this analysis is similar to that presented for investment in the
previous section. The analysis described below first considers the locus of decision-
making in this area; a description then follows of the search for forms of
coordination within the institutional framework.
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Box 7.1 Strategies and actions of the strategic plan of Monterrey
More efficient urban development within the built perimeter of the city, using all
empty lots and ‘re-densification’, according to socio-economic levels 
Consolidate the centre of Monterrey, densification of existing uses and stimulation
of residential uses.
Consolidate urban sub-centres to reduce trip lengths.
Favour the densification of regional development poles, located within an hour
form Monterrey. They should become counterweights to the metropolis.
Create or sustain cities located beyond one-hour time-distance of Monterrey. This
is to create alternative attraction centres.
Establish integral plan of urban transport. An action plan developed by the regional
government. The general objective is that public transport should account for 80%
of urban mobility, against a 20% from private transport.
A network of routes
• Establish a system of routes linked to actual profiles of demand and volumes
• Establish local circuits to cover intern mobility within each district of the
metropolitan area
• Improve the efficiency of ‘circumvallation’ routes that allows continuity of the
whole system of trajectories (2 out of 5 designed routes are in operation)
• Establish Radial routes to rationalize their branches and act on the major
corridors towards the metropolitan centre
• Ensure that the inter-zone routes appear as feeding routes for the bus system
• Implement express routes
• Implement students’ routes to service zones and destinies typically related to
schools and universities
• The Metro network should become the vertebral column of the routes’ network
• Door to door services.
Urban transport infrastructure
• Multimodal centres
• Systems for local mobility. Transport facilities in zones with high volumes of
movements, like the metropolitan centre.
• Dedicated road corridors. Dedicated road for buses or high occupation modes of
transport.
Planning: Locus of decision making
In Monterrey, the planning and regulation of urban public transport involves two
main actors: the state government, and the municipal governments. Through the
SEDUOP (Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Planificación) and the Metropolitan
Council for Transport, the state government is responsible for setting the guidelines
for medium and long-term investments, the development of goals for the sector,
general strategies for achieving those goals, and a code of regulations to be applied
to public urban transportation. The Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport holds
the key responsibility for assigning and managing public transport routes.
From the long list of requirements in the strategic planning document (see box 7.1),
the planning objectives that are important in the Metropolitan Council for Urban
Transport are: a) increased speed of transit; b) reduction of trip times; c) improved
cost/time ratios (research interview: Metropolitan Council of Transport, 1999). 
Local government authorities are responsible for the implementation of the
regulations, the issuing of permits for concessionaires, and the specification of a
code of regulations appropriate to their particular needs. The participation of local
government authorities in planning is limited to the adaptation of their local urban
transportation plans to the general state plan, or the urban transport component of
the strategic plan of Monterrey. In the case of METRORREY, planning is undertaken
independently of other government agencies, but with the necessary harmonization
of local government authorities at certain stages. This structure corresponds with the
expected profile of a single-purpose metropolitan public agency. 
In recent years, especially after decentralization, the decisions about the maintenance
of the system, the fleets, and the traffic management infrastructure (bus stops, traffic
lights, terminals, and so forth) have shifted from the state government to the
municipal level. The local authorities have become responsible for the management
of the traffic infrastructure; they have also become the agents of the central and
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Network of parking spaces associated to exchange nodes
• Local facilities for low-mobility modes like bicycle or walking. These facilities
include refuges and stops to use public transport
• Integration of urban transport modes
• Multimodal system of fares to improve the operative integration of transport
modes
• Differential fare system based on trip-distances of by passengers
• Adaptation of transport units to the volume demands of each corridor. From
mini-buses for inter-zone routes, conventional buses of 70 passengers,
panoramic units of 100 passengers, and double-articulated buses for use in the
dedicated roads.
regional governments in the task of monitoring public transport with respect to such
issues as the environment, or the quality of the service.
The loci in the institutional network where decisions are taken concerning planning,
regulation and maintenance, are positioned towards the regional government level. The
SEDUOP is the major planning office in urban transport; the Council for Urban
Transport is the main coordinating agency in the city; and METRORREY decides on
metropolitan issues in the subway/light rail system. Local authorities and their
agencies have decision powers on specific issues, such as procedures to regulate
vehicle emissions, and procedures for the issue of permits for public transport
vehicles or specifications for public transport companies. These specific issues are
municipal rather than metropolitan concerns. 
Planning: coordination
The capacity to coordinate in the area of planning, regulation and maintenance in
urban public transport while taking a metropolitan scale into consideration is
discussed below. Four themes are featured: the level of coordination; the underlying
powers; the impacts of the actual level of coordination on the functioning of urban
public transport; the development of metropolitan tendencies around this function. 
Level of coordination. On the metropolitan scale, the level of coordination is
moderate; the intergovernmental coordination present in Monterrey for the
planning and regulation of urban transport is rated as ‘relatively easy’ (See tables
below). There is informal cooperation between the different agencies, and the state
office assumes control of planning (SEDUOP) in partnership with the Council for
Urban Transport. 
Basically, the SEDUOP is still of the opinion that the planning capacity at the
municipal level is inadequate (Research interviews, 1999), and as a result of that
opinion the SEDUOP avoids facilitating the transfer of planning functions to the local
government authorities. At the same time, this attitude precludes further
engagements from SEDUOP with respect to coordination or in relation to
collaboration. This attitude contrasts with that at the Council for Urban Transport,
where the objective is to incorporate the actors involved as far as possible, whether
from SEDUOP, or the municipal public transport offices, or as private providers, in
the accomplishment of the goals of the Council regarding urban public transport in
the metropolitan area (Research Interview, 1999). However, it was noted in those
same interviews that the Council assumed the coordination role as its right. The
Council assumes that it has the duty to facilitate coordination within the metropolis
and at the same time, to fulfil this duty, it seeks to command more authority (planning
control, coordination of related projects) and power (finance, political support from the
governor and mayors). This situation positions the policy coordination scale (see Table
7.4) at the level of ‘search for agreement’ for the Council, and ‘information exchange’
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Table 7.3 - Urban Public Transport. Planning: Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 7.4 - Urban Public Transport. Planning: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Criteria addapted from Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864)
and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
Council X
X
SEDUOP X
for the SEDUOP. The practices and opinions registered in the interviews showed that,
on this scale of policy coordination, the Council for Urban Transport anticipates
climbing the ladder, thereby reaching their objective of setting up a government
strategy with metropolitan reach through improved coordination. A different
interpretation could be made of the SEDUOP register, with a lower level of
commitment towards coordination and more towards a re-centralization of decisions.
The underlying powers. Regional government has extended its control over
decisions on urban transport planning and regulation in Monterrey. The
Metropolitan Council of Transport is an institution with regional power over the city.
Local government authorities have failed to take part in this decision process, or
have been prevented from doing so, being relegated to a following role in their
limited capacity in urban transport. Although the state government has two
important agencies operating in the city, the Metropolitan Council and
METRORREY, they cooperate with each other and are aligned under their chief
executive officer – the Governor.
The regional government’s interests in maintaining the status quo is related to its
tendency to delay the decentralization processes of devolution, and the need for
legitimization and investment capacity at state level. Controlling the planning in
urban public transport carries with it the advantage of being able to foresee and
thereby control immediate and future investments in the sector. Major
infrastructure investments are also involved, such as METRORREY, or the feeder
road infrastructure. The primacy of Monterrey in the state of Nuevo León reinforces
this incentive for the state government to be active in the sector. The size of the city
and its consequently high demand for transport, and therefore of government
investment, favours the pre-eminence of the state government in the sector.
Through acting on the metropolitan scale, incumbent executives at state level
acquire political advantages. 
The devolution of these instruments of control to lower levels of government does
not seem feasible. The assignment of federal funds has changed, to the benefit local
government, but in Monterrey it is evident that the state government has put up an
institutional barrier, taking upon itself exclusive responsibility for the planning of
urban transport. 1) Local government lacks the capacity; 2) urban public transport
goes beyond the short-term interests of local politicians; 3) intervention from the
regional government does not facilitate decentralization, and neither does it help
local authorities build up the capacity to coordinate. Nevertheless, in effect the state
agency is a metropolitan agency, since the population of Monterrey accounts for 87%
of the total state population.
Meanwhile, local government authorities are reluctant to insist on devolution at the
present time, because the current arrangements absolve them from building up the
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necessary capacity and dealing with metropolitan questions that are not included in
their remit. Nevertheless, acting as followers of the state government planning
guidelines could bring them benefits if they were to negotiate for programmes and
investments in their jurisdictions with sufficient acumen.
Impacts. The main impact of the current arrangements for the planning and
regulation of urban transport is the manner in which the pre-eminence of the
regional level of government hinders the active participation of local government
authorities in the sector. While it may seem that action currently takes place at the
appropriate scale, coordination is not being built in among the governments of
metropolitan Monterrey. This fragmentation might become an obstacle in Monterrey
if the local and regional government authorities and agencies acting in the urban
area were to evolve into institutions on a metropolitan scale. Nevertheless, the
functional aspects in the provision of urban transport are well covered under the
present arrangements. Although planning has not been particularly effective in goal
achievement, fragmentation is not currently considered to be a major problem.
Metropolitan arrangements. For planning and regulation, there are no
metropolitan arrangements involving collaboration, horizontal coordination, or
shared decision-power among local governments. The Metropolitan Council of
Transport deals with metropolitan issues and is influential among all actors,
fulfilling the role of a metropolitan agency. This top-down approach is a legacy from
the typical centralized policy inherited from central and regional government. Here
there is a legacy of overwhelming control by regional government (Nuevo León
State) in urban matters in Monterrey; there are no local government initiatives likely
to change, or affect this state of affairs.
The strategic plan of Monterrey gives no hint of any change in the decision-making
structure of planning and regulation. The strategic plan includes the formulation of
objectives and strategies, but does not put forward any institutional structure, a
situation apparent to the actors concerned (Metropolitan Council for Transport,
Local authorities, SEDUOP, Governor) as a validation of the present institutional
framework (research interviews, 1999). Basically, planning is carried out below
regional level (Nuevo León State) and the Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport
seeks territorial, operational, technical and political adequacy.
7.3.3 Pricing
In this section, an analysis of the pricing component of urban transport is presented;
this analysis is similar to the analyses for investment and planning, regulation, and
maintenance presented in the preceding paragraphs. In the analysis documented
below, consideration is first given to: the locus of decision making in this area;
subsequently, searches for forms of coordination within the institutional framework
are described.
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Pricing: locus of decision making
In Monterrey, pricing in urban public transport is a responsibility allocated
exclusively to the regional government. The Metropolitan Council for Urban
Transport manages and coordinates the whole process of setting tariffs and fares in
urban transport. All providers of urban transport operate under concessions issued
by the regional government; the Council sets the conditions under which these
concessions are granted at this government level. 
For Metrorrey, even within its relative independence as a company in public
ownership, the Council is also involved in decisions on pricing. The Council for
Urban Transport either approves or disapproves fare increases or changes in the
metro system according to its own technical criteria and political discretion (or
under the close eye of the governor). For metropolitan Monterrey, the locus of
decision-making is at the regional level of government, at a dedicated institution
(Metropolitan Council of Transport). 
Pricing: coordination
The Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport coordinates all the actors involved in
urban transport through exploiting its position of power as the agency with the
decision power. The Council’s approaches to coordination are of interest. Basically,
the tension between supply and demand is expressed in the requests from the
transport companies for new routes and tariff adjustments. These requests are made
to the Transport State Sub-secretariat (under SEDUOP), who sends them on to the
metropolitan Council for technical evaluation. In practice, requests are made directly
to the Council and, when there is a positive advice, they are then made official
through the formal channels. 
The Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport provides the Chair for the Tariff
Revisions Board, which comprises 6 members, including the chair: one
representative from the local authorities, one from the student associations, one
delegate from the Chamber of Commerce, one member of the labour union, and
one from the private concessionaires. But most of the decisions granted by the
Board have already been negotiated and prepared with the assistance of the Chair,
who helps facilitate agreements being reached. The Council makes use of its
information resources (statistics on numbers of passengers, feasibility studies, trip
characteristics, and so forth) to steer discussions towards its own objectives
(Research interview, 1999). Local authorities or unions have not produced
alternative sets of data capable of contesting the official set, so they tend to follow the
Council’s recommendations regarding technical arguments. Only when political
issues are at stake, such as avoiding student protests by keeping student fares
unchanged, or dealing with strong coalitions between permit-holders and
municipalities, or with counterparts to the council that have blockade potential
development, is the role of the council less prominent. 
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Table 7.5 - Urban Public Transport. Pricing: Types of intergovernmental co-ordination
Types of intergovernmental coordination, governance, and government
Relatively easy
1 Informal co-operation
3 Joint power agreements
4 Extraterritorial powers
5 Regional councils of government (COGs)
6 Federally encouraged single-purpose districts
7 State planning and development districts (SPDDs)
8 Contracting from private vendors
Source: Own analysis. Addapted from Meltcalfe (1994, p. 281)
2 Inter-local service agreements
Moderately difficult
9 Local special districts
10 Transfer of functions
11 Annexation
12 Regional special districts and authorities
13 Metropolitan multipurpose districts
14 Reformed urban county
Very Difficult
15 One-tier consolidation: city-county and area-wide consolidation
16 Two-tier restructuring: federal structures
17 Three-tier reform: metropolitan-wide structures
Table 7.6 - Urban Public Transport. Pricing: Policy Co-ordination Scale
Present
X
X
Source: Own analysis. Criteria addapted from Mitchell-Weaver et al (2000, p. 864)
and Walker (1987, p. 16)
9. Government strategy
8. Establishment of central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Searching for agreement among actors
4. Avoiding differences among actors
3. Consultation with other actors
2. Information exchange
1. Independent decision-making
Council X
X
Level of coordination. The level of coordination is intermediate; information is
exchanged, although there is a tendency to concentrate and monopolize this
information within the Council for Urban Transport. The Council’s desire to
promote an integrated system of fares is the binding force in the process. The
regional government therefore enforces cross-subsidizing. The local government
authorities are interested in participating in the process of fare adjustments, because
they have some leverage power, and because otherwise they could be overruled by
the Council (research interviews, 1999). They therefore find it better to say little
rather than nothing at all. Imposing itself on this element of urban transport is not a
goal of the Metropolitan Council for Transport. It prefers to use its powers in this
matter to persuade the local government authorities to collaborate in other transport-
related issues, such as road infrastructure, where they have more financial facilities
through inter-governmental authority transfers.
The level of coordination is intermediate, and intergovernmental coordination can
be typified as ‘moderately difficult’. That is to say, adequate coordination is achieved
with regard to the metropolitan territory, although with strong state level
intervention.
The underlying powers. The executive of the State Government is the primary
power behind the system for setting transport fares. Apart from technical
considerations regarding homogeneity and intermodal trips, controlling the price-
setting mechanisms is of great political value. The governor has a trump card in
hand at the negotiation table with the unions (permit holders), private firms
(concessionaires), student associations, and local government authorities. The
regional executive also capitalizes on the outcomes of the pricing decisions that
imply a benefit for the users (freezing tariffs, implementing subsidies, and so forth). 
The state government has an instrument for conducting business with permit
holders; this could be electoral support, or some other kind of political favour. For
concessionaires, it could be an opportunity for participatory activities (campaign
finance, interest groups, corruption, and so forth). The inclusion of members of
other levels of government in the tariffs revision board lends legitimacy and a
possible escape valve from undue influence from the regional executive office.
Basically, the Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport is a consulting body and is
exempted from control by other government branches (state legislative, the
judiciary). The way in which the decision-making process has been built up
minimizes the balancing input from other sources. 
Ruling on pricing and urban transport routes gives the Governor an indirect
instrument to influence urban development plans set up at the municipal level. The
approval or revision of routes and fares for new developments is an important factor
in achieving public transport accessibility. Falling off the line with the regional
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government could endanger the success of urban development plans proposed or
implemented independently by local government authorities. The political
differences between the Governor and the mayors in affiliation and projects play a
part here. 
Since this arrangement of power is assured through legislation, the mayors in
Monterrey follow the Metropolitan Council of Transport. There is no current attempt
to change the legal framework. The local government authorities concentrate their
efforts on the consolidation of their recently acquired powers in urban territorial
planning, while accepting regional rule on urban transport.
For the permit holders and concessionaires, this form of pricing development
through the metropolitan council gives them the comfort of having just one
counterpart to discuss prices and fares. Furthermore, local demands for
improvement in the service are diluted, because of the distance that is set in the
process between the communities (close to the municipal government), and the
providers of public transport (close to the regional government). 
Impacts. The arrangement by which the regional government remains in charge of
pricing policy and the local authorities are still at a distance from actual decision
power has impacts of two kinds on the metropolitan realm. First, pricing issues are
identified as state issues, although local governments are also involved. The
metropolitan character of the council diminishes this, but shows that there is an
intermediate territory that is not politically represented. The second impact is that
price arrangements are more sensitive to top-level agreements (supply level) than to
consumers’ demands. 
Metropolitan arrangements. The regional body in charge of urban transport, the
Metropolitan Council for Transport, is an institutionalized form of state government
involvement in controlling urban transport fares. The approach is top-down, and has
gained support from other actors, mainly the local government authorities, by
allowing for their participation in decision-making on transport fares. The clear
objectives of the Metropolitan Council for Transport and its mix of technical
expertise, coordinating role, discussion forum and, not least importantly, providing
political support from the state executive, allow this agency to run a policy of
transport fares that is metropolitan. Although the goals of multimodal transport,
unified tickets for all modes of transport, and homogenous tariffs have not yet been
achieved, the presence of this agency on all pricing decisions indicates the positive
attitude of local government authorities in Monterrey to a metropolitan system in
transport fares. 
In the event of a changing balance of power (giving more decision-power to
municipal government) it is unlikely that this initiative of searching for metropolitan
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consolidation would be abandoned. The positive experience is that the Metropolitan
Council for Urban Transport gives homogeneity in the work that it delivers in regard
to pricing to an otherwise heterogeneous system of transport (minibuses, buses,
metro) in nine different local authorities. On the negative side is the apparent
promotion of the rule of regional government on urban issues and urban actors
(local authorities, transport firms, METRORREY, unions), which could be viewed as
oppressive and might produce a reaction, leading to the fragmented allocation of
decision-power. 
7.4 Metropolitan arrangements
In this section the bottlenecks that constrain wider territorial arrangement in urban
transport are discussed. In the last part, the extent to which it is possible to have
formal metropolitan arrangements within urban public transport is argued, together
with the most important conditions for that to be feasible. These bottlenecks and
feasibility observations are returned to in the final chapter.
7.4.1 Bottlenecks
The institutional arrangements that could improve decision-making in urban public
transport in Monterrey have several bottlenecks. The loci of decision-making for
several components of this urban utility are relatively adequate in scale, since they
tend to be at government levels that cover more than one local authority. However,
coordination with other government authorities acting in the metropolitan area is
not optimal, with negative results in the final outcome of service provision.
Various levels of Coordination. For some elements of urban transport
(investments, planning) coordination among the actors is fragmented, with a
regional agency seeking to gather together efforts in the metropolitan area. For
pricing in urban transport, it is the ruling power of this same regional agency that
produces smoothly coordinated policy. These disparities tend to compensate each
other, where the Metropolitan Council of Urban Transport, which follows a
metropolitan policy for improvement in the sector, yields the gains.
Decline of metropolitan agencies. While other urban functions have in the past
been performed by regional or central government, urban transport is shifting
towards local governments. At the moment the Metropolitan Council for Urban
Transport has sufficient capacity to support coordination with other actors, but
conflicts are becoming apparent with respect to investments. The outcome of
planning at local level is very limited and regional involvement (through
METRORREY and the Metropolitan Council) is partially based on the exclusion of
local government authorities. In the same way, the pricing mechanism has been
artificially assigned to regional government by way of a legal framework that
excludes local government authorities; that is a legacy of previous intergovernmental
arrangements (pre-decentralization). 
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Conflict avoidance. All the local authorities would prefer to maintain the status
quo. They would rather leave urban transport issues in the hands of the regional
government than seek active participation elsewhere. The provision of urban
transport is undermined by controversial elements, such as sensitive price
negotiations, and the transport union as a powerful counterpart. For investment on a
metropolitan scale in urban transport, the local authorities are also reluctant to take
over control, because this move would involve a coordination capacity that they
would have to build up from scratch, or derive from the metropolitan Council.
7.4.2 Feasibility
There are good indications that Monterrey would keep decision-making
arrangements in urban transport appropriate to the metropolitan scale.
METRORREY and the Metropolitan Council for Transport – despite its uncertain
legitimacy – provide metropolitan involvement in urban transport in Monterrey.
The Metropolitan Council for Transport. In the context of decentralization,
Monterrey has come up with a strong agency that is adequate in terms of territory.
Its strength lies in the state legislation that ensures that urban transport decisions
are taken at state level. Its adequacy lies in the acknowledgement of the metropolitan
area as the logical level of action. It this way, the contradiction of a regional-level
agency acting on the metropolitan scale is resolved by specifying a metropolitan
mandate. Besides, being instrumental in the governor’s decisions has not prevented
this agency from building up the knowledge and capacity to facilitate coordination.
This indicates that the agency is prepared to operate in a less protected environment,
or at least complement its affiliation to regional government with a knowledge base. 
METRORREY and its role. The company responsible for the subway and light rail
transport is an element in urban transport in Monterrey that has a metropolitan
reach by design. The only system that is expected to cover the whole metropolitan
territory is METRORREY. It is in this sense – that of the metropolitan scale – that
METRORREY represents the basic network for the integration of the other modes of
transport that have limited city coverage. Any metropolitan arrangement should
capitalize on the METRORREY infrastructure and system to improve urban public
transport. Until now, the metropolitan Council has aimed to build up an integrated
system with the metro as the major network, improving coordination, intermodal
transfers, and with the clear objectives of “increasing the number of passengers (in
the metro system), increasing intermodal travel, and cultivating a new attitude
among users” (research interview at the Metropolitan Council for Transport, 1999).
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Note
1 Camiones panoramicos are often buses of recent manufacture (less that 7 years old). This feature
makes them the newest in town and they are easily recognized as a result. Their fare system is
more open than those applied to other routes, and therefore more expensive (30%). In practice,
every user knows that a trip in a panoramico will cost more that in other type of bus.
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Conclusions
In this chapter the basic propositions on which the research is based are revisited, a
summary of the findings of fieldwork and analysis of the case studies is presented,
and the research questions discussed in the light of the findings of the fieldwork;
finally, the general conclusions drawn are presented.
8.1 Theoretical standpoints
From the beginning of this study, every effort has been made to clarify the
standpoint taken on the issue of metropolitan government or governance (see
section 2.4.1). An important point for this research is that, for city governments,
metropolitan coordination is a relevant practice, because it produces more gains
than losses in economic, social, and political terms, and because it corrects scale
distortions in urban government practice. This line of argument is in agreement
with what Sharpe (1995a), Brenner (1999), Hall (1996), and Mohan (1994) have
observed regarding metropolitan government and re-territorialization processes. 
The second standpoint taken is that metropolitan coordination is best practised on a
set of urban utilities that corresponds to the metropolitan scale. The concept of
subsidiarity plays an important part in the conceptualization of the research. There
are certain functions that have a natural territorial scale, and these functions would
be better dealt with if the government agency responsible for them matched that
territorial scale. The functions that are generally assigned to the metropolitan level
are: urban transport, urban development planning (spatial planning), environmental
control/regulation, local economic development, and water and sanitation (Davey,
1996; IHS, 1996; Lefèvre, 1998; Sharpe, 1995). 
8.2 Fieldwork and case studies
Fieldwork took the form of a search in Caracas and in Monterrey for forms of
metropolitan coordination within their urban government structures. Each city is
considered representative of one particular Latin American class of city: Caracas as a
capital city and Monterrey as an export city. Not all metropolitan functions were
studied: only spatial planning and urban public transport. It was expected that, given
their relevance and policy impact at the metropolitan scale, conclusions could be
drawn from this limited set of functions about the dynamics of institutional change
and rearrangements within these metropolises, so that generalized observations could
be made about metropolitan government and its state in Latin American cities.
Forms of metropolitan government and coordination in spatial planning and urban
public transport were analysed according to the model described earlier (see section
2.4). The analysis first identified, then classified metropolitan arrangements, and
later specified the coordination capacities according to a referential scale. 
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For Caracas, physical planning and urban public transport were discussed in
chapters 4 and 5. For physical planning in Caracas, it was found that the main
bottlenecks were related to issues of scale definition, poor coordination among the
agencies concerned, the fragmentation of power, and antipathy between the agencies
(see 4.4.1). The main opportunities for improved coordination were found in a
sound fiscal decentralization programme including use of the metropolitan scale,
and the establishment of a formal coordination body on the metropolitan scale (see
4.4.2). In the case of urban public transport, the bottlenecks identified were: the
poor coordination of government agencies in dealing with strategic decisions; the
direct intervention of metropolitan agencies with special responsibilities (the subway
company); a tendency by the actors involved to avoid conflict and therefore avoid
taking decisions in the sector; the legacy of clientelism practices in and around
urban public transport (see 5.4.1). Positive developments were found in the
metropolitan character of the subway company CAMETRO (a clear exemplification
of the scale on which it is possible to build up effective public action) and the
growing awareness of local authorities of the need to coordinate for metropolitan
action (see 5.4.2).
For Monterrey, physical planning and urban public transport were discussed in
chapters 6 and 7. In the case of physical planning, there were several capacity issues
blocking metropolitan action. A lack of organizing and professional capacity, and the
heterogeneous levels of professional capacity found among different agencies
impede coordination. Furthermore, local authorities have other priorities besides
creating the coordination capacity for metropolitan functions. Local authorities are
mainly interested in consolidating the devolution of power from centralized
government. However, the legacy of a strong regional planning office challenges this
devolution that the municipal agencies demand. The energies and interests of local
government authorities in Monterrey are concentrated on the issue of bringing
devolution about. In general, the coordination scores were low in this context (see
6.4.1). Among the developments in the direction of metropolitan government found
during the research were the consensus about the definition of the metropolitan
territory which seem to be widely accepted by different actors, the application of
urban development programmes (housing and urban infrastructure) that take the
metropolitan area as their territory of action, and the opportunity for the regional
planning agency (SEDUOP) to redefine itself as a metropolitan agency. In this case,
SEDUOP can act as the stakeholder of metropolitan coordination, and as an
advocate for metropolitan government (see 6.4.2). 
For urban public transport in Monterrey, it was found that the coordination of
decision making on strategic action was dispersed, or that some elements of policy
were better coordinated that others (with ‘pricing’ better than ‘investment’). Also in
the context of extended devolution, the metropolitan agencies that support
coordination at this moment will lose ground. Moreover, as in Caracas, it was found
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that local authorities avoid conflicting issues regarding urban public transport
(mainly decisions affecting fare prices), preferring to maintain the status quo and
not pressing for shared decisions or coordination (see 7.4.1). On the positive side,
the metropolitan agencies now in place – the subway company METRORREY and
the Metropolitan Council for Transport – operate at the appropriate metropolitan
scale. They provide good starting points, in achievements and experience, for the
intensification of metropolitan coordination and the advocacy of metropolitan
government (see 7.4.2).
8.3 Research questions
Research in Caracas and Monterrey regarding the four fundamental research
questions (see also section 2.4.2) can be summarized as follows.
Are there relevant (existing) institutional arrangements with the ability/capacity to
respond to issues at the metropolitan scale? 
As stated earlier (section 2.4.2.) the occurrence of forms of metropolitan
governments is important for this research. The context in which these forms
operate and the aims of their policies were examined to see how they interact.
It is appropriate to state that, despite the institutional arrangements in force, there
are some outcomes that are adequate in metropolitan terms, at least in the urban
functions analysed in this study. The metropolitan scale is not ignored in the
delivery of the urban functions selected in either Caracas or Monterrey. However,
these outcomes are more the result of the gaps and openings in the present
institutional arrangements than a conscious search for institutions that can operate
efficiently at an adequate metropolitan scale. In Caracas, there is neither a
metropolitan planning agency nor a metropolitan urban transport agency. 
In Monterrey, the de facto metropolitan agency (SEDUOP) in charge of spatial
planning has been undermined by the devolution of power and responsibilities to
the local government authorities. The consequence is a decline in organizing
capacity on the metropolitan scale. For urban transport, an ad-hoc agency acting with
regional government support has the responsibility of coordinating urban transport
on the metropolitan scale, but in practice the agency is outplayed when political
interests are affected.
Urban government authorities in these cities have a strong tendency to operate
within the authority given them by the legal framework (including statutory duties
and responsibilities, legislation, court decisions) and less authority is derived from
coalitions or coordinated action. The legal framework is a combination of
constitutional law, which defines administrative subdivisions and legislation
demarcating the responsibilities of each government authority, and decentralization
policy, which establishes intergovernmental transfers and devolution programmes.
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Seeking and formalizing agreements across the metropolitan territories between
different government authorities is less institutionalized and is often a by-product of
a particular agency’s agenda.
Are there new emerging institutional arrangements that respond to the problem at the
metropolitan level? 
In the research involving the case studies, new developments (agencies, coalitions,
and so forth) were identified and described. These new developments operating in
these cities were related to the forms of coalitions, agreements, and coordination in
the metropolitan public functions that had an agency form not yet defined in the
ruling institutional structure. Within these forms, it was possible to detect working
agreements among government agencies in the selected urban functions and cities
that provide metropolitan answers to city problems. 
In Caracas, there is an initiative to consolidate urban physical planning and other
elements of urban management under a strategic plan that would act as a
metropolitan agreement between all the actors involved in spatial planning.
Although this agreement has not yet reached its full potential, the fact that there is
an institution [Fundación Plan Estratégico de Caracas] that is working towards this
goal is a positive development. Moreover, there has been a growing interest in
consolidating urban spatial planning by way of constitutional reform, legislation
leading to the reform, or even the creation of an intermediate level of government
that would take on urban spatial planning as one of its tasks: a metropolitan district.
It has however to be admitted that these initiatives only reflect the interests of some
actors in finding an adequate form of authority to deal with the urban problems that
are manifest on a metropolitan scale. No actual working agreements between
agencies in urban spatial planning were found during the fieldwork.
For urban transport, the situation is similar. There were expectations that the
strategic plan of Caracas would bring more authority to urban government
authorities on this sector. In practice, public urban transport is delivered without
regard for metropolitan scale arguments. Nevertheless, public transportation is still
perceived as a sector where government intervention is unavoidable. The reasons for
this include the economies of scale for infrastructure and urban public transport
investments, and the social-political component (subsidies, impact on household
income). But great inefficiencies in the delivery of urban public transportation have
not been prevented. In Caracas, these inefficiencies occur because of the fragmented
government and lack of coordination; sector policies are implemented in an
uncoordinated and inefficient fashion. It is remarkable that in the case of a system
of mass-transportation such as the Metro, a conscious choice has been made to
operate in parallel and without any coordination with other modes of transport
serving the city. As a result, routes and services are duplicated, but CAMETRO and
the central government seem to consider this duplication less troublesome and
more efficient from a technical and economic viewpoint.
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In Monterrey, physical planning is moving from central and regional government
domination to fragmented management scattered at the municipal level. The speed
of the process of devolution has created a vacuum and a lack of capacity in the old
agencies to assume the new roles involving adaptation and change. In Monterrey, a
dominant agency at metropolitan scale – SEDUOP – has been stripped of its
decision powers in spatial planning, and now has to compete with municipal
agencies. SEDUOP’s role as an agency capable of coordinating, or at least
facilitating, metropolitan action has not been achieved, since it has been unable to
break free from the infighting involved in its attempts to hold on to its previous
dominant status. No other agencies or planning departments at the different local
authorities of Monterrey have been able to show any progress towards metropolitan
arrangements.
The state of physical planning in Monterrey is one of growing fragmentation.
Planning operates in a context of decentralization put into place against a
background of power struggles between the regional and local governments.
Remarkably, such struggles did not start in the administration of public urban
transport. It is not the case here of an emerging institutional arrangement that deals
with decisions of metropolitan scale. In Monterrey there is an existing institution –
the Metropolitan Council of Urban Transport – that has resisted the transformation
of urban government, seeking to retain its role as a metropolitan agency regardless
of the re-assignments of powers between central, regional, and local governments.
Even though the Metropolitan Council of Urban Transport is a subsidiary
organization of the regional government, local government authorities in
Monterrey’s metropolitan area have not pressed for more decision power in urban
public transport as they have for spatial planning. 
What is found is that institutional arrangements in urban functions of metropolitan
reach are produced outside the opportunities provided by the legal framework (that
is to say,. these metro arrangements are not specified within the legal framework
that defines other scales of governments). Both existing and emerging arrangements
evolve and maintain their power positions without undergoing any legal
formalization (defined, assigned exclusive responsibilities). For example, in Caracas
the city government is moving towards metropolitan coordination, as indicated by
the expectations associated with the strategic plan of solving fragmentation by
providing a coordinating institution. The strategic plan is an institutional form that
was not foreseen in the current legal framework. For instance, the main law
organizing municipal government (The Municipal Government Act) proposes other
institutional forms (metropolitan district, municipal associations) to carry out
metropolitan tasks. 
In the case of Monterrey, the dominance of regional government in urban public
transport and the metropolitan form of this dominance (an existing arrangement,
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which is largely incidental and not structural), points to a balance of power for this
function that is unrelated to other urban functions (such as spatial planning), and
independent of the legal framework that establishes municipal authority. The
authority is metropolitan – in any case adequate according to the metropolitan scale
– although there is no legal justification for a metropolitan agency to be responsible
for a sector (The Council for Urban Transport).
In Caracas, development in the last fifteen years or so (from 1989 onwards) of the
processes of decentralization and devolution has proved to be unidirectional.
Centralized decision-making has been shared out into decision-making by several
sub-national government authorities (regional or local). But moving in the opposite
direction, from scattered decision-making power to a centralized form (on the
metropolitan scale) is very difficult. The relative ease of movement towards
fragmentation is also seen in physical planning in Monterrey, where local authorities
were keen to lay claim to key decision-making powers when the new Act came into
force, while the regional agency (SEDUOP) viewed the process as an irreversible loss
of coordination capacity (although their main concern was loss of decision power
and political influence).
In Monterrey, it was found that some existing institutional arrangements or old
institutions provided adequate capacity for metropolitan action. An example is the
Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport. Institutional systems with a metropolitan
reach are resilient when they derive from upper level government initiatives backed
by swift access to finance and transfers. It might be the case that existing agencies or
arrangements such as the Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport are more
relevant than emerging collaborative efforts. Decentralization and devolution could
become unidirectional in the redistribution of power and functions, but there is the
risk of bringing about unnecessary fragmentation of decision-making power.
However, intermediate steps in the decentralization process on the appropriate
scales of action could yield adequate responses. In Monterrey, the failure of the
devolution of the urban transport authority to local government authorities has
obstructed the development of local government capacities. This failure could also
be seen as a failure to enforce the constitutional principles, or general national
strategies of decentralization. The Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport is an
institution whose actions and benefits are concentrated on the metropolitan territory
of Monterrey, a major difference from other institutional arrangements found in the
study. An incomplete devolution of power has left an agency that is metropolitan in
scale and concern.
What is the performance of these (existing or emerging) arrangements with regard to
decision-making on processes at the metropolitan scale? 
Economic, political, and spatial transformations (as described in 2.4.1.) affect urban
government structures. To be able to respond to these pressures and deliver better
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public services, urban government authorities have to set their strategic decisions on
a territorial dimension and on a medium to long-term perspective. During the
fieldwork and its analysis, two elements were viewed as performance indicators of
the current metropolitan arrangements: the Metropolitan territorial adequacy for
decision-making, and the timeframe of decision-making. 
Decision-making for the selected functions in Caracas and Monterrey fails to cover
the major metropolitan territory. In the majority of cases, there is little coordination
of the various government authorities and actors. The present institutional
arrangements lack the coverage of a territory that corresponds to metropolitan
dynamics. Decisions made regarding physical planning, or urban public transport,
are not effective over the whole territory of the city. The results of decisions made are
scattered and unrelated, reflecting administrative subdivisions, or incidental
coalitions between urban government authorities. Even though most of the
metropolitan arrangements encountered were specifically designed for larger
territorial scales (the strategic plan for Caracas, Council for Urban Transport in
Monterrey), they have failed to secure any effective follow-up to their strategic
decisions, having come into conflict with empowered local, regional, or central
government authorities. For the actors involved in the support of metropolitan
arrangements, the appropriate scale can be obtained by one of two different means.
On the one hand, the opportunities brought about by decentralization can be
exploited if the actors involved are able to constitute a metropolitan organization for
the government of the city within the statutory scales or levels. On the other hand,
territorial adequacy can be achieved by centralization, consolidating fragmented
tasks and responsibilities under metropolitan agencies, thereby bringing back
intermediate levels of government into the system. 
The low scores in all the case studies for the coordination of decision-making
provide food for thought. First, intergovernmental coordination is perceived and
practised as if it were a voluntary action. Second, coordination is optional both in
Caracas and Monterrey for the selected elements (spatial planning, urban public
transport) of urban government. For the practitioners of physical planning acting in
the different planning agencies in Caracas, the coordination of decision-making is
not relevant, and it is not an important issue in urban public transport either, where
local government authorities tend to let things carry on in the entrenched manner.
In Monterrey, intergovernmental coordination is the last item on the agenda for local
government authorities, either because they seek more power (as in the case of
spatial planning), or because they encounter a stronghold of regional-metropolitan
power that they are unable to break through (as in the case of urban public
transport). In addition to this, metropolitan coordination has no foundation in
current urban management practice. Management capacities that support
metropolitan coordination – horizontal coordination, consensus building,
information sharing, and so forth – are not part of the culture of the organizations
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in charge of urban government. Sub-national levels of government tend to reproduce
the vertical structures encountered in central government (Davey, 1996; McGill,
1998). Decentralization is then a modern idea implemented in organizations bound
down by old practices (De la Cruz, 1995). Finally, metropolitan coordination has a
short time span, which results from the inability of urban government authorities to
draw up agreements within their terms of administration. 
What bottlenecks can be observed for these metropolitan arrangements? 
In the previous questions, the presence of metropolitan arrangements has been
considered either as a product of the current institutional frameworks acting in
Caracas and Monterrey, or as new arrangements evolving from informal agreements
and coalitions. Furthermore, the performance of these arrangements has been
examined against their actual territorial coverage and long-term impact. Taking a
further step forward, a number of major bottlenecks affecting the performance of
these metropolitan arrangements were observed during the course of research. The
findings are presented below.
The major bottlenecks hindering metropolitan arrangements are the legal
restrictions imposed on coalition forming and metropolitan coverage implicit in the
framework of the legislation, the statutory responsibilities, and the court rulings and
decisions in Venezuela and Mexico. These restrictions obstruct the formalization of
metropolitan government and metropolitan governance initiatives. This obstruction
is reinforced by the practice of executives and officers waiting for unambiguous legal
frameworks before embarking on further action. There are often lively expectations
that a new political structure for the city will be capable of resolving the metropolitan
problems (that is, creating a metropolitan government, a metropolitan district, and
so forth), and waiting on these as yet unfulfilled expectations discourages the taking
of initiatives to build coordination on a metropolitan scale with the resources already
at hand. The search for adequate government action in metropolitan areas in Latin
America is met with the traditional legalistic approach to institutional change. In
general, most Latin American political institutions (head of state, political parties,
legislatures, judiciaries) resort to the creation or replacement of political hierarchies
to produce change. The expectation that a new constitution, a new piece of
legislation, or a new decree would consolidate the wishes of the actors involved in an
effective structure is typical. This assertion coincides with the view expressed by
Borja (1996), who observed that in Latin American cities, there is a primacy of
hierarchical relationships above the contractual associations of the government
authorities acting in metropolitan areas. Waiting for an hierarchical solution holds
back improvements in the actual situation, or the use of other routes to achieve
metropolitan coordination, namely the building up of consensus, agreements, trade-
offs, intergovernmental coalitions, and so forth
The metropolitan scale also coincides with the territory of conflict between the
different levels of government. Central, regional, and local government authorities
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are constantly repositioning themselves within a (still unfinished) process of
decentralization. Assuming that these processes are ‘conflicts’ in an
intergovernmental arena (lack of coordination in physical planning in Caracas,
unlawful authority in urban public transport in Monterrey), they become bottlenecks
hindering the search for metropolitan government. But this struggle around the
question of territory, scale, and authority in these cities confirms the importance of
the metropolitan scale in the re-territorialization of the state. If these findings are
seen as re-territorialization processes in Caracas and Monterrey, remembering that
there are similar conditions of intergovernmental relationships in other Latin
American cities, it is plausible that Brenner’s (1999) argument – globalization as re-
territorialization – is applicable in Latin America. Brenner based his arguments on
the analysis of urban governance in the European Union. His argument is
applicable in the sense that these events, whether in Europe or Latin America, do
not differ in the effect they have on state organizations (re-scaling, re-
territorialization). However, the motivations of the different levels of government in
Caracas and Monterrey to re-define their territory and authority with respect to other
government authorities is founded on political reasons (gaining authority, re-
election, visibility) rather than on “an economic logic of maximizing the
competitiveness” (Brenner, 1999). In any case, no such economic reason for
competitiveness was revealed in the interviews held in Caracas and Monterrey. 
The various initiatives for collaboration (the strategic plan, and a metropolitan
district in Caracas; the Metropolitan Council for Urban Transport, and the Urban
Settlements Act in Monterrey) are put forward to gain power, influence, or finance
from other levels of government. The primary intention of these initiatives is not to
establish scale-effective levels of government or collaboration; this would be fully in
line with Brenner’s argument. For the existing governments, subsidiarity is good as
long as no new levels of government appear to come along with new scales, which
could displace power positions. The hierarchical structures of government in the city
are therefore maintained. The leap forward towards formal metropolitan
government is often favoured, but never taken. Caracas and Monterrey are no more
successful in these initiatives than the four megacities in the region (Mexico City,
Sao Paolo, Buenos Aires, Lima), where Ward (1996, p. 61) has already observed that
there is little achievement by consultative bodies as possible forums for metropolitan
coordination: “A (second) source of coordination, at least in theory, comes from the
consultative bodies which have been established in all four megacities to improve
communication between the different administrative units. In practice, however,
these bodies achieve little, because they threaten existing power structures within
each administrative area.” 
The legacy of previous national policies based on urban growth and territorial
development, with their emphasis on seeking urban deconcentration, and which
sought a balanced territorial development for the whole country and the
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development of economic poles, still plays a part in the culture of the organizations
in charge of urban management (Jungemann, 1996). Big cities are still seen in
pejorative terms, and a metropolitan government represents the acceptance of the
continued existence of a large urban agglomeration, so that metropolitan
government is perceived as a pro-city approach. This attitude is extremely relevant
when central government support is needed to push forward metropolitan
arrangements. National governments and political elites are usually in favour of
decentralization; they have at least accepted the prospect of sharing power, but they
are still uncertain about the urbanization processes. On the wave of decentralization,
urban policy with regard to the development of spatial planning, settlements, and
infrastructure has weakened and has gradually been abandoned as a government
task. This breakdown has already been denounced by Garza (1999); he points to the
progressive withdrawal of national government from spatial planning in Mexico in
favour of a more liberal policy. This withdrawal has produced a collapse of national
policy for territorial development. Negrón (1997) arrives at similar conclusions in
his discussion of the Venezuelan situation of spatial planning following state
reform. This traditional bias against urban agglomerations in national spatial
planning institutions, and the dramatic withdrawal of national governments from
spatial planning in many Latin American countries as part of their state reform
programmes, represent a bottleneck to the establishment of metropolitan
government or metropolitan arrangements. Support from central government for
territorial development – for which metropolitan regions are a relevant scale – is not
a clear national policy. The political and tactical rationale of decentralization
(reforming the state) does not correspond with the long-term policy and strategic
issues of setting up, or consolidating a system of cities. 
The electoral value of the urban vote explains the conflicts between the various
government levels. Caracas and Monterrey are primate cities at national and state
levels respectively. The electoral base of Caracas or Monterrey enables public
servants to aspire to political posts that exert power and authority over a larger
territory than that of Caracas or Monterrey. The political system – based on the
exertion of control over an urban electorate and therefore dependent on urban
primacy – becomes contradictory when reforms are introduced which aim to change
the configuration of urban government institutions. At the lower level of
government, new actors – municipal governments, community leaders, opposition
parties – compete to take charge of the empowered municipal governments. At the
higher levels of government – that is to say, those that have been decentralized – the
tendency is to oppose this power dilution. In the struggle for political power in
urbanized Latin America, technical scale issues are not the top priorities, although it
is from these issues that the metropolitan scale derives its rationale. Turning this
statement around: the scale issue – and mainly the metropolitan scale problem – is
neither convenient nor persuasive enough to be a decisive argument for change for
the political parties in power. 
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8.4 Towards metropolitan government
What has been found and analysed in Caracas and Monterrey shows that urban
government produces responses that deal with problems of a metropolitan scale.
Within the present rigid structures there is room for by-pass arrangements, top-
down impositions, the takeover of responsibilities (or the alternative: neglect of
responsibilities), temporary agreements, and so forth. These institutional
arrangements are produced outside the legal institutional framework. They run
parallel to the legislative provision of the distribution of powers and responsibilities.
Despite bottlenecks and a lack of statutory responsibilities and institutional
structures (districts, legislation, constitutions), the government authorities in these
cities have managed to acquire quasi-metropolitan institutional arrangements to
coordinate or deliver some of their responsibilities. The weak foundation of
metropolitan government lies in this partial delivery and quasi-metropolitan
situation, together with the lack of legal instruments to contain, incorporate, or
support these initiatives.
8.4.1 The metropolitan debate
The initial assumptions made in this study lead to the assertion that the imminence
of the metropolitan scale in the urban government authorities of these cities is
related to the new roles of cities in Latin America: their strengthened position within
their national urban systems, and their consolidation as nodes in an international
system of cities, as a result of economic liberalization (Hall, 1996; Sassen, 1994).
But the main sources of pressure and support for metropolitan action in Caracas or
Monterrey included these factors only as a general justification, or in long-term
visions formulated in election programmes, or by organizations with little formal
power (as in the case of the Foundation for the Strategic Plan of Caracas). What
makes metropolitan arrangements cohere in these cities, whatever their form, is that
they are political contractual constructions that provide some kind of effective
decision-making power on urban issues in these main cities. 
The other sources of support for metropolitan arrangements are technical
considerations about the convenience of an adequate scale for certain urban public
functions. At some point in the process, the technical argument for metropolitan
intervention wins the support of the political ranks and then becomes
institutionalized. 
Metropolitan arrangements in Caracas and Monterrey evolve with the support of
these two fundamentals: a) the political will, where an intermediate (metropolitan)
agency becomes the negotiation instrument between different government levels; b)
a fortuitous momentum gained by technical arguments, the legacies of previous
government arrangements, or the avoidance of scale problems. The logic of
competitiveness for the emergence of metropolitan government does not dominate.
In their article “The Growing Localness of the Global City,” Persky and Wiewel
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(1994, p. 131) wrote: “The new metropolis may well prove more ‘local’ than the old
one.” From the findings in Caracas and Monterrey it can be added that metropolitan
governance is still driven by national and local circumstances.
Caracas and Monterrey, as cities engaged in the processes of the re-scaling and re-
territorialization of their government institutions, have undoubtedly arrived at the
threshold of the metropolitan scale. This position is evident from the goodwill
shown towards metropolitan arrangements and the nature of their urban problems.
Caracas and Monterrey are contemporary urban regions where the multiplicity of
geographical scales (Brenner, 1999) is still unresolved.
From his investigation of Latin American megacities and his experience of area-wide
government styles in North America and Europe, Ward recommends that for Latin
American cities of this kind there should be “one authority for the whole city over
certain metro-wide concerns” (Ward, 1996). This recommendation, however valid
and well supported by this study, does not specify the difficulties of constructing
such an authority. These difficulties are rooted in the institutional culture and the
characteristics of reform in Latin America. 
In a totally different approach, Mohan (1994, p. 238-239) advocates fragmented
government on the basis fn his study of Bogota, asserting: “Fragmented structure
made up of powerful public service agencies is probably well suited to the needs of a
rapidly expanding city.” He closes the argument with this assertion: “It is quite
possible that a tight, more centralized governmental system might have performed
less well in the context of a rapidly growing city.” (Mohan, 1994) No confirmation of
his observation can be found from the evidence from Caracas and Monterrey in
physical planning and urban public transport. In Caracas, fragmented structures are
ill-suited to deal with urban public transport, however powerful and autonomous an
agency such as Metro de Caracas (CAMETRO) might be. Urban public transport
coordination in Caracas is ineffective in the metropolitan area, because of
fragmentation and also because of the isolation in which an agency such as
CAMETRO tends to operate. As for the case of Monterrey, the rapid dispersion of
know-how and professional capacity, the disparate goals, expectations, and
implementation of physical planning after the approval of the Urban Settlements
Act in 1999 (which opened the door to the fragmentation of physical planning to
municipal units) has led directly to a situation of bottlenecks, delays, overlapping
procedures, and unregulated growth that could hardily be considered an
improvement. Additionally, Mohan’s argument implies that most of the initiatives
towards collaboration and coordination on a metropolitan scale taken by municipal
government authorities (and other agencies involved in the city) are futile, while this
is the issue where this study has found relevant developments towards more
effective government of the metropolis.
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There are certain metropolitan government arrangements in Caracas and Monterrey.
Metropolitan government could be strengthened in these cities, as a way of dealing
with the problems that are unavoidable on the geographical scale of the metropolis.
Moreover, the conditions found in these cities in the practice of urban management
have shown that there is sufficient concern about the territorial dimension of many of
the problems confronted by the city government. The metropolitan scale is visible and
real for those involved in the delivery of urban public goods. Neither the prescriptions
of Ward nor the sceptic views of Mohan can preclude that from happening. 
What this study confirms is that the primacy of hierarchical relations above
contractual relations in intergovernmental affairs and cultures substantially damages
the accomplishments of urban management goals and the level of well-being enjoyed
in the cities. Metropolitan government conflicts in the power struggle with
established hierarchies, and the only method that has been applied in Latin American
countries to change hierarchical structures is to introduce or impose new structures. 
Proposing and implementing a metropolitan form of government, or setting up a
system of metropolitan governance for Caracas, Monterrey, or any other Latin
American city, is not so much a matter of setting up a new power hierarchy for the
city that includes an intermediate level between central and local government; rather,
it is a matter of developing the ability to learn from the practice of intergovernmental
cooperation. A change of strategy would seem to be preferable to the substitution of
structures to be subjected to the interactions that already take place. The process of
reform – which propelled municipalization in the first place – also implies a shift
into a different mode, namely that of producing transformations from the
‘reformed’ institutions (what Campbell at the World Bank calls ‘the third generation
reform’. Campbell, 1997). 
The transformation of city government – fragmented, interlocked, ineffective, and
alien to its territory – into an effective, flexible metropolitan government would have
to be supported by parallel national government action in a way that does not ignore
the alliances, coordination efforts, and informal agreements that have dealt with the
metropolitan scale so far. In this process, the policy coordination scale and the types
of intergovernmental coordination introduced in this study could play a role as
assessment instruments.
Metropolitan government authorities and systems of metropolitan governance in
Latin America do not differ much from those present in Europe or North America
(Brenner, 1999; Newman, 2000). The competitiveness argument of the need for
metropolitan government authorities will probably gain ground in Latin American
cities during the next few years, and evidence may start to build up, although for this
study other arguments were at stake in Caracas and Monterrey. In any case, the need
for urban government structures with a metropolitan reach will not decline. 
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8.4.2 Challenges for metropolitan government
In this context of the increasing metropolitanization of Latin American urban areas,
it is clear from this research that the main task is to develop an alternative approach
to government re-scaling and re-territorialization to those of just changing
hierarchies. Basically, the government authorities acting in the city have to
acknowledge the multiple scales of their duties and identify those that need to be
shared; they must also develop mechanisms whereby this sharing is fiscal and
politically feasible. National governments should support these developments with
appropriate legislation so as to untangle any unnecessary constraints, with
corresponding fiscal provisions to give strength to the resulting institutions, and to
take the lead when necessary.
The difficulties accompanying recommendations such as those of Ward (1996) for
one “authority across the city” lie at the centre of the problem. There are important
political challenges for metropolitan government. However, institutional reform in
Latin America has not stopped, despite serious delays produced by political turmoil,
such as the institutional crises in Peru, Ecuador, or Venezuela in the latter part of the
1990s. Similarly, other countries are confronted by difficult political horizons, the
result of long-term developments such as the guerrilla wars in Colombia, the perils
of MERCOSUR for Brazil and Argentina that impact on the economy and political
structures of those countries. In Mexico, signs of change in the political spectrum
(an alternative party in power after more that seventy years) test the foundations of
political reform and democracy. But in any case, political decentralization has not
receded. Elections for public servants at regional and local level have not been
eliminated, regional and local government authorities are slowly gaining and
consolidating powers over revenue and expenditure, and new forms of coordination
between government authorities and agencies are evolving, as has been found in
this research. Thus, for the national context, the momentum for reform has not
diminished and could provide an opportunity for metropolitan government to be
established. The difficulties lie in the political resistance to hierarchical change. The
introduction of scale – whether on a technical, geographical, or urban rationale basis
– implies a revision of current institutional hierarchies. It has been found that
current arrangements are based in old administrative subdivisions, clientelism
practices that foster fragmentation, and the initial need (at the beginning of the
decentralization process) to give legitimacy to the whole national political system
(Rojas, 2000). Introducing scale – and therefore the clearly present metropolitan
scale – for the definition and resolution of government in Latin American cities
entails new subdivisions. Fragmentation must be avoided for urban metropolitan
functions (in fact, the fine-tuning of subsidiarity is needed), and the whole political
system must realize that effective government in the metropolis is as important for
institutional legitimacy as for improved political representation. 
New subdivisions, avoiding fragmentation, and gaining political consensus with
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respect to metropolitan effectiveness are tough challenges for central governments,
legislatures, regional and local government, and interest groups. It has been stated
elsewhere (Paiva, 2001) that new legislation enacting new hierarchies and
metropolitan government authorities (as was recently the case in Caracas, after the
fieldwork for this study had been completed) is not enough. Top-down imposition
fails to recognize (let alone compensate for) the damage suffered by established
political power, current public service efficiencies, or the best practices found in
metropolitan areas. This research study has encountered a pool of initiatives and
arrangements that already reflect power games in metropolitan areas, whether a
capital city such as Caracas or an export-oriented agglomeration such as Monterrey,
that are built on best practices or tend to find some efficiency levels. 
To build up metropolitan governments in Latin American cities is a challenge for
state reform, because building on experiences is required. This round of reform is
different from the first, where the structure followed a blueprint derived from
existing models (Campbell, 1997). Further experience is available now that those
models have been realized and have undergone mutation into institutional forms
such as those found in this research. Not only does the metropolitan scale form part
of an academic debate; it has also emerged in the practice of government, as Caracas
and Monterrey exemplify. Improvement of the government institutions acting in the
city has to pass through a combination of vision – which identifies the metropolitan
scale as a relevant goal and that is assumed by central government – and experience,
which guarantees that current coordination development and local government
initiatives are not omitted. This is a new stage of decentralization that includes the
metropolitan scale more deliberately, and that balances between top-down steering
and bottom-up inclusion.
The emergence and consolidation of urban government structures with a
metropolitan reach imply deep political and institutional changes. In Latin America,
it is a challenge that goes beyond the scale and inhabitants of the city; it tests the
strength and vision of the State, and it demands bolder transformations than those
of the firsts round of reform. Re-founding the government of the city in its territory
is now called for, because the territory of the local and the global shapes are
themselves urban and metropolitan. 
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Appendix I: Data collection plan
The data collection plan for the Caracas and Monterrey case studies includes
documents and interviews. The sources and uses of this data and some relevant
remarks are listed below.
The rationale of this plan was to ascertain at what level decisions on metropolitan
functions are made. The decisions considered relevant were those most likely to affect
the position of the city in the national urban system in terms of economic importance
in the context previously referred to (liberalization, globalization, state reform). For
what are referred to here as metropolitan functions, some are urban utilities: a) urban
transport; b) water/sanitation; and some are regulatory and planning functions: a)
environmental control/regulation, b) local economic development c) urban
development planning. For the utilities, decisions on pricing, investment and
maintenance are considered particularly relevant as against decisions on production,
distribution, or provision. For regulatory and planning functions, the enforcement of
regulations and investment decisions are considered relevant.
Furthermore, what kinds of bottleneck constrain the outcome of these decisions?
Finally, consideration of these two elements (level where decisions are made;
bottlenecks) was expected to yield the basic relevant data for the analysis of the
metropolitan arrangements and options, and later to provide answers to the
research’s questions.
Documents: Statistics
Sources: Annual Statistics, Central Government compilations and, where available,
regional and local compilations.
Use: To establish the demographic and economic dimensions of the case study.
Remarks: Statistics are usually arranged according to political-administrative
divisions. City and metropolitan observations are rare. It was considered probable
that a derivation of the actual observations to city and/or metropolitan realms would
have to be undertaken.
Documents: laws and ordinances
Sources: Compilations of legislation, ordinance publications, for Central and Local
government.
Use: To establish the formal institutional arrangements now functioning in the case
study. Particular attention to be paid to:
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a) the assignment of metropolitan functions (what each level of government does/ is
entitled to do);
b) the decision-making power concerning those functions (pricing, investment,
maintenance, regulation enforcement);
c) the general structure of service provision;
d) the territorial dimension.
Remarks: The theoretical framework intervenes here directly: the selection and
definition of metropolitan functions, decision-making at selected stages, the
definition of metropolitan territory. 
Documents: Resolutions, documents related to meetings, protocols
Source: Municipal archives, concession documents for central and local government,
according to structure.
Use: To facilitate examination of the practical execution of formal arrangements (as
seen on the previous data). Attention paid to:
a) the form of service delivery (direct production and provision, coordination,
concessions, contracting out, etc);
b) the territorial coverage;
c) the decision-making process (pricing, investment, maintenance, regulation
enforcement).
Interviews: Mayors, municipal managers, planners, managers of utilities, governors.
Source: As above, for local authorities, state government, utility companies,
planning offices, mayoral office staff.
Use: In interviews to:
a) ascertain the institutional arrangements;
b) explore the internal mechanics of the arrangements (procedures, communication,
collaborations, coordination, negotiations) involved in decision-making;
c) detect the perceived and actual bottlenecks of decision-making.
Remarks: This phase of data collection could be isolated or coupled with the
previous data, used to map the institutional arrangement on metropolitan functions
and the key position in those maps for decision-making.
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Appendix II: 
Research Themes/interviews
The plan of activities involving data collection on study locations depends on
selected research themes. These themes were derived from the focus of the research,
emphasizing the areas of interest for the study. In addition, these research themes
set the tone for activities such as the interviews and questionnaires conducted
during the fieldwork.
The plan was to identify the people and officials to be interviewed through a review
of the institutional framework operating in each city and in each function. The aim
of this review was to ascertain the key positions concerning such strategic actions as:
definition of goals, decision-making, coordination, monitoring and evaluation.
Second, but no less important, was the identification of the actors carrying special
weight in the delivery of these public goods (community leaders, long-term mayors,
promoters of metropolitan issues, and so forth). The key to the identification of
these persons was to be found in the preliminary consultations with experts in the
selected cities with close experience with the topic, the institutions, and the city. In
this regard, the expertise sought in the supporting research institutions was relevant.
The main themes chosen for the interviews were:
1. Territorial dimension
2. Goal strategies
3.Coordination
4. Management
5. Bottlenecks
II. 1 Themes
Territorial dimension
The conversations with counterparts were designed to provide opportunities for
them to state, or elaborate on, their perceptions of the territory involved in their
actions. This perceived territory was considered to be more capable than the
administratively defined territory of revealing the level up to which a metropolitan
territory was assumed and addressed by institutional action. Moreover, the
administrative definition within which an institution (agency, local government,
planning office, and so forth) operates needs to be set against the metropolitan
territory or functional region.
Goals and Strategies
Goals and strategies can be considered relevant themes for discussion, since they
reflect the medium and long-term vision of the institution approached. It was
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supposed that, depending on the level of action (central, regional, or local) some
goals would correspond to certain scales, but the research interest was to detect any
variation in scale related to a wider metropolitan scale. 
Coordination
What are the channels and processes through which coordination take place? Do
they proceed in a top-down or bottom-up direction? Where are the decisions
concerning projects and their financing made? Who, finally, holds the purse strings? 
Certain elements of coordination within the sectors (urban planning, urban
transport), and across sectors provided themes of interest for the interviews. These
could yield evidence of ad hoc metropolitan action, strategic alliances, and so forth.
A discussion theme facilitates the determination of emerging developments. It was
assumed that some of the agencies involved were responding to demands related to
a metropolitan area (accessibility, land use, and so forth) and their efforts to deliver
would move them towards arrangements with other agencies and actors.
Coordination problems were also of interest.
Management
The discussions of management issues were designed to concentrate on the culture
of an organization, its orientation (client agency, effectiveness, efficiency) and the
ways in which these features facilitated coordination and goal sharing. Surveying the
different profiles of the organizations involved in the provision of urban functions
was expected to provide an indication of the quality of their interaction.
Bottlenecks
During the interviews, it was planned to give all the counterparts the opportunity to
identify the major bottlenecks encountered in the execution of their mandate.
Comments on bottlenecks regarding metropolitan coordination and territorial
definitions were to be introduced into the discussions. It was anticipated that this
inventory of bottlenecks would give a picture of where the territorial-administrative
dimension of problems could be identified, providing relevant information for the
research.
II. 2 Functions
Urban planning
For urban development planning (physical planning) three elements were identified:
the institutional framework, management, and control. 
Framework
The plan was to support the research about the institutional framework with
documents, laws, and procedures. The layout of a function in the different
administrative levels could be identified within an institutional framework. This
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framework could make clear the agreements concerning competencies, authorities
and functions with regard to who was responsible or provided endorsement.
Basically, this plan was designed to clarify the formal structure of planning in the
metropolitan area regarding decision-making.
Normally, the relevant legislation predetermines competencies/responsibilities;
these comprise the distribution of tasks, resources and power. An understanding is
needed of which tasks are assigned to which levels (national, state, local), with what
resources, and with what degree of power within the metropolitan area. Normative
functions (planning, legal proposals, ordinances) and their corresponding
implementation instruments (regulations, permits, taxes) have priority at this stage
over more physical functions such as housing and infrastructure delivery, which are
sometimes performed by planning offices or related agencies within the public
sector.
Furthermore, the characteristic features of the institutional configuration require
consideration. Are the authorities appointed or elected? To whom are they
accountable?
In addition, the tasks assigned to the different levels have different characteristics.
The impact of planning and design actions differs from that of implementation
actions, calling different actors into play, or demanding participation of a different
kind. The functions of strategic relevance for the metropolitan area are: strategic
planning, land use, housing development and the coordination of infrastructure
investments.
Management
With the framework for the metropolitan area of study established, information
about the management of this urban function could be collected. Essentially, this
‘management’ refers to the ability to get things done: meeting development goals,
for example. Goals for strategic planning, land use, housing development and the
coordination of infrastructure investments had to be observed. At what level of the
institutional framework are they proposed? Who is responsible for following up
developments in the direction of the goal? Who is responsible for implementation?
What kind of coordination is carried out? What is the territorial range of these goals?
Where are the perceived bottlenecks?
The detection and description of the metropolitan tendencies in the urban
management of the city represents a major task. Looking at these strategic goals
against the background of the institutional framework previously identified is involved.
Implementation, follow-up, coordination and territorial range exemplify the topics for
discussion with the key officers and figures responsible for urban planning. 
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Control
Enforcing the implementation of strategic decisions and controlling the outcome of
these decisions are important actions within the urban development plans carried
out in the metropolitan area as a follow-up to the management and implementation
of the various urban planning initiatives and actions. This specific function has a
typical metropolitan dimension. The assumption is that coordination efforts are
aggregated when the metropolitan area is covered, or difficult discrepancies arise. 
Transport
For urban transportation, the most important elements of metropolitan action are
planning issues and infrastructure coordination. As with planning, the institutional
component is relevant as a starting place to pinpoint key figures, the origin of
strategies, implementation paths, resources, outcomes and bottlenecks. In this
urban function the analysis of public action starts with an institutional framework
and is followed by a strategy analysis.
Basically, the metropolitan dimensions of these elements required investigation. The
institutional framework of the transport sector could have a profile resembling or
related to the metropolitan area. Alternatively, regardless of this profile, strategies
might be well enough coordinated to respond appropriately to the demands of the
metropolitan region.
Framework
As with planning, the identification of the positions where strategic decisions are
made necessitated an examination of the layout of the institutional framework to
enable further approaches to those positions for interviews and information.
Similarly, the layout of the various administrative levels involved, their
competencies/ responsibilities, their authority and specific functions required
examination.
Strategies/integration
A general assumption is that, because of the amount of capital involved, strategies
involving infrastructure investment in transport are proposed at national or regional
level, with the local level playing a lesser role. The financing of these investments
lies more in the range of national and regional government than local government
authorities, since the scale of the physical networks (roads, railways, canals, ports,
airport) relates to larger territories. However, strategies for traffic management,
public transportation, urban scale infrastructure and connections to national
networks have a less clear-cut function assignment.
The strategies that take into account the metropolitan area require attention,
considering the plans and persons responsible for implementing them. The main
topics for discussion include the metropolitan territory, coordination among the
different actors, the economic impact of the strategies, and the perceived
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bottlenecks. In the absence of such strategies, the assumptions of the research with
respect to the importance of the coordination of transport strategies for metropolitan
areas justify an investigation of the reasons for their absence; thus conversations
with the relevant officials and people were arranged.
Whether components of land use strategies and environmental control (air quality,
for example) are incorporated into the transport strategies is also a relevant issue.
Apart from revealing the coordination of the different sectors involved in the
management of urban functions, it can also indicate a concern that includes the
metropolitan territory as a unit, if not as a unit of action at least as the physical unit
where outcomes take place.
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